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ABSTRACT 
 
Poverty alleviation has become one of the main global agendas of the twenty first 
century, but the identification and targeting of the poor is facing fundamental problems 
due to the lack of required information. We utilize the micro-level estimation technique 
to estimate household expenditure for the census households using Nepalese household 
surveys, and estimate different measures of poverty and inequality at the national level as 
well as at the regional, districts and village levels, and for the different caste/ethnic 
groups.  
Our findings indicate that the reduction in poverty during 1995/96 – 2003/04 is 
not uniform across the villages of Nepal, and the level of poverty actually went up in a 
significant part of the country. The intensity of inequality went up significantly during the 
study period, where enterprise income and remittances contributed the most.  
Using public choice theory of conflict, we test the effect of inequality and poverty 
on the intensity of Nepal’s conflicts due to the Maoist’s People’s War.  We take into 
account the heterogeneity among the districts of Nepal and hierarchical nature of the data 
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by introducing multi-level models. The increased poverty accompanied by the 
accelerating inequality throughout the country has compounded the divide between the 
haves and the have-nots and provided a suitable atmosphere for the conflict. The results 
show that higher inequality and poverty escalate the deadly violence while the presence 
of social network and the government welfare programs reduces it. An economic 
variable, such as employment, however, has no effect on the level of conflict indicating 
that Nepal’s conflict is rooted in the age-old grievances and inequality.  
Finally, we test the implication of the full consumption insurance hypotheses in 
the presence of violent conflict that household consumption should not be affected by the 
idiosyncratic shocks. We find that food consumption suffers the most from the violence 
related shocks. The level of food consumption vulnerability is more pronounced for the 
households with low levels of education and income, but the socially disadvantaged 
caste/ethnicity is not appeared as a significant factor of food-consumption vulnerability.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY AND INEQUALITY MAPPING AND 
VIOLENT CONFLICT IN NEPAL 
1.1 .  Introduction 
Nepal experienced violent political unrest during 1996-2006. Within a decade, 
over 13,000 people have been killed and over 200,000 people have been displaced due to 
the Maoist People’s War (MPW) that started in 1996. In November 21, 2006 the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord 2006 was signed by the rebel insurgents and Nepal 
government that officially ended the MPW. The over a decade long deadly violence has 
raised many questions: why did such high-intensity violent conflict occur in the country 
that is very often referred to as the county of peace loving people who embrace 
heterogeneity and diversity? What are the consequences of it? Is the prospect of 
reoccurrence of such violent conflict over for good? Or, are there still chances of 
reoccurrence of such violent conflicts in the future from one or the other sections of the 
society? Clearly, until and unless the backgrounds and the pre-existing conditions that led 
the conflict are changed permanently such violent conflict might reoccur in the future. 
This research estimates the distributional measures of household expenditure at the 
village level, and utilizes a public choice theory of conflict (e.g., Esteban and Ray 1999, 
Milante 2004) to analyze the causes of the decade long armed conflicts in Nepal, and to 
some extent explore the consequences of it with respect to households’ welfare. 
The social cost of such violent civil unrest is tremendous, including loss of lives, 
abductions, disappearances, and family disintegration.  On the economic front, the short-
run consequences of such violent conflict are increased spending on defense activities 
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and decreased spending in social sectors that puts a strain on the financial viability of the 
welfare state in addition to the destruction of infrastructure, the backbone of economic 
progress.  Evidence from elsewhere (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003) shows that the long-
run cost of violent conflict would be a significant drop in GDP growth over time that may 
be reflected in lower standards of living.  Nepal’s GDP growth supports this finding as it 
was expected to grow just by 2% in 2006/07 contrary to South Asia’s expected growth 
rate of over 7.3%.  Before the start of MPW, Nepal’s GPD growth rate was over 5% 
(Asian Development Bank 2006).  Results from a recent national household survey (CBS 
2005) shows that inequality has gone up significantly compared to 1995/96, the starting 
point of the MPW (CBS 2005). Such an increased inequality coupled with sluggish 
economic growth may lead to further polarization and social clustering thereby 
reinforcing the violent conflict.1 
  
1.2 .  Poverty and Inequality Mapping 
Data deficiency is the major problem while doing social science research related 
to developing countries (DCs). In order to address the data issue, several DCs, on the one 
hand, have been conducting household surveys spending millions of dollars with the help 
of multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank. On the other hand, census data that 
almost all countries collect on their own, has not been utilized to the extent it could be 
used. The data collected from such nationally representative household surveys are used 
extensively to analyze the aggregate household welfare and to estimate other aggregate 
                                                 
1 For detailed discussion of Maoist insurgency in Nepal, see Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 
(2006), and Murshed and Gates (2005). 
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development indicators and those results are widely used while designing various socio-
economic policies.   
While the outcomes of the surveys are very useful in designing socio-economic 
policies at the aggregate (national or regional) levels, by design those surveys are not 
representative at the lower administrative units of the country. In the decentralized 
communities, census data that are used basically to analyze the population dynamics in 
the county can provide details about all households in the given geographical (political) 
units, but generally lack information about household welfares (income or expenditure) 
that can be found in details in the household surveys. This kind of information problem 
can be resolved by linking survey data with census using a statistical methodology called 
the micro-level estimation technique (Elbers et al 2003). Once the welfare indicators of 
census households are estimated, we can use those indicators to estimate levels of 
poverty, inequality, polarization, and other measures of welfares at the village level, the 
lowest administrative unit of Nepal.  
   
1.3 .  A Brief History of Nepal’s Maoist Movement    
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was founded in 1996 after breaking 
away form Samyoukta Jana Morcha (United People’s Front) and Communist Party of 
Nepal (Unity Center) in 1994.  After breaking up, they ran the parallel parties, boycotted 
1994 mid-term election, and finally, in 1996, both break-away factions merged into one 
party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist or CPN (M)). Some of its members such as 
present spokesperson, KB Mahara, were also the elected members of the parliament in 
1991 from the United People’s Front party.  
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 The MPW began on February 13, 1996 with a simultaneous attack on three 
remotely stationed police outposts, a bank branch, a soft-drink bottling plant (owned by 
an American Company), a liquor factory and a private house. This event went unnoticed 
in the beginning as was the case in similar revolutionary movements in other countries.2 
Their strategy was of a guerilla nature – establishing bases in the rural and remote areas 
with the objective of surrounding urban centers in order to seize state power.  They did so 
by eliminating the police outposts and killing local feudal elements and the so called 
informers (school teachers and other local people who opposed the Maoist ideology and 
did not provide food, shelter and did not pay money when they are asked for). In their 
base areas, the Maoist redistributed the captured land from the absentee landlords and 
feudal interests to the locals to farm and use as cooperatives.  What started as an 
insignificant and isolated incident in 1996 has transformed into a devastating conflict 
claiming more than 13,000 lives and displacing over 200,000 people in the next ten years.   
In November 21, 2006 the MPW was formally ended with signing of a historic 
peace deal with Nepal government. Maoist fighters and their arms have been put in 
different cantonments under the supervision of the United Nations, aiming to conduct the 
election to constituent assembly under fearless environment of the Maoist arms.  The 
                                                 
2 For example, in Peru, the Maoist People’s War, also called the Shining Path Movement, 
was begun on May 17, 1980 when a group of Maoist workers burned the ballot boxes and 
voters list during the first ever presidential election after 17 years of juntas rule, in the 
Andean town of Chuschi (Grorriti 1999).  That event went unnoticed in the beginning. 
During two-decade long violent conflict, the MPW in Peru claimed more than 69,000 
lives.   
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Maoists have joined the Interim Government on April 1, 2007. In the mean time, in the 
southern plains of Nepal, two break-away fractions of the Maoist organization, both are 
called Janatantratic Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), have been actively using the same old 
tactics of abductions, killings, intimidations, and all sorts of violent activities that they 
have inherited from the Maoists. They put forth various demands including an 
independent state for the people of Terai origin (a flat belt of fertile plain that runs east to 
west along the Indian border).  In the hills area, several ethnic groups are also raising 
their voices demanding federal structure with the provision of rights to self-
determination. What was started as an ideology based political movement a decade ago 
might well be headed towards a separatist movement. Whether the peace deal translates 
into a lasting peace remains to be seen in the light of increasing frustration among the 
masses about the slow socio-economic transformation of the country and how the 
government and responsible political parties will handle the issues raised by the JTMM, 
and several other indigenous and ethnic groups who are now looking for their identity 
and fair share in Nepali politics.  
 
1.4 .  Violent Conflict in Nepal 
Nepal’s decade old violent conflict has claimed over 13,000 lives and the 
prospects for such conflicts in the future have not been addressed yet. Bohara, Mitchell 
and Nepal (2006) made an initial contribution towards analyzing the causes of the violent 
conflict using district level (sub-national) information. District level analysis, however, 
requires aggregation of village level data to the district level that basically covers up the 
diverse information that we could use for the analysis. The micro-level analysis that uses 
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the village level information can provide better understandings of Nepal conflict. 
Additionally, there are competing theories about the causes of the violent rebellion. Is it 
the inequality in the wealth/income or is it the polarization of the people/communities 
based on the income/wealth distance coupled with the group (ethnic or caste) 
identification that leads to the violent conflict (Esteban and Ray 1994, 1999; Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol 2005)? Once we estimate the household level income/expenditures at 
the micro-level, we can then estimate the measures of inequality as well as the 
polarization indices at the lowest administrative units of the country (villages) and 
investigate the links between the violent conflict and the distributional issues like 
inequality, poverty and polarization.     
 
1.5 .  Introduction to Data and other Information Sources 
In the case of Nepal, there are two sets of nationally representative household 
survey data: Nepal Living Standard Survey 1995/96 (NLSS-I) and Nepal Living Standard 
Survey 2003/04 (NLSS-II). These comparable surveys are Nepal’s version of the World 
Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS). So far, these surveys have been 
used extensively to formulate periodic plans and other government policies. As stated 
earlier, extensive use of household survey data, which are representative at most up to the 
regional level, to formulate village level plans and policies may not provide reliable 
information. After the restoration of the dissolved parliament in April 2006, Nepal has 
been striving to restructure the political landscape into federal system. This kind of 
restructuring requires massive amounts of reliable information of all administrative units. 
One way to derive the essential information is to utilize the micro-level estimation 
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technique that links nationally representative small but information rich household survey 
with large data set like census data. 
 In this research, an attempt is made to estimate the income as well as expenditure 
of all households covered in the census. The usefulness of such a detailed account of 
income and expenditure of all households in the country is extensive. Here we use such 
information to estimate village level poverty, polarization, inequality and average 
income/expenditure all over the country. This research effort is the first of its kind using 
Nepal data. The estimated micro-level distributional information is mapped using GIS 
technology that makes the results visually more accessible to wider audiences and thus 
expands the applicability of the research outcomes across the villages of Nepal.   
 
1.6 . Hypotheses 
This research builds upon the public choice theory of conflicts (Chapter 3) and 
consumption insurance hypothesis (Chapter 4). We test two different sets of hypotheses 
that are given below:  
 The intensity of violent conflict is positively associated with degree of inequality 
and polarization.  
 Social capital helps to reduce the violent conflict. 
 Government transfers helps to lower the incidence of violence conflict.  
 Higher level of poverty exacerbates violent conflict.  
 The effect of aggregate shock(s) on household’s consumption is proportional 
(one-to-one) if households pool their resources and insure each other for 
unforeseen shocks within an insurance community.  
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 There is no effect of idiosyncratic shocks to growth rate of the per capita 
household consumption if households pool their resources and insure each other 
within a given insurance community.    
The first four hypotheses are generated from the public choice theory of conflict in the 
presence of inequality and polarization. The remaining hypotheses are generated from the 
theory of full consumption insurance where households within a given insurance 
community collectively maximize their time separable state dependent utility functions 
given the resource constraint. 
  
1.7. Major Contribution 
 The major contributions of this research are as follows: 
i) Poverty and Inequality Mapping: Household survey data are now available for several 
countries around the world. One common characteristic of these surveys is that they 
follow the same format of the Living Standard Measurement Survey methodology 
advanced by the World Bank. These data sets provide household and community level 
information regarding household’s demographic, employment, income, expenditures, and 
other information as well as community characteristics where those households reside. 
Now, household surveys are commonly used for generating socio-economic indicators 
and designing socio-economic policies in most of the developing countries around the 
world. The major issue with this practice is that household surveys are small in sample 
size and not representative below regional level. However, communities or villages 
within a region may vary in terms of socio-economic opportunities, infrastructures and 
connectivity to the markets, culture and level of education, and hence income and 
 25
expenditure of households in those communities may vary significantly. Aggregate 
information obtained from household survey may not be relevant to the lower 
geographical units of a country given that these lower levels of geographical units are 
heterogeneous.  
One way of addressing such informational problem is to reconcile census data that 
includes all the households around the country but does not include detailed measures of 
household welfare, and survey data that is rich in welfare related information but small in 
size. This research reconciles information contained in two household surveys and one 
population census for Nepal and estimates poverty and inequality at the national level, as 
well as at the regional, districts, and village levels. Also, we compute these welfare 
indicators for different caste/ethnic groups. This research is first of its kind using Nepal 
data.  
ii) Estimation of Polarization Indices: Second contribution of this paper is the estimation 
of the polarization indices across the villages of Nepal using the idea advanced by 
Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999).  
iii) Analysis of the link between the violent conflict and inequality, poverty, polarization, 
social capital and government transfers: Third contribution of this research is the 
analysis of a relationship between the violent conflict and distributional measures of 
household income/expenditures such as inequality, poverty and polarization as well as the 
government welfare programs and social capital.   
iv) Analysis of the welfare impact of the violent conflict: Another contribution of this 
research is the evaluation of the theory of consumption insurance using Nepal data. 
Several researchers have tested the consumption insurance hypothesis using data from 
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different countries, e.g., US, India, Indonesia, and Russia. In those studies, shocks such 
as, illness, job loss, bad weather, etc., are considered. In our case, we not only use 
negative shocks, such as, intensity of violent conflict in the village of Nepal and natural 
disasters but also use positive shocks, such as, flow of remittances to the households. We 
directly modeled these different shocks and analyze their impact on the household’s 
welfare.    
     
1.8. Organization of the dissertation 
The next three chapters comprise the major body of the research. After a brief 
introduction in Chapter 1, we present an analysis of poverty and inequality at the national 
as well as at the regional, district and village levels across Nepal. This chapter presents 
the technical as well as empirical methods of micro-level estimation that we use to 
estimate the poverty and inequality indices across the country at the different 
political/geographical units. Additionally, we also estimate the poverty and inequality 
indices for different caste/ethnic groups in the country. Chapter 2 also presents the 
decomposition of inequality by expenditure categories and income sources as such 
decompositions provide the necessary information for policy intervention if the degree of 
inequality goes beyond a desirable limit.  
In Chapter 3, we use the public choice theory of conflict to analyze of the 
correlates of the violent conflict in Nepal. We make use of the poverty and inequality 
indices from Chapter 2 and also estimate polarization indices while analyzing the causes 
of the violent conflict. Chapter 4 investigates the consequences of the violent conflict on 
household welfare, especially on household’s consumption.  In this chapter, we first 
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present the theory of full consumption insurance, which generally implies that household 
consumption should be insulated from the idiosyncratic shocks and it should only 
respond to the aggregate shocks to the households. Some of the variables estimated in 
Chapter 2 are used in Chapter 4. We specifically use the estimated household’s 
consumption from micro-level estimates to calculate the village level aggregate 
consumption as the village level consumption that can be obtained from the household 
surveys alone suffers from the small sample property where the individual household 
expenditure may have significant influence on the aggregate expenditure of the village or 
the community. We summarize the overall research and findings in Chapter 5. This 
chapter also summarizes the policy implications of our findings and outlines future 
direction.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 MICRO-LEVEL ESTIMATION AND DECOMPOSITION OF POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY IN NEPAL 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Poverty alleviation has become one of the global development agendas of the 
twenty-first century.3  It basically requires identification of the poor and targeting 
programs. For policy and planning purpose, the estimation of the poverty rate at the 
national level is the most prevalent practice in developing countries. However, the 
aggregate estimate of poverty at the national or regional level generally covers up 
important details and does not provide a good account of the distribution of the poor 
across local geographical units that could affect targeting the poor and implementing 
poverty alleviation programs.  Micro-level poverty estimates help to find out who the 
poor are and where they are living.  
Another concern with the poverty reduction is the lack of resources in developing 
countries that hinders implementing the development programs to alleviate poverty. 
Estimates of poverty, inequality and household income/expenditure within the same 
geographical unit may provide a useful guide about the distributional issues, needs and 
priorities of the local communities, and information regarding whether the mobilization 
of the local resources is feasible to finance the programs locally. Mobilization of 
resources at the local level also helps to promote and strengthen the decentralization that 
                                                 
3 Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 is the first Millennium Development 
Goal of the United Nations that was set in 2000 (UN 2006).   
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reduces the dependency of local governments on the central one, and dependency of the 
central government on foreign loans and grants. Local people may feel more responsible 
if they are to utilize their own resources rather than receiving funds from outside. Such a 
sense of association of people may help to raise awareness and lower corruption as well, 
which is considered as a major issue in most of the developing countries as corruption 
engenders poverty (TI 2006).  
Given the scopes of micro-level estimation of poverty and inequality, this chapter 
has two objectives: to estimate the poverty and inequality at the village level, and to 
decompose the inequality based on the sources and the determinants of households 
income/expenditure to provide policy prescriptions. Basically, we estimate village level 
poverty and inequality for the years 1995/96 and 2003/04, and compare the results 
between those two years. We use Nepal Living Standard Surveys 1995/96 and 2003/04 
(NLSS-I and NLSS-II) as a primary data sources. By design, those surveys, however, are 
not representative at the village level. In the case of census data, the issue of sample size 
and selection biases would disappear but census data generally lack welfare measures of 
the households. Therefore, we use the two-step micro-level estimation technique (Elbers, 
Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2003) that provides a framework to link the census data with the 
survey and estimate welfare measures at the village level.  
Though small in size, there is a wider variation in geography, culture, ethnicity 
and economic opportunities across Nepal. It is divided into 75 districts and each district is 
further divided into several Village Development Committees (VDCs).  The official 
poverty and inequality estimates using the household surveys for Nepal (CBS 2005) do 
not go beyond the traditional rural-urban, mountain-hills-terai, and east-central-west-
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midwest-farwest settings that cannot be used to analyze the distributional issues at the 
village level across the country. This research contributes towards filling such gap.  
 Consistent with the official report (CBS 2005), our results show that aggregate 
poverty in Nepal declined from 41.7% to 31.5% between 1995/96 and 2003/04. This is a 
good outcome given that Nepal is facing a decade-long Maoist insurgency and economic 
slow-down. When we analyze the situation with disaggregated data, the results are not 
uniform. Our results show that during the eight-year period, 16 out of 75 districts, and 
about 22% of VDCs (out of 3880 for which we have census information) across the 
country experienced increased poverty.4 In the case of inequality, aggregate Gini 
coefficient went up from 0.382 to 0.427 during the same period (the Atkinson index went 
up from 0.366 to 0.412). But micro-level estimates show that it went down in 9 districts 
and in 34% of VDCs, indicating that inferences drawn from aggregate estimates will not 
be that accurate for designing the public policies in the decentralized communities.  
For the past several years, the caste/ethnic issue has been at the forefront of the 
development agenda in Nepal. Most of the analyses are based on the inter-caste/ethnicity. 
But the analysis of poverty status of different caste/ethnic groups and the income or 
expenditure inequality within a given caste/ethnic group is not available for designing 
appropriate policies. The estimation of poverty and inequality at the micro-level and 
within different caste/ethnic groups is the main contribution of this chapter. Such 
inequality and poverty mapping at the district and village levels provides background 
                                                 
4 Total VDCs across the country are over 4000. Due to the on going high intensity 
conflict in Nepal since 1996, some of the VDCs are not included in the census, and some 
VDCs do not have enough observation to be included in the estimation.  
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information for designing economic policies suitable for decentralized communities. 
Also, the estimates of poverty and inequality within different caste/ethnic group may be 
used as a guide while formulating social and economic policies. 
     
2.2. Statistical Method 
 The basic methodology of micro-level estimation (Elbers et al 2003) is a 
technique that links survey with census information and it resembles the small-area 
statistics of Ghosh and Rao (1994). In the recent years, the technique has been used in 
Ecuador, Brazil, South Africa, Panama, Madagascar and Nicaragua (Alderman et al 
2002, Elbers et al 2003) for mapping poverty. This section summarizes the basic idea of 
the micro-level estimates.5  
Assume that per-capita household expenditure, ych, depends on a vector of 
observable characteristics, Xch, of the household that are present in both survey and 
census data sets. Then the linear approximation of the conditional distribution of ych is 
given by:  
ln (ln | )h h h hy E y X u  = 'ch chX u            [2.1] 
Where, c refers to the sample cluster (level of aggregation of survey and census data) and 
u as a vector of disturbances, ~ (0, )u   .  By nature, the survey data is just a sample of a 
total population, therefore, the residual of [2.1] must contain the location variance to 
allow for a within cluster correlation (spatial autocorrelation) in disturbances as 
ch c chu    , where   is the cluster component and   is household components. They 
are independent of each other and uncorrelated with Xch. Generalized least squares (GLS) 
                                                 
5 For details, see Elbers et al (2003). 
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or Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation of [2.1] using household survey data 
provides the estimates of the complex error structures, ˆchu , that can be decomposed as 
ˆˆch c chu e  . The residual term che  can be used to estimate the following heteroscedatic 
model: 
2ln( /( ) 'ch ch ch che A e Z r                       [2.2] 
where chZ  refers to the vector of household characteristics assumed to be driving the 
heteroscedasticity, and A is the upper bound of 2che .  We will refer [2.1] as ‘Beta’ model 
and [2.2] as ‘Alpha’ model (as in Zhao 2004) for estimation purposes.   
 
2.2.1. Steps in Micro-level Estimation6 
 The process of linking household survey with census data to estimate micro-level 
welfare indicators requires two steps. The first step includes the following (Zhao 2004):  
Step I 
i) estimate the beta model [2.1] using survey data that provides model 
parameters estimates, including the beta vector, an associated variance-
covariance matrix, and parameters describing the distribution of the 
disturbances. 
ii)  calculate the location effect ˆc ,  
iii) calculate the variance estimator 2ˆvar( )n ,  
iv) estimate the alpha model [2.2],  
v) estimate GLS model to generate a variance-covariance matrix,  
                                                 
6 Zhao (2004) and Elbers et al (2003) provide details of the estimation process.  
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vi) generate a vector of normally distributed random variable, and  
vii) read the census data that follows the simulation.  
Step II  
In the second step, we estimate the following model and generate    
household level welfare measures using bootstrap simulation 
ln ' chcch chy X              [2.3] 
where )ˆ,ˆ(~~  N , c~  and ch~  are random variables (could be 
normally distributed or t-distributed).7 This specification allows spatial 
autocorrelation for the households in the given community and for the 
heteroscedasticity in household component of the disturbances. After 
simulating for chy~ln , we compute several poverty and inequality measures 
that are discussed below.  
 
2.2.2. FGT Class of Poverty Indices 
In poverty analysis, how any measure of poverty relates sub-group poverty to 
total poverty is an important issue, also called additive property. It is because in poverty 
analysis, all else being equal, one would expect to know a subgroup’s contribution to 
total poverty and that a decrease in poverty level of one subgroup should lead to reduce 
over all poverty (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 1984).  Sen (1976) proposes two axioms 
that any poverty measure must fulfill: i) Monotonicity Axiom that a reduction in income 
of a person below the poverty line must increase the poverty measure, and ii) Transfer 
                                                 
7 The variance structure of these errors is given in Elbers et al. (2003). 
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Axiom that a pure transfer of income from a person below the poverty line to anyone who 
is richer must increase the poverty measure, ceteris paribus. Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984) demonstrate that the following poverty measure (also called FGT poverty 
measure) allows a quantitative as well as qualitative assessment of the effect of change in 
subgroup poverty on total poverty.  
1( ) (1 )
v
h
h
h H
yFGT m
N z


   for hy z         [2.4] 
where 0z   is a predetermined poverty line defined in per capita expenditure terms, 
0   is the poverty sensitivity parameter, Hv is the number of households, mh is the 
household size in the case of census (household weight in the case of large survey), and 
hN m is the number of individuals in village v.  We compute FGT measure of 
poverty that (i) is additively decomposable with population-share weights, (ii) satisfies 
the basic properties proposed by Sen (1976), and (iii) is justified by a relative deprivation 
concept of poverty. The FGT(0) index is called the head count index that represents the 
proportion of a population that is in poverty, and the index FGT(1) is called the poverty 
gap that indicates an average shortfall of income from the poverty line, also known as the 
depth of poverty.      
   
2.2.3. Inequality Measures 
Several distributional measures that satisfy the principle of transfer are in use for 
empirical analysis of inequality. The transfer principle, originally proposed by Dalton 
(1920) states that social welfare will be increased (inequality will be decreased) by any 
arbitrary transfer of t from a richer to a poorer person, provided that the transfer does not 
change the relative positions of the rich and the poor. Dalton indicates that more 
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equitable distribution of income is desirable than more unequal distribution (p. 349). 
Social welfare functions are usually preferred to more equal distributions to less equal 
ones (Deaton 2000, p. 135). In that sense, measuring inequality itself is an important part 
of welfare analysis. Some of the standard measures of inequality that are consistent with 
the principle of transfer and social welfare function are Atkinson Inequality Index, 
Generalized Entropy Index, and Gini Coefficient (Deaton 2000, ). We calculate these 
three classes of inequality measures as described below. 
 
2.2.3.1. Atkinson Inequality Index 
 The Atkinson Inequality Index represents the cumulative deviation of the actual 
expenditure (income) distribution from the equally distributed equivalent expenditure 
(income) (Fields 1979), and is given by the following expression:  
1 1
(1 ) 1
0
1
0
( ( ) )
1 , 1
( )
exp( ln( ( )) )
1 , 1
y p dp
A
y p dp
 


      


           [2.5] 
where α is the Atkinson parameter of relative inequality aversion, and μ is the mean 
expenditure. There would be no perceived inequality if 0   as the marginal social 
utility is constant at this value of  ; a situation where an increase in income of poor 
people by a certain amount has the same social welfare impact as an equal increase in 
income of the non-poor people. To avoid such neutrality, we use 0   that indicates an 
increase in poor people’s income is more desirable than that of the non-poor. This index 
is often criticized on the ground that the inequality aversion parameter depends on the 
value judgment of the researchers (Fields 1979).   
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2.2.3.2. Generalized Entropy Index 
Generalized Entropy (GE) Index is an alternative to Atkinson Inequality Index. 
This index has a property that an index derived from it can be interpreted as a measure of 
the distance between the distribution of the expenditure (income) and the distribution in 
which every economic unit spends (receives) the mean expenditure (income) μ (Cowell 
and Victoria-Feser 1996). The GE Index is given by the following expression:      
1
0
1 ( )( ) 1
( 1)
y pGE dp

   
               , if θ ≠ 0, 1          [2.6] 
where ( , )     represents the weights given to distance between the incomes at 
different parts of the distribution. For empirical purpose,   = [0, 1, 2], where   = 0 
indicates more weights to the lower tail of the distribution, and 
1
0
(0) ln( )
( )
GE dp
y p
  , 
which is the mean logarithmic deviation (average deviation between the log of the mean 
income and the log of incomes. The GE index for   = 1 applies equal weights across the 
distribution, and  
1
0
( )(1) ln( )
( )
y pGE dp
y p

  , which is also called the Theil index of 
inequality. If every one has the same (mean) income, then GE(1) = 0, and if one person 
has all the income, then GE(1) = ln(N). 
0
( )
p
y q dq  sums to the expenditure (income) of the 
bottom p proportion of the population. When   = 2, the GE measure gives relatively 
more weights to the upper tail gaps, and it is equivalent to the half of the squared 
coefficient of variation.  
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2.2.3.3. Gini Coefficient 
Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of relative inequality given its 
relation with the Lorenz curve. The social welfare function associated with the Gini 
coefficient assigns weight to the individual income based on the relative position of the 
individuals in the distribution. In this case, the income of the poor gets more weights than 
the non-poor ones.8 Let hy  denote the per capita consumption expenditure of household h 
in the given village. Then the Gini index for the village is given by (Deaton 2000, p. 
139):  
  1 | |
( 1) i ji j j
GINI y y
N N        [2.7] 
where   is the average expenditure, N is sample size,  | |i jy y  is the absolute deviation 
of expenditure between a pair of households. An alternative, but related formulation of 
the Gini index is given by (Deaton 2000, p.139):  
 
1
1 2
1 ( 1)
N
i i
i
NGINI y
N N N
 
         [2.7a] 
where i  is the rank of individual i in the y-distribution, counting from top so that the 
richest has the rank 1. For computational purposes, we use [2.7a].  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Such a weighting scheme involves value judgments as in the case of Atkinson index.  
Therefore, despite the known sampling distribution of the Gini coefficient, it is not 
dispute free measure of inequality measure (Thistle 1990).  
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2.2.4. Inequality Decomposition 
The inequality itself may or may not have much importance while designing the 
public policies. Common belief is that a moderate degree of inequality may be desirable 
for economic growth, and trying to even-out inequality may provide disincentive effects 
to work and invest thereby leading towards slower growth. Feldstein (1998) argues that if 
we accept the Pareto principle as a basis of economic analysis that a change is good if it 
makes someone better off without making anyone else worse off, then inequality should 
not be considered as a problem. Another line of argument (Alesina and Angeletos 2005, 
Bowles and Gintis 2002) is that whether inequality is a problem depends on the social 
belief about what determines income. In a society where people believe that individual 
effort determines income or wealth, inequality does not appear to be a problem. But in 
Nepalese society where people believe that corruption, connection, birth, or luck 
determines income or wealth (Bista 1991), inequality appears to be a social problem. 
Empirical evidence shows that inequality contributes significantly towards conflicts and 
violence (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 2002, Kelly 2000, Wang et al 1993). As we 
can see in Chapter 3, the village level expenditure inequality has significant effect on the 
violent conflict in Nepal. Using a general equilibrium model as well as an empirical test, 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) show that inequality is harmful for growth.  
The following sub-section presents methodology for decomposing inequality by 
the factor components as well as the income sources. Such decomposition provides the 
contribution of different factors or sources in the total inequality that can be used to 
design a public policy so that inequality can be reduced if it goes beyond an acceptable 
range. 
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2.2.4.1. Decomposition by Factor Components 
Knowledge about the determinants of the inequality can be used to design 
appropriate policies if inequality goes beyond a desirable limit. The desirable limit may 
not be a fixed number and it may depend on the perception of the citizens towards what 
determines income, wealth and employment as discussed in previous sub-section. 
Inequality decomposition by factor components is proposed by Fields (2002) using 
regression based analysis that was proposed earlier by Shorrocks (1984). The 
determinants of household expenditure are termed as factor components in this case. 
Shorrocks also provides the axiomatic decomposition of inequality by income sources.  
The following paragraphs summarize the method for the decomposition of expenditure 
inequality proposed by Fields (2002).  
Assume that ln 'y X u   is the expenditure function where, y is the household 
expenditure, X is the vector of determinants of the household expenditure, and u is the 
normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance. The expenditure 
share of jth factor is given by  
2 ( ) ( , ln )cov( , ln ) / (ln )
(ln )
j j j
j j j
X X y
s X y y
y
    
               [2.8] 
 where σ is the standard deviation and ρ is the correlation coefficient. This decomposition 
is independent of the inequality measures as we get the same percentage effect for the jth 
factor for a broad class of inequality measures applied to the log of the household 
expenditure (Fields 2002).    
 There is a serious concern that Nepal inequality index has gone up from 0.34 to 
0.42 between 1995/96 and 2003/04 (CBS 2005). Our goal, therefore, is not only to 
estimate the factor weights but also estimate the factor contribution for the change in the 
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inequality during the 1995/96 and 2003/04 so that these results can be used for designing 
economic policies that address the distributional issues. The contribution of the jth factor 
to the change in inequality between period t and period (t+1) for an arbitrary inequality 
measure I(.) is given by (Fields 2002):  
, 1 1 , 1( (.)) [ (.) (.) ] /[ (.) (.) ]j j t t j t t t tI s I s I I I                       [2.9] 
where ( (.)) 1j
j
I  , that the sum of the factor contribution to the change in inequality 
is 100%. Here the contribution of the jth factor depends on the measures of inequality 
used for analysis.  
 
2.2.4.2. Decomposition by Income Sources 
An alternative way to look into the sources of inequality that can be used to 
analyze the distributional impact of economic policies is to calculate the marginal 
contribution of various income sources to the given inequality measure. Following Pyatt, 
Chen and Fei (1980), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), and Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) 
we write the Gini coefficient (G) as a function of the covariance between household 
income, y, and its cumulative distribution, F(y), as 
G =  2 [ , ( )]i iCov y F y
y
 = 1
2 [ , ( )]K k ik Cov y F y
y
 = 
1
K
k k kk
R G S   [2.10] 
  where 
1
K
i ikk
y y  is the incomes that household i gets from K different sources, y  is 
the mean income, Rk is the correlation coefficient between yk and yi, also called the Gini 
correlation, Gk is the Gini index corresponding to income component k, and Sk is the 
share of component k in total income. One important advantage of the given 
decomposition by income source is its use in examining the marginal effect of an income 
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source on overall inequality, that is given by ( )k k kG S R G Ge
   , where e is the small 
percentage change in income from source k. The marginal effect of income source k 
relative to overall G is given by the source’s inequality contribution as a percentage of 
the overall Gini minus the source’s share of total income, i.e., 
 k k k k
S G RG e S
G G
                 [2.11] 
When the inequality goes beyond a certain acceptable limit,9 the government can design 
an appropriate fiscal (tax-transfers) policy to address the issue by utilizing such results.  
 
 2.3. The Data 
The data for this analysis are drawn from various sources.  The major sources are 
the Nepal Living Standard Survey 1995/96 (NLSS-I), Nepal Living Standard Survey 
2002/03 (NLSS-II), and the Nepal Population Census (2001). The NLSS-I and NLSS-II 
are the Nepal version of the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
that consists of nationally representative household survey responses to questions 
covering different aspects of household welfare.  The survey is the outcome of a joint 
                                                 
9 There is no fixed or given size that indicates an acceptable limit of inequality in a given 
country. It is a matter of empirical investigation and may well depend on the general 
notion about what determines income and how opportunities are distributed for general 
public in a given society. If human capital or acquired skills do not determine economic 
opportunities or income but the birth, connection or luck does so, then the threat level of 
inequality may be lower than the case where human capital plays key role in determining 
opportunities and income.    
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project of the Central Bureau of Statistics (Nepal) and the World Bank.  In the NLSS-I, 
the full data set consists of a national sample of 3373 households (rural and urban). The 
households were selected from 274 sampling units around the country, called wards, 
based on a Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling plan.  In NLSS-II, the sample 
size is 3912 households from 334 sampling units around the country. In both surveys, a 
two-stage stratified sampling procedure was used.  The household survey responses 
include the detail account of income and expenditures at the household level, along with 
extensive socio-economic and demographic characteristics of household.  
 The third source of the data is the Nepal Population Census 2001 conducted by 
Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). For the first time CBS administrated two types 
of forms, complete enumeration and sample enumeration, simultaneously, to collect 
census information.  The sample enumeration was intended to collect comprehensive 
information that is generally not included in the complete enumeration due to resource 
constraints.10  For the sample enumeration, systematic sampling was used that included 
one-in-eight housing units in each enumeration area meaning that the sample size for 
sample enumeration is about 12.5% of the complete enumeration that comprises 520,624 
households throughout Nepal.  
                                                 
10 The sample enumeration basically collected the information related to housing, 
utilities, land ownership, education, employment, occupation, economic activities, etc, 
along with the usual demographic information.    
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 Nepal is divided into 75 administrative districts and each district is further divided 
into several village development committees (VDC).11  Altogether, there are over 4000 
VDCs (or simply ‘villages’).  This research focuses on estimating the poverty and the 
inequality at the lower administrative divisions (villages) in Nepal. Sample surveys like 
NLSS-I and NLSS-II that contain detailed information about household income or 
expenditures can be used to calculate distributional measures, but such survey 
information is not representative at the village level due to the small sample.  On the 
other hand, sample enumeration in the census that covers significant number of 
households around the country does not collect detailed accounts of household income 
and expenditures.  Without the detailed accounts of household income and expenditures, 
the computation of inequality and poverty at the village level is not possible. To 
overcome such a data deficiency, we utilize both household surveys and sample 
enumeration of census using the recently developed micro-level estimation technique 
(Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2003), which was developed from the small area statistics 
(Ghosh and Rao 1994).  
 
2.4. Empirical Estimates of Poverty Indicators 
2.4.1. Comparing Basic Statistics in Surveys and Census Data 
The starting point of micro-level estimation is preparing a set of the common 
variables that are defined and measured in the same way in both household surveys and 
the population census. The survey data is collected in 1996 and the census data is 
                                                 
11 For our purpose, we treat all types of municipalities like VDCs, and call them villages 
for simplicity. 
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collected in 2001, giving five-year or so gap between those two data sets. Table 2.1 
presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis from the household 
surveys and the census data.  The table shows that descriptive statistics across the data 
sets are fairly comparable after allowing for the natural change in some of the variables 
like literacy rates, and economic activities. For example, the literacy rate of the household 
head was 38.1% in 1996, and that went up to 48.7% in 2001 and 52% in 2004.  
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions and Basic Statistics  
Variable 
 
 
Definition 
NLSS 1995/96 NLSS 2003/04 Census 2001 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
AGEHEAD Age of HH Head 44.698 14.403 45.488 14.226 43.350 14.364 
BAHUNCHHETRI 1 if upper caste (Bahun or Chhetri), else 0 0.341 0.474 0.299 0.458 0.337 0.473 
LITERACY 1 if HH head can write, else 0 0.381 0.478 0.520 0.500 0.487 0.500 
CENTRAL 1 if region is central, else 0 0.391 0.488 0.383 0.486 0.331 0.470 
DAKASA 1 if lower caste (Damai, Kami, or Sarki), else 0 0.077 0.267 0.078 0.268 0.069 0.253 
EASTERN 1 if region is eastern, else 0 0.213 0.409 0.230 0.421 0.217 0.412 
EDUCATION HH head’s years of schooling 3.732 4.175 3.257 4.393 3.468 5.101 
FARMER 1 if  HH head is farmer, else 0 0.509 0.485 0.432 0.323 0.476 0.499 
FULEWOOD 1 if household uses fuelwood for energy, else 0 0.629 0.483 0.647 0.478 0.645 0.478 
FWESTERN 1 if region is far-western, else 0 0.104 0.306 0.071 0.256 0.096 0.295 
HHAGE Average age of all household members 25.703 10.599 27.092 11.781 26.505 11.959 
HHEDU Household average year’s of schooling  3.802 4.139 4.606 4.002 4.618 3.885 
HHFARMER 
% of household members employed in 
agriculture 0.516 0.310 0.323 0.196 0.241 0.272 
HHMONTHWORK Household’s average months of employment 7.997 2.969 8.359 1.922 5.275 3.229 
HHSIZE Average household size 5.590 2.768 5.504 2.639 4.962 2.453 
HHLETERACY % of all household member who can write 0.396 0.337 0.518 0.344 0.463 0.333 
HINDU 1 if household religion is Hindu, else 0 0.828 0.377 0.816 0.388 0.821 0.383 
ELECTRICITY 1 if household uses electricity, else 0 0.259 0.438 0.446 0.497 0.423 0.494 
MALE 1 if household head is male, else 0 0.865 0.342 0.807 0.395 0.841 0.365 
MARRIED 1 if household head is married, else 0 0.850 0.357 0.855 0.352 0.904 0.294 
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MOUNTAIN 1 if Mountain region, else 0 0.121 0.326 0.098 0.298 0.095 0.293 
NEWARI 1 if mother tongue is Newari, else 0 0.042 0.200 0.067 0.250 0.055 0.227 
OWNHOUSE 1 if household owns a house, else 0 0.876 0.329 0.887 0.316 0.780 0.414 
OWNLAND 1 if the household owns land, else 0 0.760 0.427 0.726 0.446 0.654 0.476 
PERMANENTHOUSE 
1 if the household owns a house with 
brick/concrete, else 0  0.172 0.378 0.239 0.426 0.411 0.492 
RURAL 1 if rural area, else 0 0.788 0.409 0.623 0.485 0.588 0.492 
SEMIPERMANENT 
1 if household owns a house with semi-
permanent structure, else 0 0.719 0.450 0.414 0.165 0.274 0.446 
TAMAGURALI 
1 if Tamang, Magar, Gurung, Rai, or Limbu, 
else 0 0.161 0.368 0.204 0.403 0.187 0.390 
TERAI 1 if Terai region, else 0 0.363 0.481 0.417 0.493 0.467 0.499 
TERAICASTE 1 if Low caste from Terai, else 0 0.085 0.279 0.079 0.269 0.080 0.271 
TOILETFLUSH 1 if the household owns flush toilet, else 0 0.161 0.368 0.291 0.454 0.238 0.426 
TV 1 if the household owns a TV, else 0 0.137 0.344 0.118 0.322 0.224 0.417 
WATERPIPED 1 if the household uses piped water, else 0 0.424 0.494 0.498 0.500 0.531 0.499 
WATERWELL 1 if the household uses well-water, else 0 0.377 0.485 0.368 0.482 0.367 0.482 
WESTERN 1 if western region, else 0 0.185 0.388 0.199 0.400 0.215 0.411 
 
Sources:  
1. Nepal Living Standard Survey 1995/96, Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal. 
2. Nepal Living Standard Survey 2003/04, Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal.  
3. Population Census 2001, Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal.  
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 Table 2.2 displays the official estimates (CBS 2005) of the aggregate welfare 
indicators using the Nepal Living Standard Surveys (NLSS-I & NLSS-II). It also 
provides the same welfare indicators obtained from the micro-level estimation 
technique.12 As we can see in table 2, the official estimates of the nominal per capita 
expenditures, head count ratios, poverty gaps, and Gini indices estimated from NLSS-I 
and NLSS-II, and the micro-level estimates that we get by combining survey data with 
the census are very close to each other. Such comparable aggregate estimates provide 
reasonable justification for using micro-level estimation technique to get the village level 
estimates of those welfare indicators. 
Table 2.2: Comparison of Basic Welfare Indicators from NLSS-I & II, and Micro-level 
Estimation 
Welfare Indicators 
 
1995/96 2003/04 
NLSS-I 
Micro-Level 
Estimates  NLSS-II 
Micro-Level 
Estimates 
Per Capita HH Expenditure (Rs) 
 
6802 
 
6828 
(181) 
15848 
 
15836 
(437) 
Head Count (%)1 
 
41.76 
 
41.70 
(0.018) 
30.85 
 
31.5 
(0.014) 
Poverty Gap (%)2 
 
11.75 
 
13.30 
(0.009) 
7.55 
 
8.80 
(0.006) 
Gini Coefficient 
 
0.367 
 
0.385 
(0.01) 
0.41 
 
0.427 
(0.011) 
Notes:  
The figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the imputed values.  
1 Percentage of households below the poverty line.  
2 Poverty Gap measures the amount of income relative to the poverty line that has 
to be transferred to the poor families to bring their incomes up to the poverty 
threshold. It is sometimes called the depth of the poverty (how severe is the 
poverty problem).
                                                 
12 The first-stage GLS estimates (equation [2.1]) and the estimates for the heteroscedastic 
model (equation [2.2]) that are required in order to get the bootstrap simulation for the 
micro-level estimates are presented in Appendix 2A (Table 2A.1 and Table 2A.2).  
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2.4.2. Poverty among Caste/Ethnic Groups 
One of the main social issues in Nepal is the probable social discrimination based 
on caste/ethnicity. In Table 2.3, we present the household per capita expenditures, and 
poverty estimates at the regional, rural-urban level as well as among different caste/ethnic 
groups in Nepal. At the aggregate level, the head-count ratio has gone down across the 
board. The reduction is significant in all regions except in the case of the eastern region. 
The poverty gap also follows the same trend.  Those drops are significant in most of the 
cases. In the case of caste/ethnic groups, one notable point is that among the Tamang, 
Magar, Gurung, Rai and Limbu (TAMAGURALI, also called janajaties) who comprise 
about 19% of the total population and living primarily in the hilly areas, the drop in 
poverty and the poverty gap is insignificant.  The poverty rate as well as the poverty gap 
among all the caste/ethnic groups (62% of total population) is above the national average 
except in Bahun-Chhetri (34% of total population with 20.6% poverty rate in 2003/04) 
and Newar (7.5% of total population with 11.7% poverty rate in 2003/04),. Among the 
higher caste/ethnic groups, the poverty rate is lower than the national average of 31.5%. 
The poverty rate among the lower castes/ethnic groups such as Damai, Kami, Sarki, 
Muslims (43.1%) is not only higher than the current national average (31.5%) but also 
higher than the national average in 1996/96 (41.7%), indicating that there is a high 
economic disparity between the upper and lower castes/ethnic groups in Nepal. 
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Table 2.3: Regional, Rural-Urban, Caste/Ethnic Per-Capita HH Expenditures, Head Count Ratios, and Poverty Gaps in 
Nepal 
 
Region/Ethnicity 
Per Cap HH Expenditure Head Count Ratio Poverty Gap 
1995/96 2003/04 % Change 1995/96 2003/04 % Change 1995/96 2003/04 % Change  
 
Regions EASTERN 
6749 
(3) 
13861 
(3) 
105** 
(2.40) 
0.365 
(4) 
0.361 
(2) 
-1.10 
(0.12) 
0.102 
(4) 
0.103 
(2) 
0.98 
(0.08) 
CENTRAL 
8232 
(1) 
19247 
(1) 
134*** 
(13.20) 
0.339 
(5) 
0.283 
(4) 
-16.52*** 
(2.12) 
0.102 
(4) 
0.080 
(4) 
-21.57* 
(1.89) 
WESTERN 
7029 
(2) 
16502 
(2) 
135*** 
(13.01) 
0.371 
(3) 
0.249 
(5) 
-32.88*** 
(3.52) 
0.112 
(3) 
0.065 
(5) 
-41.96*** 
(3.18) 
MIDWEST  
4402 
(5) 
11898 
(5) 
170*** 
(15.17) 
0.647 
(1) 
0.396 
(1) 
-38.79*** 
(6.02) 
0.236 
(1) 
0.112 
(1) 
-52.54*** 
(5.32) 
FARWEST 
4502 
(4) 
12670 
(4) 
181*** 
(10.31) 
0.630 
(2) 
0.355 
(3) 
-43.65*** 
(5.48) 
0.233 
(2) 
0.100 
(3) 
-57.08*** 
(4.87) 
 
Ecological  
Belts 
MOUNTAIN 
6315 
(2) 
13552 
(3) 
115*** 
(11.25) 
0.398 
(2) 
0.281 
(2) 
-29.40*** 
(3.05) 
0.120 
(2) 
0.073 
(3) 
-39.17*** 
(3.08) 
HILLS 
8003 
(1) 
17950 
(1) 
124*** 
(17.40) 
0.332 
(3) 
0.277 
(3) 
-16.57** 
(2.11) 
0.099 
(3) 
0.076 
(2) 
-23.23** 
(2.23) 
TERAI 
5827 
(3) 
14150 
(2) 
143*** 
(18.14) 
0.496 
(1) 
0.353 
(1) 
-28.83*** 
(4.92) 
0.166 
(1) 
0.102 
(1) 
-38.55*** 
(4.44) 
 
Rural-Urban RURAL 
5868 
(2) 
12894 
(2) 
120*** 
(20.59) 
0.461 
(1) 
0.349 
(1) 
-24.30*** 
(4.34) 
0.148 
(1) 
0.098 
(1) 
-33.78*** 
(4.29) 
URBAN 
12795 
(1) 
33911 
(1) 
165*** 
(13.55) 
0.138 
(2) 
0.103 
(2) 
-25.36* 
(1.91) 
0.041 
(2) 
0.029 
(2) 
-29.27* 
(1.79) 
 
Caste/Ethnicity BAHUNCHHETRI
8014 
(2) 
19111 
(2) 
138*** 
(17.36) 
0.324 
(6) 
0.206 
(6) 
-36.42*** 
(5.13) 
0.097 
(6) 
0.052 
(6) 
-46.39*** 
(5.03) 
TAMAGURALI 
6757 
(3) 
13127 
(4) 
94*** 
(13.77) 
0.374 
(5) 
0.368 
(4) 
-1.60 
(0.21) 
0.109 
(5) 
0.104 
(4) 
-4.59 
(0.41) 
DAKASA 
4976 
(7) 
11391 
(7) 
129*** 
(14.57) 
0.569 
(1) 
0.431 
(1) 
-24.25*** 
(3.73) 
0.200 
(1) 
0.127 
(2) 
-36.50*** 
(3.70) 
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TERAICASTE 
5109 
(6) 
11918 
(6) 
133*** 
(14.39) 
0.553 
(2) 
0.404 
(3) 
-26.94*** 
(3.76) 
0.192 
(2) 
0.117 
(3) 
-39.06*** 
(3.86) 
NEWAR 
11850 
(1) 
31727 
(1) 
168*** 
(9.75) 
0.156 
(7) 
0.117 
(7) 
-25.00** 
(2.08) 
0.042 
(7) 
0.030 
(7) 
-28.57* 
(1.79) 
MUSLIM 
5294 
(5) 
12304 
(5) 
132*** 
(9.66) 
0.550 
(3) 
0.430 
(2) 
-21.82*** 
(3.30) 
0.188 
(3) 
0.131 
(1) 
-30.32*** 
(3.02) 
OTHER 
5765 
(4) 
13821 
(3) 
140*** 
(8.08) 
0.500 
(4) 
0.360 
(5) 
-28.00** 
(4.76) 
0.163 
(4) 
0.103 
(5) 
-36.81*** 
(4.06) 
 
Total NEPAL  
6828 
 
15836 
 
132*** 
(19.04) 
0.417 
 
0.315 
 
-24.46*** 
(4.47) 
0.133 
 
0.088 
 
-33.83*** 
(4.16) 
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2.4.3. Regional Poverty 
Table 2.4 shows the head-count ratio and the poverty gap in 15 different regions 
across Nepal.  The regional disaggregation of the poverty shows that the poverty has not 
gone down everywhere as reported in the official documents (CBS 2005), and the 
reduction is not significant in several regions, indicating that aggregate poverty estimates 
do not provide enough information for lower level geographical targeting. In the Eastern 
Mountain (MEAST), Eastern Hill (HEAST), and the Central Hill (HCENTRAL) regions, 
both the head-count ratio and the poverty-gap have gone up, and that increase is 
significant in the Eastern Hill region. Though the rates are lower, the changes are 
insignificant in the case of the Central Mountain (MCENTRAL), Western Mountain 
(MWEST), and the Eastern Terai (TEAST) regions.  What we find is that the poverty rate 
and the poverty gap either went up or did not change significantly in the Eastern region 
(Mountain, Hills and Terai), most of the Central region (Mountain and Hills) and the 
Western mountain region. Those six regions (out of 15) comprise over 41% of total 
population in the country suggesting that the official estimate of the aggregate poverty 
measures does not provide detail account of the distribution across the regions.   
 52
Table 2.4: Per Capita Household Expenditure, Headcount Ratio, and Poverty Gap in 15 Regions, 1995/96 and 2003/04 
 Per Cap HH Expenditure Head Count Ratio Poverty Gap 
DIST 1995/96 2003/04 % Change 1995/96 2003/04 % Change 1995/96 2003/04 %Change 
MEAST 
6748 
(329) 
12008 
(507) 
77.9*** 
(8.70) 
0.31 
(0.035) 
0.335 
(0.030) 
8.1 
(0.54) 
0.089 
(0.010) 
0.079 
(0.012) 
12.66 
(0.64) 
MCENTRAL 
7731 
(416) 
15219 
(673) 
96.9*** 
(9.46) 
0.262 
(0.031) 
0.234 
(0.025) 
-10.7 
(0.70) 
0.06 
(0.008) 
0.067 
(0.011) 
-10.45 
(0.51) 
MWEST 
7229 
(521) 
15579 
(860) 
115.5*** 
(8.30) 
0.3 
(0.043) 
0.229 
(0.030) 
-23.7 
(1.35) 
0.062 
(0.011) 
0.083 
(0.016) 
-25.30 
(1.08) 
MMWEST 
4298 
(244) 
11349 
(624) 
164.1*** 
(10.52) 
0.65 
(0.041) 
0.385 
(0.041) 
-40.8*** 
(4.57) 
0.105 
(0.015) 
0.224 
(0.024) 
-53.13*** 
(4.20) 
MFWEST 
4839 
(344) 
13610 
(752) 
181.3*** 
(10.61) 
0.564 
(0.050) 
0.249 
(0.033) 
-55.9*** 
(5.26) 
0.062 
(0.010) 
0.191 
(0.028) 
-67.54** 
(4.34) 
HEAST 
6801 
(304) 
11368 
(402) 
67.2*** 
(9.06) 
0.321 
(0.033) 
0.405 
(0.025) 
26.2** 
(2.03) 
0.115 
(0.010) 
0.083 
(0.012) 
38.55** 
(2.05) 
HCENTRAL 
10797 
(543) 
25649 
(1320) 
137.6*** 
(10.41) 
0.196 
(0.020) 
0.199 
(0.012) 
1.5 
(0.13) 
0.054 
(0.004) 
0.052 
(0.007) 
3.85 
(0.25) 
HWEST 
7625 
(370) 
16961 
(683) 
122.4*** 
(12.02) 
0.315 
(0.031) 
0.229 
(0.019) 
-27.3** 
(2.37) 
0.059 
(0.006) 
0.089 
(0.012) 
-33.71** 
(2.24) 
HMWEST 
4509 
(240) 
11124 
(447) 
146.7*** 
(13.04) 
0.621 
(0.037) 
0.407 
(0.032) 
-34.5*** 
(4.37) 
0.114 
(0.012) 
0.214 
(0.022) 
-46.73*** 
(3.99) 
HFWEST 
4983 
(352) 
12331 
(745) 
147.5*** 
(8.92) 
0.547 
(0.050) 
0.325 
(0.038) 
-40.6*** 
(3.53) 
0.088 
(0.013) 
0.184 
(0.026) 
-52.17*** 
(3.30) 
TEAST 
6759 
(281) 
14726 
(624) 
117.9*** 
(11.64) 
0.395 
(0.027) 
0.341 
(0.021) 
-13.7 
(1.58) 
0.098 
(0.009) 
0.115 
(0.012) 
-14.78 
(1.13) 
TCENTRAL 
5932 
(234) 
13913 
(540) 
134.5*** 
(13.56) 
0.479 
(0.032) 
0.367 
(0.021) 
-23.4*** 
(2.93) 
0.107 
(0.009) 
0.151 
(0.016) 
-29.14** 
(2.40) 
TWEST 
6089 
(357) 
15652 
(787) 
157.1*** 
(11.07) 
0.463 
(0.034) 
0.282 
(0.026) 
-39.1*** 
(4.23) 
0.075 
(0.009) 
0.151 
(0.017) 
-50.33*** 
(3.95) 
TMWEST 
4287 
(243) 
12980 
(2470) 
202.8*** 
(3.50) 
0.677 
(0.0320 
0.389 
(0.033) 
-42.5*** 
(6.27) 
0.112 
(0.013) 
0.261 
(0.024) 
-57.09*** 
(5.46) 
TFWEST 
3988 
(246) 
12581 
(1089) 
215.5*** 
(7.70) 
0.721 
(0.032) 
0.421 
(0.044) 
-41.6*** 
(5.51) 
0.125 
(0.019) 
0.289 
(0.026) 
-56.75*** 
(5.09) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in the parentheses. The t-values are in 
parentheses in the % change columns.   
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2.4.4. District-level Poverty  
Beyond the regional level we also estimate several welfare measures at the district 
level. Table 2.5 shows the poverty profile of Nepal’s 75 districts. The district level 
disaggregation of poverty provides a detailed account of the poverty dynamics between 
1995/96 and 2003/04. The head count ratio went up in 16 out of 75 districts, whereas the 
poverty reduction in 13 districts was statistically insignificant. In total, the poverty rate 
either went up or did not change significantly in 29 districts (out of 75). In the case of 
poverty gap, it went up in 19 districts and that increment was significant in 15 districts. In 
most of the cases, both the head-count ratio and the poverty-gap went up in the districts 
located in the eastern and central parts of Nepal. Map 2.1 provides the district level 
poverty rates in 1995/96, Map 2.2 provides the same for 2003/04, and Map 2.3 provides 
the change in district level poverty between 1995/96 and 2003/04. 
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Table 2.5: District level Per Capita Household Expenditure, Head Count Ratio and Poverty Gap, 1995/96 and 2003/04 
DISTRICTS 
Expenditure Head Count Ratio Poverty Gap 
1995/96 2003/04 1995/96 Rank 2003/04 Rank Difference 1995/96 Rank 2003/04 Rank Difference 
KATHMANDU  15419 39827 0.043 1 0.037 1 -0.006 0.009 1 0.009 1 0 
BHAKTAPUR 13447 36404 0.062 2 0.051 2 -0.011 0.014 2 0.013 2 -0.071*** 
LALITPUR 14268 37336 0.076 3 0.07 3 -0.006 0.018 3 0.019 3 0.056*** 
KASKI 12055 30714 0.139 4 0.102 4 -0.037* 0.037 4 0.026 4 -0.297*** 
MANANG 7807 15941 0.229 5 0.196 6 -0.033 0.056 5 0.049 6 -0.125*** 
KAVRE 8708 18626 0.239 6 0.257 18 0.018 0.062 6 0.069 20 0.113*** 
ILAM 7950 13606 0.252 7 0.327 37 0.075* 0.063 7 0.09 37 0.429*** 
DOLAKHA 7933 15999 0.255 8 0.218 10 -0.037 0.064 8 0.055 8 -0.141*** 
CHITAWAN 8823 19489 0.255 9 0.216 9 -0.039 0.069 12 0.056 10 -0.188*** 
NUWAKOT 7929 14360 0.26 10 0.292 28 0.032 0.067 10 0.079 28 0.179*** 
SINDHUPALCHOK 7665 15053 0.261 11 0.229 11 -0.032 0.067 9 0.057 11 -0.149*** 
SOLUKHUMBU 7081 12132 0.277 12 0.322 34 0.045 0.067 11 0.084 30 0.254*** 
TERHATHUM 7179 11601 0.282 13 0.379 51 0.097** 0.071 13 0.105 49 0.479*** 
SYANGJA 7628 16421 0.285 14 0.208 7 -0.077** 0.077 16 0.052 7 -0.325*** 
MYAGDI 7362 14527 0.296 15 0.235 12 -0.061 0.081 18 0.061 12 -0.247*** 
OKHALDHUNGA 6930 10894 0.298 16 0.399 56 0.101** 0.075 14 0.111 54 0.480*** 
TAPLEJUNG 6834 11962 0.303 17 0.344 42 0.041 0.076 15 0.093 40 0.017 
RASUWA 7177 13467 0.306 18 0.311 31 0.005 0.081 19 0.086 34 0.062*** 
DHADING 6989 12420 0.307 19 0.32 33 0.013 0.08 17 0.085 32 0.063*** 
JHAPA 7507 16108 0.311 20 0.278 23 -0.033 0.083 21 0.076 27 -0.084*** 
PARBAT 7118 14980 0.315 21 0.214 8 -0.101** 0.087 24 0.055 9 -0.368*** 
LAMJUNG 7202 15390 0.316 22 0.241 13 -0.075* 0.088 25 0.063 13 -0.284*** 
BHOJPUR 6520 10635 0.322 23 0.418 63 0.096** 0.081 20 0.118 62 0.457*** 
DHANKUTA 6992 12483 0.324 24 0.372 44 0.048 0.084 23 0.103 45 0.226*** 
KHOTANG 6515 10191 0.326 25 0.454 73 0.128*** 0.083 22 0.131 72 0.578*** 
MAKWANPUR 7652 15753 0.333 26 0.337 40 0.004 0.093 28 0.094 41 0.011 
PANCHTHAR 6327 10277 0.341 27 0.434 69 0.093** 0.089 27 0.123 66 0.382*** 
BAGLUNG 6882 14517 0.341 28 0.251 16 -0.090** 0.097 30 0.066 15 -0.320*** 
MUSTANG 6895 15609 0.342 29 0.249 14 -0.093* 0.1 32 0.068 19 -0.320*** 
SANKHUWASABHA 6400 11907 0.343 30 0.337 41 -0.006 0.089 26 0.09 38 0.011 
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MORANG 7421 16598 0.348 31 0.301 30 -0.047 0.098 31 0.086 35 -0.122*** 
RAMECHHAP 6412 11268 0.354 32 0.378 48 0.024 0.094 29 0.104 47 0.106*** 
TANAHU 6991 15497 0.354 33 0.259 20 -0.095** 0.102 35 0.069 21 -0.324*** 
GULMI 6561 13982 0.36 34 0.25 15 -0.110*** 0.102 34 0.064 14 -0.373*** 
PALPA 7040 15702 0.36 35 0.257 19 -0.103*** 0.105 36 0.066 16 -0.371*** 
GORKHA 6486 13713 0.361 36 0.279 25 -0.082* 0.1 33 0.073 25 -0.270*** 
SUNSARI 7348 16273 0.364 37 0.322 35 -0.042 0.107 37 0.094 42 -0.121*** 
UDAYAPUR 6129 11038 0.399 38 0.438 70 0.039 0.112 38 0.128 69 0.143*** 
ARGHAKHANCHI 6163 13617 0.404 39 0.259 21 -0.145*** 0.12 39 0.067 17 -0.442*** 
PARSA 7055 17155 0.409 40 0.298 29 -0.111*** 0.124 40 0.083 29 -0.331*** 
RUPANDEHI 6791 17968 0.42 41 0.251 17 -0.169*** 0.136 41 0.067 18 -0.507*** 
NAWALPARASI 5945 14989 0.454 42 0.278 24 -0.176*** 0.143 44 0.074 26 -0.483*** 
SAPTARI 5753 12590 0.468 43 0.395 55 -0.073* 0.139 43 0.116 59 -0.165*** 
SINDHULI 5477 10387 0.468 44 0.448 71 -0.02 0.138 42 0.13 71 -0.058*** 
DARCHULA 5466 15611 0.477 45 0.176 5 -0.301*** 0.151 45 0.041 5 -0.728*** 
BARA 5594 12789 0.481 46 0.386 53 -0.095** 0.152 46 0.113 56 -0.257*** 
BAITADI 5361 13386 0.492 47 0.27 22 -0.222*** 0.159 48 0.069 22 -0.566*** 
SIRAHA 5305 11095 0.506 48 0.428 67 -0.078* 0.153 47 0.127 67 -0.170*** 
DHANUSA 5621 13844 0.516 49 0.383 52 -0.133*** 0.165 50 0.112 55 -0.321*** 
SARLAHI 5320 12402 0.518 50 0.403 58 -0.115*** 0.164 49 0.12 63 -0.268*** 
DADELDHURA 5096 12628 0.536 51 0.312 32 -0.224*** 0.182 53 0.085 33 -0.533*** 
KAPILBASTU 5199 13180 0.538 52 0.327 38 -0.211*** 0.183 54 0.089 36 -0.514*** 
MAHOTTARI 5151 11936 0.54 53 0.406 60 -0.134*** 0.175 51 0.121 64 -0.309*** 
RAUTAHAT 5042 11948 0.552 54 0.425 66 -0.127*** 0.181 52 0.128 70 -0.293*** 
DOTI 4917 12370 0.558 55 0.336 39 -0.222*** 0.192 55 0.092 39 -0.521*** 
SALYAN 4922 12401 0.582 56 0.362 43 -0.220*** 0.195 56 0.099 43 -0.492*** 
JAJARKOT 4528 10807 0.596 57 0.378 49 -0.218*** 0.198 58 0.102 44 -0.485*** 
JUMLA 4743 13081 0.596 58 0.325 36 -0.271*** 0.197 57 0.084 31 -0.574*** 
BAJHANG 4537 12647 0.604 59 0.285 27 -0.319*** 0.209 61 0.072 24 -0.656*** 
ACHHAM 4527 11050 0.606 60 0.378 50 -0.228*** 0.207 59 0.104 48 -0.498*** 
PYUTHAN 4636 11365 0.607 61 0.399 57 -0.208*** 0.211 63 0.113 57 -0.464*** 
DAILEKH 4510 10658 0.609 62 0.407 61 -0.202*** 0.207 60 0.114 58 -0.449*** 
BAJURA 4532 12689 0.611 63 0.284 26 -0.327*** 0.211 62 0.071 23 -0.664*** 
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BANKE 4755 14243 0.627 64 0.372 45 -0.255*** 0.24 69 0.11 53 -0.542*** 
SURKHET 4617 12799 0.637 65 0.386 54 -0.251*** 0.23 67 0.108 50 -0.530*** 
RUKUM 4287 10364 0.639 66 0.416 62 -0.223*** 0.219 65 0.117 61 -0.466*** 
ROLPA 4294 9835 0.641 67 0.458 74 -0.183*** 0.222 66 0.131 73 -0.410*** 
DOLPA 4250 10452 0.644 68 0.428 68 -0.216*** 0.217 64 0.121 65 -0.442*** 
KANCHANPUR 4418 14168 0.663 69 0.377 47 -0.286*** 0.256 71 0.109 52 -0.574*** 
HUMLA 4084 10472 0.674 70 0.403 59 -0.271*** 0.232 68 0.109 51 -0.530*** 
DANG 4208 12115 0.684 71 0.375 46 -0.309*** 0.259 72 0.103 46 -0.602*** 
MUGU 3989 10329 0.696 72 0.424 65 -0.272*** 0.248 70 0.116 60 -0.532*** 
BARDIYA 3971 11917 0.712 73 0.423 64 -0.289*** 0.281 74 0.127 68 -0.548*** 
KALIKOT 3877 10189 0.718 74 0.459 75 -0.259*** 0.266 73 0.139 75 -0.477*** 
KAILALI 3724 11440 0.756 75 0.448 72 -0.308*** 0.308 75 0.134 74 -0.565*** 
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Map 2.1: District Level of Poverty Rates, 1995/96 
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Map 2.2: District Level Poverty Rates, 2003/04 
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Map 2.3: Change in District Level Poverty Rates, 1995/96- 2003/04 
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2.4.5. Village-level Poverty 
We also compute the village-level head-count ratio and the poverty-gap for all the 
villages across Nepal. Fig. 2.1 displays the change in the village level head-count ratio, 
and fig. 2.2 displays the change in poverty-gap between 1995/96 and 2003/04.13 The head 
count ratio increased in 22% (out of 3880) of the villages, and the poverty gap has 
increased in 23.6% of the villages. The village level trend is similar to district level trend 
in that villages in the eastern and central part of the country experienced worsening 
poverty situation. This trend can be seen in Map 2.4, Map 2.5 and Map 2.6 presented 
below.  
Poverty analysis using the national average statistics indicate the welfare 
improvement among the poor people between 1995/95 and 2003/04, but the disaggregate 
analysis using micro-level estimation shows that the achievement towards reducing 
poverty rate is a mixed-bag during that period. The puzzling aspect of the outcome is that 
the Eastern and Central parts of the country, which otherwise are considered as relatively 
the better-off regions than the mid-west and far-west regions, experienced worsening 
poverty.14    
                                                 
13 The village level poverty indicators are presented in Appendix A.  
14 Our claim is that the Maoist People’s War (MPW) drove adult household members out 
of their home. Some are forced to join the rebel army (voluntarily or otherwise), and 
others voted with their own feet by moving either to urban centers or to foreign countries 
in search of a secure life. It may be the case that in a labor surplus subsistence agrarian 
society like Nepal, the reduction of the labor force may not reduce output, but the per 
capita output/expenditure may go up instead (an application of the principle of 
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Fig 1: Change in Head Count, 1995/6 and 2003/4
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Fig 2: Poverty Gap Difference, 1995/96 and 2003/04
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diminishing marginal productivity). Also some of households receive remittances sent by 
the household members who left the village that help to increase household expenditures. 
We suspect that it may be one of the reason why the western part of the country that is hit 
hard by the insurgency, and also has been considered as the least developed regions, 
experienced higher rate of reduction of the poverty in comparison to the eastern and the 
central regions.    
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Map 2.4: Village Level Poverty, 1996 
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Map 2.5: Village Level Poverty, 2004 
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Map 2.5: Village Level Change in Poverty, 1996-2004 
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2.5. Empirical Estimates of Inequality Indicators 
 A study conducted by Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2005) shows that 
inequality worsened in Nepal between 1995/96 and 2003/04. This section presents the 
estimates of inequality across different regions, districts, and villages of Nepal including 
the inequality between different caste/ethnic groups.   
 
2.5.1. Inequality among Caste/Ethnic Groups 
Table 2.6 shows the estimated expenditure inequality in Nepal during the years 
1995/96 and 2003/04. The inequality measured by the Gini index increased at the 
national level, regional level, rural-urban, and among different caste/ethnic groups. The 
increase in the Gini index is significant in four regions (except in the Eastern region). In 
terms of ecological regions, Hills and Terai regions experienced significant increased in 
the inequality index which is also true in the case of urban areas.  In the case of the 
caste/ethnic groups, the Gini index went up significantly in the case of Bahun-Chhetri, 
Newar, Tamang, Magar, Gurung, Rai and Limbu. In the case of Newar, an ethnic group 
with the highest per capita household expenditure (and income) in the country, the 
inequality went up the most, indicating that inequality increases with the increase in the 
household income.    
The relative position or the inequality ranking of the five regions, three ecological 
belts and rural-urban areas has not been changed between 1995/96 and 2003/04. In the 
case of caste/ethnic groups, there is only one change in the ranking that the Newar and 
Bahun-Chhetri groups changed their respective ranks (from 6th to the 7th position and 
vice-versa). The relative inequality position of other caste/ethnic groups did not change. 
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Table 2.6: Regional, Rural-Urban, and Caste/Ethnic Inequality, 1995/96 and 2003/04 
   1995/96 Rank 2003/04 Rank Diff t-value 
5-Regions MIDWEST  0.323 1 0.353 1 0.03*** 3.75 
 FARWEST 0.33 2 0.357 2 0.027* 1.69 
 WESTERN 0.364 4 0.396 3 0.032*** 2.67 
 EASTERN 0.34 3 0.397 4 0.057 1.10 
 CENTRAL 0.404 5 0.469 5 0.065*** 4.06 
        
Eco-Belts MOUNTAIN 0.333 1 0.334 1 0.001 0.07 
 TERAI 0.367 2 0.406 2 0.039*** 3.55 
 HILLS 0.391 3 0.447 3 0.056*** 5.60 
        
Rural-Urban RURAL 0.343 1 0.358 1 0.015* 1.87 
 URBAN 0.371 2 0.447 2 0.076*** 5.43 
        
Caste/Ethnic Groups DAKASA 0.337 1 0.354 1 0.017* 1.89 
 TERAICASTE 0.342 2 0.359 2 0.017 1.55 
 TAMAGURALI 0.349 3 0.382 3 0.033*** 2.75 
 MUSLIM 0.354 4 0.395 4 0.041* 1.86 
 OTHER 0.361 5 0.401 5 0.04 1.48 
 NEWAR 0.373 6 0.449 7 0.076*** 4.00 
 BAHUNCHETRI 0.386 7 0.422 6 0.036*** 2.77 
        
Total NEPAL  0.385   0.427   0.042*** 3.82 
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2.5.2. Regional Inequality 
The regional inequality among 15 regions is presented in Table 2.7. The 
inequality declined in the Far-West mountain region (MFWEST), but the reduction is 
insignificant. The Central hill region (HCENTRAL) experienced the highest increase in 
the inequality, more than the national average. The inequality is below the national 
average in all other regions. This is basically due to the fact that when inequality is 
computed at the disaggregate levels, it generally goes down as compared to the national 
average.  
Table 2.7: Regional Inequality, 1995/96 and 2003/04 
  1995/96 Rank 2003/04 Rank Diff t-value 
MMWEST 0.292 1 0.319 4 0.027 1.57 
MEAST 0.298 2 0.312 2 0.014 1.16 
HMWEST 0.307 3 0.323 5 0.016 1.19 
MFWEST 0.310 4 0.309 1 -0.001 -0.05 
HEAST 0.311 5 0.335 6 0.024 1.99** 
HFWEST 0.315 6 0.317 3 0.002 0.11 
MWEST 0.322 7 0.353 8 0.031 1.51 
MCENTRAL 0.326 8 0.350 7 0.024 1.46 
TFWEST 0.337 9 0.400 12 0.063 1.85* 
TMWEST 0.341 10 0.385 9 0.044 0.99 
TCENTRAL 0.358 11 0.408 13 0.050 2.81*** 
HWEST 0.359 12 0.393 10 0.034 1.85* 
TEAST 0.361 13 0.414 14 0.053 2.67*** 
TWEST 0.362 14 0.396 11 0.034 1.92* 
HCENTRAL 0.386 15 0.474 15 0.088 4.14*** 
 
2.5.3. District-level inequality 
Table 2.8 displays the district level Gini index in 1995/96 and 2003/04, their Gini 
ranks, and the difference in Gini index between the given years. The inequality in the 
mountain and hilly regions is relatively smaller than the case of terai region. The 
inequality went up significantly in 32 districts (out of 75). There are some instances 
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where inequality went down, but those changes were insignificant. Comparing Table 2.8 
with Table 2.5, we can see that the districts with lower degree of inequality have higher 
head-count ratios and higher poverty gap (the rank correlation between head-count and 
Gini index is -0.29 for 1995/96, and -0.38 for 2003/04) indicating a trade-offs between 
poverty and inequality.  
Table 2.8: The Comparison of the District Level Inequality in Nepal, 1996 and 2003 
 1996 2003 
Diff t-value DIST GINI Rank GINI Rank 
KALIKOT 0.265 1 0.288 5 0.023 1.45 
HUMLA 0.272 2 0.283 2 0.011 0.97 
DOLPA 0.275 3 0.301 12 0.026 1.53 
MUGU 0.280 4 0.289 6 0.009 0.48 
JAJARKOT 0.283 6 0.282 1 -0.001 -0.05 
RUKUM 0.283 5 0.287 4 0.004 0.11 
PANCHTHAR 0.287 7 0.295 7 0.008 0.36 
ROLPA 0.288 9 0.285 3 -0.003 -0.18 
BHOJPUR 0.288 8 0.305 14 0.017 1.34 
KHOTANG 0.292 10 0.305 15 0.013 1.02 
SANKHUWASABHA 0.293 11 0.308 18 0.015 1.01 
DAILEKH 0.296 13 0.297 9 0.001 0.07 
SOLUKHUMBU 0.296 12 0.306 16 0.010 0.88 
ACHHAM 0.297 14 0.295 8 -0.002 -0.12 
TAPLEJUNG 0.299 15 0.316 21 0.017 0.88 
BAJHANG 0.300 17 0.298 10 -0.002 -0.13 
SINDHULI 0.300 16 0.313 19 0.013 0.30 
BAJURA 0.302 20 0.300 11 -0.002 -0.13 
OKHALDHUNGA 0.302 18 0.304 13 0.002 0.06 
MANANG 0.302 19 0.333 32 0.031*** 2.92 
RAMECHHAP 0.303 21 0.307 17 0.004 0.26 
TERHATHUM 0.308 22 0.326 28 0.018 1.02 
JUMLA 0.309 23 0.349 40 0.040** 2.02 
SIRAHA 0.310 24 0.339 34 0.029 0.73 
DARCHULA 0.312 26 0.316 22 0.004 0.18 
UDAYAPUR 0.312 25 0.341 37 0.029 0.53 
DHADING 0.313 27 0.316 23 0.003 0.17 
BAITADI 0.314 29 0.319 25 0.005 0.29 
GORKHA 0.314 28 0.336 33 0.022 1.24 
PYUTHAN 0.317 30 0.327 30 0.010 0.61 
DOTI 0.319 31 0.327 31 0.008 0.31 
ARGHAKHANCHI 0.321 33 0.313 20 -0.008 -0.38 
SINDHUPALCHOK 0.321 32 0.340 35 0.019 0.96 
DADELDHURA 0.322 37 0.317 24 -0.005 -0.20 
GULMI 0.322 35 0.322 26 0.000 0.00 
KAILALI 0.322 36 0.371 51 0.049** 2.45 
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RAUTAHAT 0.322 34 0.376 55 0.054*** 2.94 
KATHMANDU 0.323 38 0.382 58 0.059*** 3.31 
SALYAN 0.324 40 0.345 38 0.021 1.35 
MAHOTTARI 0.324 39 0.362 44 0.038* 1.65 
RASUWA 0.325 43 0.350 41 0.025 0.57 
BARDIYA 0.325 44 0.373 52 0.048** 2.42 
SARLAHI 0.325 41 0.379 56 0.054* 1.87 
BHAKTAPUR 0.325 42 0.396 62 0.071*** 3.94 
PARBAT 0.327 46 0.322 27 -0.005 -0.30 
DHANKUTA 0.327 45 0.362 45 0.035** 2.13 
MYAGDI 0.328 47 0.326 29 -0.002 -0.14 
DANG 0.328 48 0.345 39 0.017 0.82 
BARA 0.329 49 0.380 57 0.051*** 2.77 
MUSTANG 0.330 51 0.367 48 0.037*** 2.60 
SAPTARI 0.330 50 0.385 61 0.055*** 3.35 
BAGLUNG 0.331 54 0.340 36 0.009 0.60 
DOLAKHA 0.331 53 0.363 46 0.032*** 2.25 
ILAM 0.331 52 0.368 50 0.037*** 2.60 
LAMJUNG 0.333 55 0.356 43 0.023 0.90 
NUWAKOT 0.334 56 0.367 49 0.033** 2.32 
KAPILBASTU 0.336 57 0.353 42 0.017 1.00 
SYANGJA 0.337 58 0.363 47 0.026 0.89 
NAWALPARASI 0.341 60 0.374 53 0.033* 1.72 
SURKHET 0.341 61 0.384 60 0.043*** 2.72 
LALITPUR 0.341 59 0.415 64 0.074*** 3.59 
TANAHU 0.347 62 0.375 54 0.028** 2.19 
JHAPA 0.348 63 0.404 63 0.056* 1.94 
KANCHANPUR 0.350 64 0.425 69 0.075** 2.04 
DHANUSA 0.355 65 0.416 65 0.061*** 5.07 
PALPA 0.356 67 0.383 59 0.027*** 2.24 
KAVRE 0.356 66 0.442 74 0.086*** 4.30 
KASKI 0.363 68 0.438 73 0.075*** 3.53 
BANKE 0.366 69 0.417 66 0.051*** 2.77 
CHITAWAN 0.368 70 0.422 67 0.054*** 3.03 
MORANG 0.370 71 0.433 70 0.063*** 3.84 
MAKWANPUR 0.371 72 0.437 72 0.066** 2.34 
SUNSARI 0.376 73 0.436 71 0.06*** 3.12 
RUPANDEHI 0.382 74 0.424 68 0.042** 2.04 
PARSA 0.390 75 0.444 75 0.054** 2.18 
 
The district level inequalities in 1995/96 and 2003/04 are also shown in Map 2.7 and Map 
2.8. The relative change in the district level inequality is shown in Map 2.8.  
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Map 2.7: District Level Expenditure Inequality Rates, 1995/96 
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Map 2.8: District Level Expenditure Inequality, 2003/04 
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Map 2.9: Change in District Level Expenditure Inequality, 1995/96- 2003/04 
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 2.5.4. Village-level inequality 
Fig. 3 shows the change in the village level inequality from 1995/96 to 2003/04. 
This figure shows that the inequality went up in majority of the villages between 1995/96 
and 2003/04. The geographical distribution of inequality between 1995/96 and 2003/04 is 
shown in Map 2.7 and Map 2.8, and the relative change in the village level inequality is 
shown in Map 2.9.    
 
Fig 3: Change in Gini Index at the Village Level, 1995/96 and 2003/04
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Cummulative %
G
IN
I D
iff
er
en
c
 
 
 74
Map 2.10: Village Level Inequality, 1996 
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Map 2.11: Village Level Inequality, 2004 
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Map 2.12: Village Level Change in Inequality, 1996- 2004 
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2.6. Inequality Decomposition  
2.6.1. Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components 
This section presents the decomposition of inequality by expenditure categories 
and income sources. First we present the results of inequality decomposition by 
expenditure sources. As a first step, we estimate an expenditure function where log-
expenditure is assumed to be a linear function of household demographics (average age 
of the household , percentage of males in the household, and household size), schooling 
(high school, college and higher education), housing structure, information sources (TV), 
location of the household (regions: eastern, western, mid-western and far-western; 
ecological belt: mountain and hills), sanitation facilities (piped water, flush-toilet), 
utilities (electricity, gas), and caste/ethnicity of the household.  The regression results are 
presented in Table 2.9.  We see that in both years, most of the explanatory variables are 
statistically significant at conventional levels and they jointly explain about 64% of the 
variations of the log-expenditures in both years.  
 The expenditure equation can be used to answer two types of questions: i) Of 
these explanatory variables, how much each of them would account for the levels of 
inequality in 1995/96 and 2003/04, and ii) how much of the increase in expenditure 
inequality is due to each of the exogenous factors. The answers of these questions are 
reported in Table 2.10 where the first two columns under the title ‘Factor Weights’ give 
the answer to the first question for 1995/96 and 2003/04, and the third column under the 
heading ‘Factor Contribution in Inequality Change’ provides the answer to the second 
question. In both years, availability of television (TV), electricity, gas, flush-toilet and 
 78
permanent housing structure are the most important variables, other than the residuals, 
with significant factor weights for the expenditure inequality.  
 
Table 2.9: Expenditure Equation Results, 1996 and 2003 (Dep. Variable: Log of HH 
Exp.) 
Var. Group Variables 1995/96 2003/04 
DEMOGRAPHIC HHAGE 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
 HHSIZE 
0.100*** 
(0.004) 
0.118*** 
(0.004) 
 MALE 
0.162*** 
(0.027) 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
EDUCATION HIGHSCHOOL 
0.149*** 
(0.021) 
0.126*** 
(0.019) 
 COLLEGE 
0.324*** 
(0.053) 
0.279*** 
(0.060) 
 HIGHEREDU 
0.435*** 
(0.074) 
0.507*** 
(0.061) 
HOUSING PERMANENTHOUSE
0.202*** 
(0.029) 
0.251*** 
(0.027) 
INFORMATION TV 
0.317*** 
(0.039) 
0.636*** 
(0.040) 
REGIONS EASTERN 
0.089*** 
(0.024) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
 WESTERN 
-0.037 
(0.025) 
0.102*** 
(0.025) 
 MWESTERN 
-0.291*** 
(0.030) 
-0.043 
(0.027) 
 FWESTERN 
-0.263*** 
(0.035) 
-0.055 
(0.032) 
ECOLOGICAL BELTS MOUNTAIN 
0.106*** 
(0.034) 
0.133*** 
(0.0310 
 HILLS 
0.090*** 
(0.027) 
0.050** 
(0.025) 
SANITATION WATERPIPED 
0.054** 
(0.024) 
0.060*** 
(0.021) 
 TOILETFLUSH 
0.247*** 
(0.039) 
0.268*** 
(0.030) 
UTILITIES ELECTRICITY 
0.232*** 
(0.029) 
0.246*** 
(0.0220 
 GAS 
0.198*** 
(0.038) 
0.236*** 
(0.035) 
CASTE BAHUNCHHETRI 0.115*** 0.189*** 
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(0.027) (0.028) 
 TAMAGURALI 
0.086*** 
(0.032) 
-0.034 
(0.029) 
 DAKASA 
-0.043 
(0.036) 
-0.037 
(0.036) 
 TERAICASTE 
0.095*** 
(0.032) 
0.037 
(0.032) 
 NEWAR 
0.105*** 
(0.039) 
0.240*** 
(0.042) 
 MUSLIM 
-0.060 
(0.043) 
-0.075* 
(0.043) 
CONSTANT 
 
CONSTANT 
9.279*** 
(0.046) 
9.730*** 
(0.045) 
R2 0.636 0.642 
F 193.7*** 217.6*** 
N 3346 3912 
Robust standard errors in the parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
As these facilities are generally absent from the rural areas, our results indicate that the 
inequality would be higher in the urban areas (Table 2.6 verifies this result). Other 
variables with sizable shares in the inequality are household size, and schooling. The 
regional variables and caste/ethnicity have very low shares in the expenditure inequality.      
 The factor contribution in the inequality change is given in columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 2.10. The caste/ethnicity is single largest source (35.4%) of the increase in 
expenditure inequality where the two dominant caste/ethnic groups (Newar 17.5% and 
Bahun-Chhetri 12.8%) are accounting for over 30% of the increase in the expenditure 
inequality. The urban-biased facilities such as electricity, gas and flush-toilet account for 
over 63% of the increase in the expenditure inequality between 1995/96 and 2003/04. 
Unlike Fields (2002) who finds that where schooling was the largest contributor (56%) in 
the inequality increase between 1979 and 1999 in the US, we find that the contribution of 
school education as a group in the increase in expenditure is negative in Nepal.  
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Table 2.10: The Contribution of Each Factor to Expenditure Inequality and to the Change 
in Inequality, 1995/96-2003/04. 
Var. Group Variables 
Factor Weights Factor Contribution 
in Inequality 
Change 
Group’s 
Contribution 1996 2003 
DEMOGRAPHIC      
 HHAGE 0.001 -0.001 -0.018  
 HHSIZE 0.121 0.103 -0.057  
 MALE 0.011 0.004 -0.059  
SCHOOLING     -0.014 
 HIGHSCHOOL 0.022 0.013 -0.073  
 COLLEGE 0.020 0.008 -0.105  
 HIGHEREDU 0.016 0.031 0.164  
HOUSING PERMANENT 0.041 0.063 0.266  
INFORMATION TV 0.160 0.140 -0.045  
REGION     -0.268 
 EASTERN -0.002 -0.002 0.005  
 WESTERN 0.000 0.002 0.022  
 MWESTERN 0.020 0.002 -0.164  
 FWESTERN 0.015 0.001 -0.131  
ECO BELTS     -0.084 
 MOUNTAIN -0.005 -0.005 -0.003  
 HILLS 0.014 0.005 -0.081  
SANITATION WATERPIPED 0.011 0.009 -0.011  
 TOILETFLUSH 0.062 0.084 0.287  
UTILITIES ELECTRICITY 0.069 0.074 0.122  
 GAS 0.048 0.066 0.234  
CASTE/ETHNICITY     0.354 
 BAHUNCHHETRI 0.002 0.014 0.128  
 TAMAGURALI -0.001 0.002 0.036  
 DAKASA 0.002 0.002 -0.005  
 TERAICAST -0.002 -0.001 0.016  
 NEWAR 0.011 0.027 0.175  
 MUSLIM 0.001 0.001 0.004  
RESIDUAL RESIDUAL 0.365 0.358 0.295  
GINI  0.385 0.427   
 
Disaggregating the school education data into below high-school, high-school, college 
and higher level education shows that high school and college level education tend to 
reduce the expenditure inequality while higher education tends to increase it. This 
indicates that putting more focus on the high-school and college level education may be a 
good way to deal with increasing expenditure inequality. Another notable result is that as 
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a group,15 the variable region (regional dummies) has negative (-26.8%) contribution in 
the inequality change where the mid-west and far-west regions accounted for the most 
negative contributions.16  
 
2.6.2. Inequality Decomposition by Income Sources 
In order to perform inequality decomposition by the income sources, we identify 
different sources of household income. In the survey, the total income is subdivided into 
agriculture, livestock, home production, wage, rental, enterprise, proprietor, remittance, 
house rent, and other incomes (Table 2.11). There is a significant change in the 
composition of income between 1995/96 and 2003/04.  In 1995/96, the shares of wage 
income, agriculture income and enterprise income were 34.13%, 21.75% and 13.16% 
respectively. Within the eight-year period, the composition of household income has 
changed significantly. In 2003/04, the contribution of these three sources became 
24.84%, 14.97% and 20.90% respectively. Another notable change in the composition of 
household income in Nepal is coming from the remittances. In 1995/96, the share of 
remittance income was 6.95%, and it increases to 12.14% by 2003/04.  
                                                 
15 The contribution of variables within a group can be added up if a group is composed of 
with more than one indicator variables (several dummies). Here we have four such 
groups (schooling, regions, eco belt, and caste/ethnicity). Other variables that are put 
under groups are not the indicator variables with several dummies and their values as a 
group’s contribution cannot be added up.   
16 These two regions have been experiencing high intensity conflicts for a decade since 
1996.  
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Table 2.11: Inequality Decomposition by Income Sources, 1995/96 and 2003/04 
 
Income Source 
Income Share (%) Relative Inequality Inequality Correlation Inequality Share (%) Marginal Effect (%) 
1996 2003 1996 2003 1996 2003 1996 2003 1996 2003 
AGRICULTURE 21.75 14.97 0.720 0.649 0.597 0.340 15.76 06.30 -5.99 -8.68 
LIVESTOCK 02.58 02.57 1.278 1.284 0.281 0.190 01.56 01.20 -1.02 -1.37 
HOMEPROD 02.86 03.31 0.758 0.721 0.251 0.291 00.91 01.32 -1.94 -1.99 
WAGE 34.13 24.84 0.765 0.752 0.688 0.605 30.26 21.55 -3.86 -3.29 
RENTAL 00.88 01.24 1.739 1.093 0.401 0.561 01.04 01.45 0.15 0.21 
ENTERPRIZE 13.16 20.90 1.485 0.925 0.822 0.800 27.07 29.48 13.91 8.58 
PROPRITER 02.72 02.00 0.994 0.990 0.899 0.893 04.10 03.38 1.38 1.37 
REMITTANCE 06.95 12.14 0.949 0.901 0.573 0.641 06.37 13.39 -0.59 1.25 
HOUSERENT 12.37 13.16 0.782 0.795 0.650 0.788 10.59 15.73 -1.77 2.57 
OTHER 02.59 04.86 0.957 0.940 0.558 0.711 02.33 06.20 -0.26 1.34 
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Table 2.11 also shows the inequality share and marginal effects of different income 
sources on total inequality in 1995/96 and 2003/04. In 1995/96, the first three major 
income sources with the larger share of inequality were wage income (30.3%), enterprise 
income (27.1%) and agriculture income (15.8%). In 2003/04, the trend changed 
significantly where the first three income sources with the larger share of inequality are 
enterprise (29.5%), wage (21.6%) and house rent (15.7%) incomes. A notable change in 
2003/04 is that the inequality share of agricultural income went down from 15.8% to 
6.3%, while the inequality share of remittance income went up from 6.4% to 13.4%. The 
enterprise income not only has the largest inequality share but also has the largest 
marginal effect (8.6%) on total inequality. The marginal effects of agricultural, livestock, 
wage and home production incomes on total inequality are negative in both of the years 
whereas the marginal effect of remittance and house rent income on total inequality 
turned from negative (1995/96) to positive (2003/04). Our results show that the recent 
trend of increased income inequality between 1995/96 and 2003/04 is probably due to the 
increasing share of enterprise income (13.2% to 20.9%) and remittance income (6.9% to 
12.1%), and decreasing share of agricultural income (21.7% to 15.0%) and wage  income 
(34.13% to 24.8%). Compared to the relative income shares, the enterprise income not 
only has higher share of inequality but also has the higher marginal contribution on total 
inequality. The agricultural income has the opposite trend, larger but diminishing share in 
total income, small share on total inequality and yet larger negative marginal effect on the 
total inequality indicating that income from agriculture helps to reduce the inequality.    
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CHAPTER 3 
INEQUALITY, POLARIZATION AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: THE MAOIST 
INSURGENCY IN NEPAL 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Is inequality associated with conflict? Sociologists, political scientists, and 
recently economists, have contributed to a rich theoretical literature in their attempts to 
answer this question. There is little doubt about the importance of this question and the 
implications it has for governance and government. Conflict is costly for society. In its 
cheapest form it alters the social and productive fabric of society that has been built over 
generations and in its more expensive form can destroy them beyond repair. If 
ameliorating inequality can forestall conflict, the role of government as an agency that 
can capably redistribute wealth and income is critical. To be sure, inequality need not be 
the only source of conflict. Weak rule of law, biased or ineffective enforcement of 
property rights and dearth of social capital are examples of poor or missing institutions 
that may mitigate conflict. Their absence can trigger conflict independently of inequality 
(Easterly 2001). When interacted with weak institutions, it is a trigger.    
The objective of this chapter is to empirically examine this association between 
inequality and conflict. The setting is the Maoist rebellion in Nepal that has claimed 
thousands of lives since it began in 1996. The regional variations across villages in Nepal 
afford a rich experiment without using cross-country data, for exploring the nature of the 
association between conflict and inequality. While using cross-country data, the 
heterogeneity in cross-cultural norms, institutions and unique historical settings can 
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produce different reference points or anchors, and a lack of common anchor within the 
sample can bias the perception of the threat and hence the measurement of such variables. 
Cultural and historical differences may influence the perception of acceptable levels of 
violence in cross-country settings. Our micro level sub-national data avoids such cross-
cultural heterogeneity and differential perceptions (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 2006).  
The first contributions in this area were made theoretically by Gurr (1970) and 
empirically by Sigelman and Simpson (1977).17  Cross-country studies of conflicts are 
not unequivocal about the relationship between inequality and conflict.18  Using the 
terrorist conflict in Basque Country, one of the seventeen regions in Spain, as a case 
study, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) find a considerable reduction of per capita GDP in 
the Basque Country relative to a synthetic control region without terrorism.  In a cross-
national study of African countries, Easterley (2001) finds that ethnic fractionalization 
increases the likelihood of war casualties, and good institutions are effective in mitigating 
this threat.   
We depart from previous empirical studies in three respects.  First, the empirical 
specification is motivated by rational choice theory.  The theory, due to Milante (2004), 
                                                 
17 On sociology-of-conflict theories, see also Gurr (1980), and the survey in the four 
papers by Eckstein, Zimmerman, Gurr and Pirages.  Cross-country studies of conflict and 
inequality pervaded the early literature since this seminal paper.  See e.g. Collier (2000), 
Mueller (1985), Mueller and Seligson (1987), Selbin (2002), Wang et al. (1993), Weede 
(1986, 1987), and Williams and Timberlake (1984).  
18 Lichbach’s (1989) survey indicates both positive and negative relationships in the 
literature.   
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clearly brings out the logic for why, when society becomes unequal, agents may resort to 
forcible redistribution by unlawful means.  In the absence of effective institutions these 
means can and do turn violent.  The theory is used to produce testable hypotheses about 
the relationship between inequality and conflict.  The issue variables in our model thus 
have a strong link with underlying theory.  Second, our data are sub-national within 
Nepal.  Thus, they suffer less from the heterogeneity problem than do cross-country data 
that have been popularly used in the literature.  Our data, assembled from human rights 
reports, are the number of deaths inflicted by the Maoist forces in each Nepalese village 
between 1996 and 2003.  Empirically, we model killings by Maoists using a hierarchical 
(count-data) model in order to account for the remaining heterogeneity in the data.  Third, 
and perhaps most important, we go beyond the popularly used Gini index to measure 
inequality.  We employ measures of polarization proposed in Esteban and Ray (1994, 
1999).  Since the polarization measures quantify wealth distances, they may be 
uncorrelated with the Gini index.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe a theory that focuses 
on inequality as a cause of conflict. In Section 3.3, we advance three hypotheses based on 
the theory that we test using village-level data from Nepal. The Nepalese data are 
described in detail, and the estimating equation is motivated.  In Section 3.4 we discuss 
the results.  
 
3.2. Theory 
Milante’s (2004) simple model starkly demonstrates how inequality causes 
conflicts. In anticipation of the empirics, the theory focuses on inequality in wealth. 
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Consider a two-period model of an economy with N agents. The agents are indexed in 
ascending order of their initial wealth nw . Thus 1 2 ,..., Nw w w  . Let the total wealth of 
all agents be normalized to unity so that nw  is agent n’s share. The main conclusions are 
particularly clearly demonstrated with a geometric distribution of initial wealth 
parameterized by 1  , and given by 1,n nw w    1,.... .n N  Then agent n’s wealth may 
be written as a function of just agent 1’s wealth as  
 1 1,
n
nw w
   1,...., .n N       [3.1] 
Summing across all agents and using [3.1], 1w  is solved as  
 1
1
1N
w     .        [3.2] 
Perfect equality is represented by 1  . As   diverges from unity, inequality 
increases.19 The parameter   determines the “distance” between the wealth endowments 
of any two agents. Clearly, the larger is the  the greater the inequality in the distribution 
of wealth by any standard measure such as the Gini index.   is also directly linked with 
Esteban and Ray’s (1994) concept of polarization. The wealth of agent n as a function of 
  is given as 
 
1
1
1
( 1)( ) .
1
n
n
n nw w

               [3.3] 
3.2.1. Redistribution 
In economic models, conflict is defined and modeled as resources devoted to 
redistribution or the amount of redistribution itself. Esteban and Ray (1999), for example, 
                                                 
19 By L’Hopital’s rule, 1
1lim
1
N
N
    , and from [3.2] 1 1Nw   or 1 1/w N . 
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view conflict as the total amount of spending by agents to bend policy in the direction of 
their ideal preference. Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1993) similarly define 
conflict in terms of redistributive activity (which increases with inequality). In Milante’s 
(2004) model conflict is measured as the net change in wealth, after resources are spent 
on redistributive activities that “appropriate”. Extending Milante’s model to one in which 
a constraint is reached on the ability of some groups to come up with the resources 
necessary to prevent further redistribution, their deprivation increases and produces 
violent conflict beyond a threshold level.20 
Suppose agents are able to expend part of their wealth on activities devoted to 
redistributing the total wealth in the economy in their favor. These activities take a 
variety of forms. In models of crime this consists of theft of property and wealth, and 
expenditures on armed guards to prevent such theft (Kelly 2000). In models of 
governmental corruption this takes the form of bribing officials or else productive activity 
is blocked (Bardhan 1997). In political-economy models this takes the form of lobbying 
politicians to bend policy and satisfying the resources politicians need to finance 
reelection campaigns (Baye, Kovenock and de Varies 1993). Denote the resources spent 
on appropriation activity by agent n as [0, ].n ng w  
Governments must take steps to ensure that both rich and poor have equal access 
to institutions that redistribute. Otherwise, as we will see, inequality increases to a point 
of instability of the system that compels redistribution via violence and force. In this 
                                                 
20 In Milante (2004) violence is disallowed, and a “privation” effect works to reduce the 
amount of redistribution.  
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framework, agent n’s activity devoted to redistribution can take a form of violence if the 
required spending on such activity exceeds his available wealth, .n ng w  
The amount of the economy’s wealth that is appropriable or redistributable 
depends on the extent of property rights laws and their enforcement. Denote by 0 1   
the fraction of any agent’s wealth that cannot be redistributed or contested. Thus, the 
redistributable wealth of the economy is given by  
 
1
(1 ) ( )
N
i i
i
w g

  ,       [3.4] 
All individuals have equal access to this redistributive wealth.21 Suppose the fraction of 
the contestable wealth captured by agent n is determined by the ratio of the resources 
devoted to redistribution by agents n to the total resources devoted by all agents towards 
redistributive activity, or /n iig g .22 Then agent n’s payoff, nI , is the sum of his 
uncontested income and the amount of wealth he appropriates from the economy’s pool 
of contestable wealth, 
 
1
1
(1 ) ) ( ).
N
n
n i i n nN
iii
gI w g w g
g
 

         [3.5] 
                                                 
21 In economies with weak legal institutions, this is not typically the case. In fact, agents 
in the position of power or with access to wealth have greater access to policy 
instruments that are used by politicians to redistribute wealth. In that case, the wealth 
inequality is further exacerbated.  
22 Different models differ in this assumption. Esteban and Ray (1999) have a full 
behavioral model in which the redistribution is a positive but a convex function of the 
amount of lobbying so that redistribution is expensive.  
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Agent n chooses ng  to maximize this objective function. Milante (2004) shows that the 
optimal spending on redistributive activity is the same for every agent,23  
 2
( 1)(1 )* ,n
Ng g
N
    1,...,n N .    [3.6] 
Thus, the less contestable is other people’s wealth, the lower is the per capita spending on 
redistributive activity.24 At this optimal solution, the income of agent n is  
 1( ) (1 ) * ( ).n nI g wN
            [3.7] 
This leads to the main result about inequality and total redistribution. Define by ( )nr   the 
net change in agent n’s wealth (as a function of  ). Then,  
 1( ) ( ) * (1 )[ ( )]n n n nr I g w wN
         .   [3.8] 
Note that this redistribution sums to zero over the full population: ( ) 0.nn r    Let n  
index the individual with the mean income.  Since 1/nw N , 0nr  . Denote by 
( )R  the total net wealth change accruing to the population with above mean income 
                                                 
23 In Esteban and Ray’s (1999) more general behavioral model, different groups generally 
expend different amounts depending on the antagonism in that society. Antagonism is 
measured by “distance” of the utilities of each group’s preferred positions from every 
other group’s preferred position.  
24 Multiplying both sides of [3.6] by N yields total spending on redistributive activity as 
1* (1 )(1 ).Ng
N
    Thus, the fraction of the economy’s total wealth devoted to 
redistribution is increasing and concave in N.  
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and by ( )R   the total net wealth change accruing to the population with below mean 
income. Then  
 1( ) (1 )[ ( )],
N
n
n n
R w
N


           [3.9] 
And,   
1
1( ) (1 )[ ( )].
n
n
n
R w
N


                    [3.10] 
Clearly, if 1  , indicating no inequality, 0.R R    However, with inequality, 
Milante (2004) shows that 
 0,R
           [3.11] 
And   0.R
          [3.12] 
There are two important messages. The first is that in the presence of institutions that 
afford equal access to redistributive resources, redistribution reduces inequality. To take 
an example, suppose that the only instrument of redistribution is via taxes levied by the 
government which is “earned” by each individual according to their lobbying 
expenditures *g . Then under plausible conditions (more on this below), redistribution 
takes away from the above-mean-income individuals and gives to below-mean-income 
population, making the wealth distribution more equal. The second message is that the 
greater the inequality, the greater the redistribution. 
This is a plausible story for developed countries which have developed such 
institutions. But two critical assumptions are required if the story is to end here. They are: 
 The required pre capita spending on redistributive activity does not exceed initial 
wealth, * ng w , 1,...., ,n N  and 
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 There is equal access to all individuals to instruments of redistribution, that is, the 
contestable wealth is equally accessible to all.  
Suppose, as is often true is the developing world, these assumptions are violated. In 
addition, suppose legal institutions are weak. Specifically:  
 There is weak enforcement of the law. 
Then theft and violence also become instruments of redistribution, making the situation 
combustible. The same mechanism that would foster equality in the presence of requisite 
institutions now endangers violence. If only a small numbers of agents relative to the 
population experience deprivation in the sense of * ,ng w  they will probably find it hard 
to organize, and will go about their appropriation activities individually.25 However, if 
there is a great number of agents whose income falls below their optimal expenditure on 
appropriable activity, the coordination problems that prevented them from organizing due 
to their small numbers is overcome. This is especially true, as in the case of organized 
violence, if there are increasing returns to organizing. Then destructive inter-group 
conflict becomes a reality. In sum, a threshold level of inequality that leads to deprivation 
for a significant section of society lays the basis for violent conflict. When this section is 
too poor to afford the required resources for (peaceful) redistribution, then they must 
resort to violence as a means of redistribution, if that instrument is possible. The haves 
are able to continue to provide *,g  exacerbating the inequity. Violence is the only means 
at the disposal of the have-nots to prevent further deterioration in their wealth 
distribution. Where enforcement is weak, and critical mass is organized for violence, we 
see it unleashed.  
                                                 
25 Risk-aversion on the part of agents works to further control the situation.  
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The sociology literature contains the most sophisticated early analysis. According 
to Gurr (1970), relative deprivation (RD), defined as a person’s perception of the 
discrepancy between his income expectations and income capabilities, foments conflict.26  
The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of 
relative deprivation among members of a group.27 
Our analysis has thus far taken as given the existence of the inequality in order to 
demonstrate the potential for inequality to lead to conflict. More commonly, inequality is 
the results of decades, even generations, of oppression by those in power. Granovetter 
and Tilly’s (1988, p.180) analysis of why inequality exists and persists identifies five 
actors: capitalists, workers, organizations, households and government. These actors 
“contend over the rewards of labor in the three arenas of employment status, jobs, and 
labor market and do so primarily by attempting to influence the process of ranking and 
sorting”.  
The relative bargaining strengths of these actors are responsible for the 
(equilibrium) labor market outcome of the ranking and sorting processes. These translate 
                                                 
26 Gurr uses the term “value” expectations and “value” capabilities, which is a more 
inclusive term than our interpretation.  Value expectations, in Gurr’s terminology refers 
to goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled.  
27 In the theoretical model inequality is captured by the parameter .   If, as the theory has 
assumed, all agents have the same capabilities and expectations, this parameter is an 
adequate measure of RD.  Modeling inequality with heterogeneity in capabilities and 
expectations within and across groups is more complex, but our polarization measures are 
designed to empirically capture this heterogeneity. 
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into the nature and extent of income inequality, consumption inequality and wealth 
inequality in that society. The threat points in this bargaining game are importantly 
determined by the ability of these actors to solve internal organizational problems and 
coalesce in order to exert the greatest pressure during the sorting and ranking processes. 
Ebbs and tides in the relative threat points of these actors are determinants of historical 
changes in inequality. For example, if the monopsony power of landlords in rural labor 
markets gives rise to rural inequality, then the inequality persists and worsens as 
landlords’ positions get stronger. If, however, property rights are not enforceable publicly 
by the government or privately by the landlords, the increasing inequality induces rural 
workers to organize and conduct appropriation activities as predicted by the theory.  
In their analysis of the American experience with inequality, Willimson and 
Lindert (1980) suggest that uneven technological development, rapid increase in the 
supply of unskilled labor (due to the lack of education), and accelerated capital 
accumulation were the three most important factors behind the increases in inequality. 
Uneven technological development and accelerated capital accumulation sharply biased 
the receipt of rewards, while an increase in the supply of unskilled labor lowered the 
bargaining strength of labor.  
If institutions that can peacefully redistribute come into being, or if the prevention 
of theft can be effectively enforced, the mechanism described above may be forestalled. 
Even in the absence of such legal institutions, other self-enforcing institutions may 
emerge to limit the amount of violent redistributive activity. While there is debate over 
how social capital (that measures civic engagement and social connectedness as defined 
by Putnam (1995)) influences institutions, there is a general acceptance of the idea that 
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“good social capital” provides a solid foundation for democratic institutions. Putnam’s 
(2000) definition of social capital as the collective value of all social networks and the 
“inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other” motivates our 
measurement of social capital. Often, the source of such institutions in developing 
countries is the learning that equitable sharing of the peace dividend from avoiding 
conflict is collectively and individually preferable to a situation with forcible 
appropriations, which is risky and in which only a few benefit. Lin (2001) likens social 
capital as economic investment in social relations motivated by market returns. 
Fukuyama (1995) suggests that social capital makes up for missing institutions by 
creating a set of informal values and norms within groups that encourage members of the 
group to cooperation, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) bring focus on individual preferences 
and belief regarding what determines income in preventing extreme outcomes. Thus, 
culture and social capital voluntarily limit forcible appropriations.  
Alternatives to engaging on such violent conflict would be voting with one’s feet 
(Tiebout 1956) or use of ballots with the hope that the outcome will change the existing 
situation (Black 1948). The above model predicts that if government makes a 
commitment towards non-distortionary tax through the agreed upon political process, and 
formulates credible redistribution programs with benefits that are at least as much as the 
agent’s expected payoffs from appropriation activities, the government can avoid violent 
conflict. Effective social programs raise the opportunity cost of engaging in violence. If 
the expected net benefit from such alternatives is greater than that from violent acts, the 
probability of observing violent conflict is lowered. When institutions do not support 
outcomes based on voting with one’s feet or at the ballot to restore equality, then, as 
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Mueller (2003) observes, violence becomes a viable options. If the wealth distance is 
large, inter-group alienation works to unify groups into polarized entities (Esteban and 
Ray 1999, Akerlof and Kranton 2000), increasing the probability and intensity of 
violence, perhaps dramatically.    
 
3.3. Hypotheses and Data 
3.3.1. Hypotheses 
We will empirically consider the Nepal situation where violence has broken out in 
1996.  Although the decade’s old Maoist People’s War ended after signing the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord between the Nepal government and the Maoist on 
November 21, 2006, the potential still exists for the conflict to escalate in the future as 
long as the underlying causes remain unresolved. The motivation for the paper is to 
understand the root causes. The theory identifies them and also identifies other factors 
that work to prevent conflict. We focus on the main hypotheses that emerge from the 
theory, which help us to clarify what problems policy should target. We state the main 
hypotheses from the model as follows: 
H1: Greater inequality is associated with higher incidence of violent conflict. 
The extent of appropriable wealth in a society depends on property rights and 
their enforcement. In the case of high intensity conflict, the formal property rights 
enforcement mechanism may not be functional for obvious reasons. In fact, property 
rights enforcement is weak to begin with, which, in the presence of rising inequality, is 
the source of forcible appropriation and redistribution of wealth by violent means. In 
countries that have experienced weak institutions, institutions evolve in communities due 
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to the need to keep continual disorder from impoverishing the community’s wealth. 
These institutions are built around social values, norms and networks. They help to 
enforce property rights informally, which is in the best interest of the community. We 
postulate that conflict is lower in communities with stronger social capital as measured 
by social networks that are built to endure. They work by providing mechanisms for 
shared governance and problem solving within the community without recourse to 
government institutions that are perceived as being ineffectual at best, and corrupt and 
biased at worst. Thus, while social capital may not lower inequality, it succeeds in 
reducing social tension in an unequal society. It provides a platform for the exchange of 
information among members of the community that promotes mutual understanding and 
tolerance. The potential for violent conflict is thus reduced. 
H2: Greater social capital is associated with lower incidence of violent conflict.      
Finally, the government can and does play a role in lowering poverty. To the 
extent that it succeeds in stemming the deterioration in the standards of living of the 
poorest, it may actually forestall conflict. To the extent government measures are 
unsuccessful, it fails in its bid to prevent the outbreak of violence. We advance two 
hypotheses about the ability of the government’s social welfare programs to effectively 
lower the incentive for forcible redistribution by individuals.  
H3a: Larger transfers by the government are associated with a lower incidence of violent 
conflict. 
H3b: Greater poverty is associated with a higher incidence of violent conflict.  
Thus, all else held constant, the theory explains conflict as: 
( , , , )CONFLICT f INEQUALITY SOCIALCAPITAL GOVTGRANT POVERTY
  
    [3.13] 
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where GOVTGRANT  refers to government transfers, and the sign below the variables 
indicates the type of relationship that we expect a priori between the respective variables 
and the dependent variable, CONFLICT.   
 
3.3.2. Data and Measurement 
The empirical setting in which we will investigate the hypotheses about violent 
conflict is the Maoist uprising in Nepal that began in 1996. Never since its unification in 
1768 has Nepal experienced such a violent division within its own rank and file. Ganguly 
and Shoup (2005) provide an account of experiments with democracy, their failure to 
improve the average Nepalese citizen’s living standards, and the rise of the Maoists.  
During and after the 1990 People’s Movement that re-introduced multi-party 
democracy in Nepal, key figures of the Maoist movement took part in the multiparty 
politics. The democratic reforms implemented under the 1990 constitution were illusory 
because they failed to address the fundamental problems facing most Nepalese citizens – 
inequality and widespread poverty (that is reflected in terms of high infant-mortality, lack 
of access to basic amenities like power and clean water, and more importantly the rural-
urban divide). These shortcomings were dire in the countryside. Further, the upper-caste 
Hindu led parties pursued interests that were distant from the median voter – illiterate, 
with stronger ties to an ethnic community than to the nation.  
In 1991 the communist party (United People’s Front, UPF) was the third largest 
political party in the lower house of the parliament. In 1994, a fraction of the UPF broke 
away from its parent party and ran a parallel party, boycotted the mid-term elections, and 
planned to start a violent campaign. On February 13, 1996 they did. The People’s War 
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began with a simultaneous attack on three remotely stationed police outposts, a bank 
branch, a soft-drink bottling plant, a liquor factory and private house. Their strategy was 
of a guerilla nature – establishing bases in the rural and remote areas with the objective of 
surrounding urban centers in order to seize state power. In their base areas, the Maoist 
redistributed the captured land from the absentee landlords and feudal interests to the 
locals to farm and use as cooperatives. What started as an insignificant and isolated 
incident in 1996 transformed into a devastating conflict claiming more than 13,000 lives 
and displacing over 200,000 people over the next ten years.28 On November 21, 2006 the 
Maoist People’s War was formally ended with signing of historic peace deal with Nepal 
government.   
Why did the Maoist outbreak occur and catapult out of control for such a long 
time? Arguably, the continued expansion of Maoist membership and the increased scale 
of their activities are due to the prevalent socio-economic deprivation of the people based 
on caste, gender and ethnicity, which had degraded visibly in the past decades. The 
mechanism for the violent outburst is captured by the theory which underscores 
deprivation, inequality and polarization as sources of violent conflict, especially in a 
system characterized by weak institutions.  
The empirical challenge before us is to measure the variables as accurately as the 
theory requires. Nepal is administratively divided into 75 districts, with each district 
further subdivided into village development committees (VDCs, or ‘villages’). There are 
over 4000 villages. For each village, the dependent variable, conflict, is measured as the 
                                                 
28 Mahat (2005) and Gurung (2003) describe the Maoist People’s War in Nepal in detail.  
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number of persons killed by Maoists.29 These data are drawn from annual reports over the 
1996-2004 period of the Informal Sector Services Center (INSEC), a non-profit national 
human rights organization. The annual reports contain details such as the date of each 
event that resulted in human casualties, the circumstances surrounding the event, and the 
number of deaths. The casualty data are summed over the eight-year period from these 
reports. Due to unavailability of time-series data on important variables such as 
inequality, polarization and poverty, the natural experiment yields a cross-section. The 
dependent variable is measured as stock over an eight-year period that leads other 
variables by many years. This reduces, but may not eliminate, concerns about endogenity.  
The inequality measures we use are (i) the Gini index, and (ii) measures of 
polarization. Since data on assets or wealth are not available at the household level, we 
use consumption expenditure data that are available in the nationally representative 
household survey. Since the survey does not cover all the villages, we use recently 
developed micro-level estimation technique (described below) for survey-to-census 
imputation of household expenditures for all villages. The first step is to construct 
complete household expenditure data in order to measure inequality at the village level. 
We thus begin with a description of the household survey and the census data.  
The data to construct our main explanatory variables are drawn mainly from 
World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Survey for Nepal conducted in 1995-96 
(jointly with Nepal’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)), and the 2001 Nepal Population 
                                                 
29 An alternative to the count of deaths due to the violent activities would be percentage 
of people killed during the violence in each village. As an alternative of computing such 
percentages, we control for population densities of the respective villages.  
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Census. We refer to the Nepal study as the Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS). The 
NLSS consists of nationally representative household survey responses to questions about 
household income and expenditures, and several socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. The data set contains a national sample of 3373 rural and urban 
households. These households were selected from 274 primary sampling units around the 
country, or communities, based on a probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) sampling 
plan. In addition to the household survey, the NLSS also conducted a community-level 
survey designed to elicit information about community characteristics and the kinds of 
social networks present in the communities to which the surveyed households belonged.  
The 2001 Nepal Population Census, conducted by the CBS, administered two 
types of forms – a complete enumeration (the “short” form) and sample enumeration (the 
“long” form). The long form was administered to one in every eight housing units, 
yielding a sample of 520,624 Nepalese households. In order to construct inequality 
variables (such as the Gini and polarization indices) and poverty-gap indices for all 
villages, we require detailed expenditure data for a thicker sample than provided by the 
NLSS sample.30 The census sample is far more inclusive but lacks the all-important 
expenditure (and income) variables. We use a recently developed micro-level estimation 
technique, developed from small area statistics (Ghosh and Rao 1994) to impute 
expenditures of the census-level households. Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2003) 
provide the theoretical foundation of the micro-level estimation technique.  
                                                 
30 As self-reported household income is less reliable than the measures of household 
expenditures (Deaton 2000) we use household expenditure as indicators of household 
welfare. 
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Essentially, we use the NLSS sample to impute expenditures for the census long-
form sample using information on covariates that are common to both NLSS and the 
census. Let ly  be household l’s expenditure obtained from the NLSS survey. A 
regression of ly  on a vector of covariates lX , where lX  are chosen so that they are also 
available for the census sample, is then estimated using generalized least squares. The 
estimated model is used to impute the census household expenditures. The (long form) 
census sample with the imputed expenditures is then used to construct our inequality and 
poverty measures as follows.   
Let ly  denote the per capita consumption expenditure of household l in the given 
village. Then the Gini index for the village is given by (Deaton 2000, p. 139): 
  1 | |
( 1) i ji j j
GINI y y
N N              [3.14] 
where   is the average expenditure, N is sample size,  | |i jy y  is the absolute deviation 
of expenditure between a pair of households. An alternative, but related formulation of 
the Gini index is given by (Deaton 2000, p.139):  
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             [3.14a] 
where i  is the rank of individual i in the y-distribution, counting from top so that the 
richest has the rank 1. For computational purpose, we use [3.14a].  
Esteban and Ray (1999) show that the concept of polarization is fundamentally 
different from inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, although the Gini is a 
special case of the polarization index. In our context, their approach posits that an 
adequate polarization measure for consumption spending must reflect three 
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characteristics: (i) in each village, the measure must partition the distribution of 
consumption spending into more than one group, and preferably not too many; (ii) there 
must be a high degree of intra-group homogeneity as measured by a large mass within 
each partition; and (iii) there must be a high degree of inter-group heterogeneity as 
measured by significant distances between the partitions.31  Satisfying these conditions 
leads to a measure that may or may not be correlated with often-used inequality measures 
like the Gini coefficient. The polarization concept seeks to measure potential hostility or 
antagonism among the groups, and therefore captures a different dimension of inequality 
than does the Gini index. This antagonism is a potent source of social tensions that can 
break down norms and institutions that may have existed for generations, abiding by 
which had provided peaceful co-existence. The Esteban-Ray polarization measure (for a 
village) is essentially a mapping of the distribution of consumption spending by families 
in the village into a value. The higher this value, the greater is the degree of polarization. 
The polarization index is measured for a specific village as (Esteban and Ray 1994, p. 
834): 
                                                 
31 Axiomatically, their measure purports to satisfy all three conditions: First, the joining 
of two neighboring probability masses into one mass exacerbates polarization in the 
presence of another separately identifiable point mass. Second, given three point masses 
(or partitions), moving a point mass closer away from the center towards an extreme 
value, however small the move, increases polarization. Third, given two point masses (or 
partitions), breaking the more centrist point mass equally into two and distributing them 
at two opposite more extreme points increases polarization.  
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where | |i jy y  is the size of absolute difference in the consumption expenditure of 
households i and j, k  is the kth household’s proportional weight32 and kL  is the number 
of households sampled from kth village. K is a positive constant. In [3.15]  measures the 
intensity of group identification, or what Esteban and Ray term the “degree of 
polarization sensitivity”. It ranges in value between 0 to 1.6 (Esteban and Ray 1994). If 
 =0 and K=1, then POLARIZATION(0) approximates Gini.33 The larger the value of  , 
the greater is the departure of the inequality measure from polarization. We employ the 
kernel estimation method in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) in order to construct three 
Esteban-Ray polarization measures at the village level, corresponding to  = 0, 1 and 1.5. 
They are termed 0POLARIZATION , 1POLARIZATION  and 1.5POLARIZATION  
respectively.34  
                                                 
32 Since we use the census sample that includes only one in eight households, we 
construct the household’s proportional weight using information about population size of 
each village and the size of the census-sampled households. 
33 As Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show, the Gini index is given by  
1 1
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34 The continuous time counterpart of [3.15] is given by (Duclos, Esteban and Ray 2004, 
p. 1744): 
1( ) ( ) ( ) | |P f f x f y y x dydx
  ,      
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The poverty measure we construct is the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty-
gap index for the year 1995-96. It measures the percentage of households (in a village) 
below the poverty line as:  
1 ( )
p
q
i
i L
z yPOVERTY
n z


            [3.16] 
where z defines a household’s poverty expenditure threshold,35 iy  is household i’s 
expenditure, n is the number of households, and pL  is the set of households (n and pL  
                                                                                                                                                 
 where (.)f  is the density function of the distribution. They also show that for every 
distribution function F with associated density f and mean  , [3.16] can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
y
P F f y a y dF y   ,        
where ( ) (2 ( ) 1) 2 ( )
y
a y y F y xdF x      . Using a random sample of n (iid) 
observations {yi} drawn from F(y) and ordered so that 1 2 .... ny y y  , Duclos, Esteban 
and Ray (2004, p. 1750) numerically estimate ( )P F as:  
1
1
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
n
i i
i
P F n f y a y


           
where yi refers to the data on the ith observations. In this equation, ˆ ( )if y
  is estimated 
nonparametrically using kernel estimation procedures, and 
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
      , where ˆ  is the sample mean.  
35 We adopted the poverty line of Rs. 4404 that was estimated by Nepal Central Bureau 
of Statistics at 1995/96 constant price (CBS 2005).  
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vary across villages) below the poverty line. 0   is a poverty aversion parameter. With 
  = 0 [3.16] simply measures the proportion of households below the poverty line or the 
“headcount” index. With   = 1 [3.16] measures the average poverty-gap index or the 
average shortfall of household expenditure from the poverty line.  
Finally, we measure the presence and strength of social capital from information 
contained in the community-level surveys in the NLSS. In the rural sub-sample of the 
NLSS, five different types of network groups are reported at the community level: forest 
user groups, farmer groups, water management associations, women in development 
groups, and credit groups.36 For each group four characteristics were recorded: (i) years 
in operation, (ii) proportion of households involved in a particular group, (iii) percentage 
of women members in a group, and (iv) the average number of meetings per year. 
Together, they cover four important dimensions of social capital in village communities. 
We compute a composite social capital measure for each group that aggregates across the 
four social capital dimensions. Since the social capital index is computed from the rural 
sub-sample of NLSS that draws survey information from less than 274 villages across 
Nepal, we do not have the social capital information for all villages. Rather than lose a 
significant proportion of our village sample, we choose to compute instead the district-
level social capital index, which is then replicated at the village level.  
                                                 
36 One additional social network, others, is also reported in the data set, but as several 
categories of social networks are lumped together to create this categories, we drop it 
from empirical analysis.  
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The social capital variables are constructed for each of the five networking groups 
as in Nepal, Bohara and Berrens (2007). For example, the social capital contributed by 
the farmer group is defined as:  
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where n indexes the four dimensions of social capital described above and i indexes the 
district. iFARMERGRP  is thus a unit-free index that combines the age, participation, 
reach, and intensity of the activity of farmer group networks in district i. We use equal 
weights to each of these characteristics of the network categories in the absence of a 
priori assumption.   
Control variables employed at the village level are: percentage of farmers 
population (FARMER), average years of schooling (EDUCATION), percentage of people 
whose primary language is Nepali (NEPALI), and binary indicators for whether the 
village is in rural (RURAL) area and ecologically mountainous or hilly (MOUNTAIN, 
HILLS). Population density (DENSITY) is at the district level. The data for these variables 
are from 2001. The poverty measures in [3.16] for different values of   are highly 
correlated in our sample, and so we use the headcount measure (  = 0) in the 
econometric analysis.  
 
3.3.3. Methodology 
Since the dependent variable, CONFLICT, is an event-count, we employ count 
data methods. We use the Negative Binomial (NB) model which is well-suited to model 
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over-dispersed count data. A likelihood ratio test (Greene 2000) indicates that the NB 
model is preferable to the Poisson model in our case.  
Villages within any district are likely to share the characteristics of their district 
and be relatively heterogeneous from villages in other districts. An important feature of 
Nepal data is that villages are relatively homogeneously clustered according to the district 
to which they belong. The districts of Nepal are heterogeneous in their socio-economic 
characteristics, ethnic composition, political representation, cultural landscape and 
government programs. For this reason, we employ a hierarchical regression method in 
which the villages are modeled as being nested within districts.37 The alternative method 
                                                 
37 The basic hierarchical (multilevel) regression model (as in Goldstein 1995, Hox 2002) 
is given by: 00 0 0 0ij p pij q qj j ijY X Z u e       , where ijY  is the dependent variable, pijX  
are the p explanatory variables at the village level, qjZ are the q explanatory variables at 
the district level, 00  is the intercept, 0p  and 0q  are the slopes, 0 ju  and ije  are the 
residuals at the district level and the village level. The model is generally called the 
variance component model as it allows decomposing the intercept variance into different 
components for each hierarchical level. Here we are assuming that the regression 
intercept varies across the districts, but the slops do not vary.  If the slope also varies for 
village level variables, then the above model can be written as: 
00 0 0 0ij p pij q qj pj pij j ijY X Z u X u e        . This model is called the random coefficient 
model where pju  are the district level residuals of the slopes of the village level 
explanatory variables pijX . As the dependent variable is event count, we use negative 
binomial (NB) estimation method. 
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of aggregating data to the district level is unattractive because we lose the rich variation 
in the data at the village level. In sum, we estimate a hierarchical Negative Binomial 
model. We estimate a two-level model which is accomplished by random effect 
specification.38 The model we estimate is  
1 2 3ij ij i ijCONFLICT INEQUALITY SOCIALCAPITAL GOVTGRANT       
,ij ij i i ijPOVERTY X B Z D u                        [3.18] 
where the ijCONFLICT  is the number of deaths inflicted by Maoists in village j, which is 
nested in district i. The issue variable for testing Hypothesis 1, INEQUALITY, is 
measured, respectively as GINI and the three variants of POLARIZATION. These 
measures are strongly correlated and including them together induces multi-colinearity. 
We thus estimate their effects separately. The issue variables for Hypotheses 2 and 3 are 
SOCIALCAPITAL, GOVTGRANT, and POVERTY. All issue variables are measured at the 
village level, with the exception of SOCIALCAPITAL which is measured at the district 
level and replicated at the village level. The vector ijX  includes control variables 
measured at the village level, while the vector iZ  includes controls measured at the 
district level. iu  is the district-effect, which is modeled as a random effect and presumed 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
38 One option is to include district-fixed effects for the 74 districts. With fixed-effects 
each village in a district would be treated as a repeated experiment of an essentially 
homogeneous entity in the district. But this would not necessarily be true since villages in 
a district may have considerable unobserved heterogeneity that is not captured by the 
measured variables.  
 110
to be uncorrelated with the regressors. ij  is the village level error term which is assumed 
to be (conditionally) identically and independently distributed across observations.  
 
3.4. Empirical Results 
3.4.1. Basics 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis across 3857 villages. The dependent variable is the number of people killed by 
Maoist (KILLINGS) over the eight-year period (1996-2003). The KILLINGS data are 
compiled from INSEC’s Nepal Human Rights yearbooks for those years. The per-village 
average over the eight-year period is 0.68, or a total of 2623 killings across villages. The 
main issue variable, inequality, is measured using three distinct variables: GINI, and two 
polarization measures ( 1POLARIZATION  and 1.5POLARIZATION ). The population-
weighted averages, though not reported here, are not greatly different. For  =1, GINI 
and POLARIZATION have a sample correlation equal to 0.47. But the correlation of GINI 
with 1.5POLARIZATION  drops to 0.18. As Esteban and Ray (1994) conjecture, in our 
sample the polarization and Gini indices measure fundamentally different aspects of 
inequality. While GINI measures the distribution of consumption spending in a 
continuous setting, POLARIZATION measures consumption distances within a 
community. In our sample, even when the Gini is relatively small, wealth distances 
appear to be significant.  
The issue variable social capital is measured by a group of unit-free indices. They 
quantify the coverage and intensity of five types of network groups: farmer group 
(FARMERGRP), water user groups (WATERUSERGRP), forest user groups 
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(FORESTUSERGRP), groups receiving micro-credit (CREDITGRP), and women groups 
(WOMENGRP).  
Table 3.1: Variable’s Definition and Basic Statistics (N= 3857) 
VARIABLE Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
KILLINGS 
 
No. of people killed by the Maoists in the villages 
(1996−2003) 
0.68 
 
3.72 
 
GINI Consumption GINI Index   0.24 0.04 
POLARIZATION (α=1) Polarization Index when α = 1 (see Section 3) 0.15 0.01 
POLARIZATION (α=1.5) Polarization Index when α = 1.5 0.17 0.03 
SOCIALCAPITAL Social network index  1.25 0.61 
FARMERGRP Network index of farmers 0.04 0.10 
WATERUSERGRP Network index of water user group 0.06 0.12 
FORESTUSERGRP Network index of forest user group 0.10 0.21 
CREDITGRP Network index of credit user group 0.02 0.08 
WOMENGRP Network index of women 0.12 0.27 
GOVTGRANT Per capita grant (Rupees 100) [district level] 0.43 0.56 
POVERTY % below poverty line 0.44 0.18 
POPDENSITY Population POPDENSITY 100 persons per sq km 2.93 3.66 
FARMER % farmers 0.34 0.14 
EDUCATION Average years of schooling in each village (VDC) 3.61 1.09 
RURAL 1 if rural, 0 otherwise 0.98 0.12 
MOUNTAIN 1 if Mountain, 0 otherwise 0.13 0.33 
HILL 1 if Hills, 0 otherwise 0.52 0.50 
TERAI 1 if Terai, 0 otherwise 0.36 0.48 
ETHNICITY 
 
Percentage of people who speak Nepali as primary 
language 
0.51 
 
0.38 
 
EMPLOYMENT Mean months of employment  5.60 1.35 
INCOME Mean income (Rupees ‘000) 9.24 3.46 
Notes: 
1. Data Sources:  
a. KILLINGS compiled from Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC): Nepal 
Human Rights Year Books (1996−2004). 
b. GINI, POL0, POL1, POL1.5, POVERTY, INCOME, SOCIALCAPITAL 
constructed from data obtained from Central Bureau of Statistics, 1996 Nepal 
Living Standards Survey (NLSS), and Nepal Population Census 2001; Variables 
measured using survey−to−census imputation. 
c. POPDENSITY, FARMER, EDUCATION, RURAL, MOUNTAIN, HILL, 
TERAI, ETHNICTY, EMPLOYMENT obtained from Nepal Population Census 
2001, Central Bureau of Statistics, Kathmandu. Variables measured in 2001.   
2. All variables measured at the village level except GOVTGRANT, SOCIALCAPITAL, 
FARMERGRP, WATERUSERGRP, CREDITGRP, CREDITGRP, and WOMENGRP 
which are at the district level and replicated at the village level. 
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The mean for the issue variable GOVTGRANT indicates that the mean grant is 
43.21 Rupees per person per year. Although only $0.70 in 1996 dollars, owing to the 
widespread poverty this is not a trivial amount in rural Nepal. The sample mean of 0.44 
for the variable POVERTY (poverty headcount) indicates that approximately, 44% of the 
population lives below poverty line.39  
The remaining variables are the control variables for our analysis. The statistics 
indicate that Nepal is an economically, geographically and ethnically diverse country. 
The village population is largely rural and just half of them speak Nepali as their primary 
language. It has a low level of education on average and long duration of unemployment. 
Per capita income in the sample is approximately Rupees 9240 or $145 in 1996 dollars. 
The geography variables indicate that 13% of our sample comes from the mountainous 
northern part of Nepal, and 52% comes from the hilly middle part of the Nepal (the 
remaining 36% comes from the wooded Terai in the lower part of the country).  
 
3.4.2. Testing H1 
Table 3.2 presents our first set of results from a two-level hierarchical Negative 
Binomial model. First consider Hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive relationship 
between inequality and violent conflict measured by KILLINGS. Regardless of how we 
measure inequality, the results show a strong association between inequality and the 
number of Maoist killings as predicted by the theory.40  
                                                 
39 The population-weighted average is not greatly different.  
40 The asterisks on the issue variables indicate statistical significance of one-tailed tests in 
the direction indicated by theory.  
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Table 3.2:  Conflict and (i) Inequality, (ii) Social Capital, and (iii) Government Policy 
Dependent Variable: Number of persons killed by Maoists 
Estimates from 2−level Hierarchical Negative Binomial Model  
  GINI POL (α=1) POL (α=1.5) 
IN
EQ
U
A
LI
TY
 
GINI 6.33*** (1.98)   
POLARIZATION(α=1)  
12.16*** 
(6.24)  
POLARIZATION(α=1.5)   
5.79*** 
(2.16) 
SO
C
IA
L 
C
A
PI
TA
L 
FARMERGRP −2.55*** (1.06) 
−2.72*** 
(1.05) 
−2.69*** 
(1.04) 
WATERUSERGRP −0.80 (0.91) 
−0.70 
(0.90) 
−0.76 
(0.89) 
FORESTUSERGRP 0.87 (0.56) 
0.91 
(0.55) 
0.93 
(0.55) 
CREDITGRP −0.37 (1.11) 
−0.18 
(1.10) 
−0.16 
(1.09) 
WOMENGRP −0.60** (0.35) 
−0.55* 
(0.34) 
−0.51* 
(0.34) 
G
O
V
T.
 
PO
LI
C
Y
 
GRANT −0.57*** (0.23) 
−0.54*** 
(0.23) 
−0.56*** 
(0.23) 
POVERTY 3.07*** (0.85) 
3.19*** 
(0.85) 
3.10*** 
(0.85) 
 INCOME 0.11*** (0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
 EDUCATION 0.02 (0.09) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
 EMPLOYMENT −0.02 (0.07) 
−0.004 
(0.07) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
 FARMER −0.33 (0.95) 
−0.35 
(0.95) 
−0.25 
(0.95) 
 POPDENSITY −0.11*** (0.03) 
−0.12*** 
(0.03) 
−0.12*** 
(0.03) 
 ETHNICITY  0.72*** (0.29) 
0.78*** 
(0.29) 
0.75*** 
(0.29) 
 RURAL −2.03*** (0.57) 
−2.18*** 
(0.57) 
−2.07*** 
(0.57) 
 MOUNTAIN 0.83** (0.42) 
0.76** 
(0.42) 
0.73** 
(0.41) 
 HILL 0.62** (0.31) 
0.60** 
(0.31) 
0.56** 
(0.30) 
 CONSTANT 0.83 (0.61) 
1.02 
(0.61) 
0.93 
(0.61) 
 σ2i  0.18 (0.09) 
0.16 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
 N 3857 3857 3857 
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.  For issue variables (Inequality, Social Capital, Government Policy) 
statistical significance is based on one−tailed tests as per hypotheses H1−H3.  For all other 
variables, statistical significance is based on two−tailed tests.  
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The coefficient of 6.33 measures by what percentage the number of killings 
increases with a unit change in the Gini coefficient. The reported estimates are from the 
log-link function and can be interpreted as estimates from a log-linear model. Therefore, 
an increase in GINI of 0.1 is associates with a 0.63 or 63.3%, increase in killings by 
Maoists. The 0.1 change in the Gini is approximately the amount by which the Gini for 
Nepal has changed for the last eight years (1996 – 2004, CBS 2005). Evaluated at the 
sample mean, the 63% increases in killings translate into a total (across all villages) of 
additional 1652 deaths over an eight-year period. When POLARIZATION is measured 
with  =1, a 0.10 increase in polarization leads to a 121.6% increase in Maoist killings, 
or a total of 3189 more deaths over an eight-year period. When POLARIZATION is 
measured using  =1.5, an increase of 0.10 in this measure is associated with an increase 
in Maoist killings by 57.9% or 1518 over an eight-year span. The quantitative 
implications of these estimates are, therefore, considerable regardless of the measure of 
inequality used.    
 
3.4.3. Testing H2 
Social capital is the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and 
expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to recurrent 
activities (Ostrom 1990). Our measure of village level social capital may or may not have 
a connection with trust in central government (Putnam 2000), but they are fundamentally 
tied to civic participation and governance at the village level. Village networks may 
enhance the presence of central government where it is effective, but more likely, they 
emerge as mechanisms of self-governance where government institutions have failed 
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repeatedly. Social capital in Nepal takes the form of investment in social relations 
motivated by market returns (as in Lin 2001), and social capital creates a set of informal 
values and norms within villages that encourages members of the village to cooperate (as 
in Fukuyama 1995).  
We measure social capital contributed by five user-groups. Members join these 
groups because they perceive economic and social benefits from subscribing to the norms 
developed within the group. If cooperation among group members is reinforced by actual 
improvements in social outcomes, market outcomes, and conflict-mitigation, then the 
groups are long-lived. These five user groups are long-lived. Lam’s (1998) study of 150 
irrigation systems in Nepal documents the effectiveness of farmer groups and water-user 
groups in solving common-resource pool problems. Irrigation systems governed by the 
farmers are in better condition and deliver more water at the end of the system, thus 
enhancing farm productivity, than systems governed by the Nepal Department of 
Irrigation. Ostrom (1992) models the mechanisms of why this result is consistent with the 
idea of social capital manifest in collective action by water user groups. Varughese and 
Ostrom (2001) study 18 forest-user groups in Nepal. They find that those groups that are 
able to overcome group heterogeneity (distance from the forests, wealth and ethnicity) 
and organize for collective action, have above-average forest stocks and improving trends 
in forest conditions. Those that fail to organize experience worsening forest conditions. 
Finally, women groups are motivated by increasing the social status of women and also 
increasing economic opportunities, and credit groups allow access to credit by lowering 
the risk to lenders of non-payment by individuals in the group. Norms developed in credit 
groups enable group of individuals and make it costly for individuals to default.  
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Does social capital in Nepalese villages have valuable spillover effects in 
deterring violent conflict? Table 3.2 supports this view. Farmer groups and women 
groups appear to deter Maoist killings. The quantitative implications are significant. In 
the first model, for example, as increase in the farmer group index of 0.10 (a one standard 
deviation change) is associated with a 25.5% reduction in Maoist killings. This result 
applies approximately across the three models reported in Table 3.2.  An increase in the 
women group index of 0.27 (one standard deviation change) is associated with a 16.2% 
decline in Maoist killings. These are additive. Thus, villages in which both networks are 
active may be expected to have 41.7% lower level of Maoist killings than a village in 
which neither network exists. While credit groups and water-user groups may serve an 
economic purpose, they do not appear to have any beneficial spillover effects on 
violence.  
The coefficient of forest group is positive that is contrary to a priori expectation 
(H2), which deserves explanation. There are alternative candidate explanations. In order 
to reverse the deforestation that took place after the nationalization of forests in 1957, the 
Nepal government began a policy in the late 1970s to decentralize forest resources by 
encouraging the formation of forest user-groups which would self-govern this common- 
resource pool. Agrawal and Ostrom’s (2001) comparative study of forestry 
decentralization in India and Nepal concludes that in Nepal, “….despite claiming 
participatory decentralization, the forestry program has devolved such limited property 
rights that it can scarcely be classified as a case of decentralization” (p. 503).  User 
groups can only claim to have somewhat attenuated use of access rights. Further, they 
have no managerial discretion or exclusive use rights, and constitutional choice authority 
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is retained by the government. In other words, our measure of social capital does not 
capture the more complex structure of disincentives under which user groups must 
operate. Conflicts have thus aggravated not only between user groups and the 
government but also with the user groups and the Maoists.41 
To the extent that user groups have improved the conditions of forests (Nepal et 
al. 2007), the positive coefficient requires a different explanation. Then, in villages 
without forest-user groups, deforestation has forced the emigration of the ablest, making 
them home to the poorest. If villages with forest user groups are pro-government or anti-
Maoists on average while villages without such groups are pro-Maoist, then this political 
preference (not captured by other variables) causes the positive coefficient on this 
variable. The poorer villages (those without forest-user groups) then are refuges for the 
rebels, but not the territory over which Maoist carried out violent activities.  
Women’s groups do appear to be effective in thwarting violent conflict. A 
growing number of the new members of the Maoist rebel groups have been women. The 
existence of women’s groups may discourage their participation in violence by offering 
alternative avenues for them to voice their frustrations or by enabling them to use the 
network to solve their problems. Taking up the gun then becomes the final, and possibly 
distant, resort. Farmer and women groups therefore appear to perform the function of real 
democratic institutions – developing widely accepted social norms that enable peaceful 
                                                 
41 Despite the fact that the property rights are not properly allocated in favor of the forest 
user groups, the community forests have become a good source of income for the 
villagers, and given the lawlessness in the rural Nepal during the MPW, it created a 
conflict between the villagers and the Maoists about sharing the forest income. 
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solutions to problems. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported by the negative signs on these two 
coefficients.42  It appears that this hypothesis is not supported by the social network 
related to forest user groups. We present an alternative way of looking at the role of 
social capital in reducing the violent conflict when we discuss about the non-linearity 
issue using interactive terms.    
 
3.4.4. Testing H3 
The two government policy variables – GOVTGRANTS and POVERTY are both 
estimated with the predicted signs in Hypotheses 3a and 3b. An increase in per capita 
government grants by 0.56 (56 Rupees, or one standard deviation increase) is associated 
with a 32% decrease in Maoist killings, or 839 fewer deaths over an eight-year period. 
This estimate implies that these 839 lives could be saved by increasing spending by less 
than $0.10 per Nepalese per year! A decrease in the poverty headcount by 18 percentage 
points (one standard deviation) is associated with a substantive impact on the number of 
Maoist killings. Across all three models, that magnitude of decline in poverty would 
reduce Maoist killings by 55% or by 1500 over an eight-year period. Thus, a policy that 
combines government grants with additional transfers targeted at reducing poverty can 
potentially solve much of the problem for which the Maoists are blamed. The results 
produce the message that a focused strategy of negotiating with Maoists on only these 
two aspects of government policy may not merely bring them to the table, but may 
convince Maoists to call off their violence. Of course, poverty reduction is a slow and 
                                                 
42 Though insignificant, the coefficients of WATERUSERGRP and CREDITGRP are 
also negative.  
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expensive process. Perhaps there is a role for international agencies not only as donors, 
but in ensuring that government funds find their way to the intended beneficiaries so that 
the transfers achieve their goals. 
Many of the control variables are statistically significant. The negative sign on 
population density indicates that Maoist killings occur in less dense areas. Population 
density also serves to control for scale effects. The higher the proportion of the 
population that speaks Nepali as the primary language, the greater is the number of 
Maoist killings. Rural areas experience fewer killings. The upper regions of Nepal 
consisting of mountainous and hilly areas experience more killings that the lower (Terai) 
region.   
Among the variables we use as controls, INCOME has a more direct link with the 
theory. While the theoretical model abstracts from differences in the level of income, 
Milante (2004) posits that being extremely poor puts violence beyond the economic 
means of the people. Provoking widespread unrest requires the purchase of weaponry and 
the ability to carry out the conflict over a long time period. This may be beyond the 
means of some villages. Theoretically, the optimal is a corner solution due to a “privation 
constraint”. Then very low income villages would have low level of violence. Such an 
association between income and violence is affirmed by the positive coefficient on 
INCOME. A simpler mechanism may be at work, especially if the privation constraint is 
overcome by inter-village Maoist networks. While the Maoist movement may have its 
source in these impoverished villages, they export violence from areas where their voice 
is heard the loudest to high-income villages. According to the first model, an increase in 
income of 3460 Rupees (one standard deviation) is associated with an increase of 1468 
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Maoist killings over an eight-year span. The third model indicates that a similar increase 
in income is associated with more than 2000 additional killings over an eight-year period.  
 Interestingly, the ETHNICITY variable has significant and positive association 
with Maoist violence, indicating that people whose mother tongue is Nepali are relatively 
more victimized than other ethnic groups. This result is consistent with the Maoist 
organizational strategy of attracting ethnic population towards their movements by 
promising separate states for those ethnic groups if their movement succeeds. Such 
promise of creating different states within a proposed federal system based on language 
and ethnicity became very attractive during the MPW, and even after the end of MPW, 
several ethnic groups are now demanding federal structure based on language/ethnicity.  
  
 
3.4.5. Non-linearity 
Milante (2004) posits a possibly non-linear relationship between inequality (and 
income) and violence, an idea we now explore. Specifically, we estimate the two sets of 
interaction coefficients: the first set is the interaction of the inequality variables with 
social capital. They answer the question of whether social capital ameliorates the impact 
of inequality in Maoist killings. The second is the interaction of inequality variables with 
(mean) income. It answers the question of whether an increase in income ameliorates or 
worsens the impact of the inequality on Maoist killings. 
Table 3.3 provides partial answers. Estimates on the issue variables are reported 
in Table 3.3 for two models, one that uses GINI to measure inequality and another that 
uses 1.5POLARIZATION  to measure inequality.  
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Table 3.3:  Models with Interactions of GINI and POL with (i) Income and (ii) Social 
Capital.  
Dependent Variable: Number of persons killed by Maoists 
Estimates from 2−level Hierarchical Negative Binomial Model  
  GINI POL (α=1.5) 
IN
EQ
 GINI 
6.43*** 
(2.15)  
POLARIZATION (α=1.5)  
4.60* 
(2.84) 
SO
C
IA
L 
C
A
PI
TA
L 
 
FARMERGRP −2.61*** (1.03) 
−2.47*** 
(1.02) 
WATERUSERGRP −0.41 (0.89) 
−0.50 
(0.87) 
FORESTUSERGRP 0.85 (0.54)
0.60 
(0.54) 
CREDITGRP −0.44 (1.10) 
−0.11 
(1.07) 
WOMENGRP −0.50* (0.35) 
−0.51* 
(0.33) 
 INCOME 0.16*** (0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
IN
TE
R
A
C
TI
O
N
S 
INEQ*INCOME −0.96** (0.50) 
1.85** 
(0.74) 
INEQ*FARMERGRP −2.24 (19.06) 
17.74 
(26.34) 
INEQ*WATERGRP −21.50 (18.83) 
−1.10 
(23.95) 
INEQ*FORESTGRP 13.93 (11.19) 
−33.07** 
(15.88) 
INEQ*CREDITGRP −9.93 (21.45) 
1.80 
(23.63) 
INEQ*WOMENGRP −5.74 (6.30) 
7.03 
(9.42) 
C
O
N
TR
O
LS
 
GRANT -0.58** (0.23) 
-0.54** 
(0.22) 
POVERTY 3.58*** (0.86) 
3.58*** 
(0.84) 
INCOME 0.16*** (0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
EDUCATION 0.02 (0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
EMPLOYMENT -0.03 (0.07) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
FARMER -0.28 (0.92) 
-0.22 
(0.92) 
DENSITY -0.11*** (0.03) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
ETHNICITY  0.74*** (0.28) 
0.73*** 
(0.28) 
RURAL -2.53*** (0.58) 
-1.76*** 
(0.56) 
 122
MOUNTAIN 0.91** (0.41) 
0.85** 
(0.40) 
HILL 0.64** (0.29) 
0.63** 
(0.30) 
 CONSTANT 1.38** (0.63) 
0.58 
(0.59) 
 σ2CONSTANT  0.17* (0.09) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
 Hausman χ2 (1) 2.67 4.96** 
 N 3857 3857 
 
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively.  For issue variables (Inequality, Social Capital, 
Government Policy) statistical significance is based on one−tailed tests as per 
hypotheses H1−H3.  For all other variables, statistical significance is based on 
two−tailed tests. 
2. Estimates are from the underlying log−link function and therefore to be 
interpreted as coefficients from a log−linear model. 
 
In the former, the income-interaction effects indicate that higher mean-village 
income is associated with lower marginal impact of inequality on Maoist violence. That 
is, as the level of the village income rises, it dampens the impact that inequality has on 
violence. One reason for this finding is an obvious one. The more (less) affluent village is 
more (less) able to protect itself against Maoist violence by convincing the government to 
divert the services of the army and the police to their region and/or purchase protection 
privately by donating money to the Maoists. A less obvious reason is that the same Gini 
in high and low-income villages translates into a better standard of living for all residents 
in the high-income village relative to the low-income villages.43 Thus, the impact of 
inequality on the intensity of violence is less in high-income villages. Beyond a certain 
threshold level of income, inequality has no influence on violence. It is in areas where 
inequality is large and the average income is low where Maoist violence is at its worst. 
                                                 
43 In the sample, GINI and INCOME have a correlation of 0.50. In contrast, 
1.5POLARIZATION has a small negative correlation with INCOME.  
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This finding indicates that when income level of the villagers goes up, the opportunity 
cost of the violent activities would go up for the given level of inequality, resulting into 
reduced level of violent activities.   
A fundamental difference between our two measures of inequality is that 
measuring inequality by 1.5POLARIZATION , leads to the opposite inference. The positive 
sign on the interaction of 1.5POLARIZATION  and INCOME indicates that higher (mean) 
income in fact exacerbates the marginal impact of polarization on Maoist violence. The 
same level of 1.5POLARIZATION  in high and low-income villages does not necessarily 
translate into a higher standard of living for all residents in high-income village relative 
to the low-income village.  This distinguishes the impact of polarization on conflict from 
the impact of the Gini on conflict. If there is a causal connection between inequality and 
conflict (we explore this further below), growth without redistribution that adequately 
decreases polarization (not merely the Gini), will have little impact on reducing killings 
by Maoists. Thus, high economic growth rate is not only desirable but extremely essential 
for the long run solution of the ongoing violent conflicts in Nepal.    
The model with the Gini shows that the interaction of GINI with social capital 
measures has no noticeable influence on the marginal impact of inequality on Maoist 
violence. On the other hand, the model with polarization indicates that activities of forest 
groups do ameliorate the impact of increased polarization on Maoist killings. The cross-
partial coefficient of -33.07 is economically significant, indicating that a one-standard 
deviation increase in FORESTGRP (=0.21) ameliorates the impact of a one-standard 
deviation increase in POLARIZATION (=0.03) on Maoist killings by 546 deaths over an 
eight-year period. Thus, while income growth reverses the deleterious impact of a 
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deteriorating Gini, it takes a specific type of social capital (forest groups) to reverse the 
deleterious impact of worsening polarization.  
 
3.4.6. Endogenity 
So far, we have presumed the inequality measures to be exogenous. Arguably, 
they are since GINI and POLARIZATION move slowly over time. It is possible, however, 
that shocks to the error term, for instance due to a sudden outbreak of violence in a 
region, are correlated with similar movements in these variables. If there is significant 
out-migration of, say, wealthy landlords or high-income families in response to sudden 
outbursts of violence, then they are negatively correlated with the error term, and their 
coefficient estimates are downward biased. In order to instrument for possible endogenity 
of GINI and 1.5POLARIZATION  we construct four instruments using data from the 1984 
Nepal statistics. They are: log of the number of students in school in the district, 
percentage of the district’s population with secondary-level education, log of the district’s 
land area, and percentage of the district land area under paddy cultivation. Arguably, 
these are exogenous. The first-stage F-statistic for the four instruments in the GINI is 
19.48 and in the 1.5POLARIZATION  equation is 7.40. The first-stage F-statistics indicate 
that the four variables do not suffer from a weak instrument problem (Stock and Watson 
1997). Having instrumented for endogenity, the theory allows use to make causal 
inferences.    
The results from the second-stage estimation of the two-level hierarchical 
negative binomial model are reported in Table 3.4. As surmised, the uninstrumented 
models understate the impact of inequality on violent conflict.  
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Table 3.4:  Models with Instrumented GINI and POLARIZATION 
Dependent Variable: Number of persons killed by Maoists 
Estimates from two−stage 2−level Hierarchical Negative Binomial Model  
  GINI POL (α=1) POL (α=1.5) 
IN
EQ
U
A
LI
TY
   
GINI 32.55** (15.26)   
POLARIZATION (α=1)  
165.04** 
(94.27)  
POLARIZATION (α=1.5)   
50.88** 
(29.34) 
SO
C
IA
L 
C
A
PI
TA
L 
FARMERGRP −2.38*** (1.00) 
−2.72*** 
(1.01) 
−1.96** 
(1.11) 
WATERUSERGRP −1.75** (0.97) 
−1.93** 
(1.14) 
−1.86* 
(1.15) 
FORESTUSERGRP 1.29 (0.58) 
1.25 
(0.59) 
0.90 
(0.54) 
CREDITGRP −1.77* (1.23) 
−0.74 
(1.12) 
−0.08 
(1.07) 
WOMENGRP −0.73** (0.33) 
−0.42 
(0.35) 
−0.25 
(0.40) 
G
O
V
T.
 
PO
LI
C
Y
 
GRANT −0.72*** (0.24) 
−0.79*** 
(0.27) 
−0.87*** 
(0.30) 
POVERTY 3.42*** (0.84) 
2.69*** 
(0.90) 
1.23 
(1.48) 
 INCOME −0.05 (0.10) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
 EDUCATION 0.02 (0.09) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
 EMPLOYMENT −0.02 (0.07) 
−0.12 
(0.11) 
−0.13 
(0.11) 
 FARMER 1.71 (1.42) 
2.54 
(2.12) 
1.44 
(1.62) 
 POPDENSITY −0.03 (0.05) 
−0.06 
(0.05) 
−0.12 
(0.03) 
 ETHNICITY  0.30 (0.39) 
0.98*** 
(0.30) 
0.90*** 
(0.30) 
 RURAL −1.16 (0.76) 
−1.22 
(0.83) 
−0.65 
(1.09) 
 MOUNTAIN 1.37*** (0.50) 
1.08*** 
(0.46) 
0.45 
(0.44 
 HILL 1.04*** (0.38) 
1.10*** 
(0.43) 
0.52* 
(0.30) 
 CONSTANT −0.36 (0.940 
−0.24 
(1.00) 
−0.41 
(1.08) 
 σ2i  0.12 (0.07) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
 N 3857 3857 3857 
Note:  
1. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
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The estimate of 32.55 on GINI indicates that an increase of 0.026 in GINI (a one standard 
deviation change in the instrumented Gini) causes an 85% increase in Maoist killing, or 
total of 2219 additional deaths over an eight-year period. The estimate of 50.88 on 
1.5POLARIZATION  indicates that a 0.011 increase in 1.5POLARIZATION  (a one-standard 
deviation change) causes an increase of 56% in Maoist killings, or 1468 more deaths over 
an eight-year period. These estimates are substantially larger than their uninstrumented 
counterparts in Table 3.2. 
Of interest are the interaction terms in Table 3.5. INCOME is no longer 
statistically significant in the model with GINI, but their interaction is negative and 
statistically significant, just as in the uninstrumented case, indicating that an increase in 
income ameliorates the marginal impact of the Gini on Maoist killings. In contrast, if 
inequality is measured by 1.5POLARIZATION , an increase in income no longer 
exacerbates the marginal impact of polarization on Maoist killings. There are two 
significant differences between the uninstrumented results in Table 3.3 from those in 
Table 3.5. The interactions of POLARIZATION with credit groups and women groups are 
statistically significant and economically large positive coefficients. While credit groups 
alleviate Maoist killings (coefficient of -2.66), the greater is 1.5POLARIZATION  the less 
effective are credit groups in ameliorating the impact of polarization on violence (positive 
coefficient on interaction term). The positive coefficient on the interaction of 
1.5POLARIZATION  with women groups is somewhat of a puzzle. While women groups 
themselves are not necessarily influential in lowering the number of killings, the presence 
of women groups actually heightens or exacerbates the marginal influence of polarization 
on Maoist violence.  
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Table 3.5:  Models with Instrumented GINI and POLARIZATION and their interactions 
Dependent Variable: Number of persons killed by Maoists 
Estimates from two−stage 2−level Hierarchical Negative Binomial Model  
  GINI POL (α=1.5) 
IN
EQ
 GINI 
30.39** 
(14.78)  
POLARIZATION (α=1.5)  
63.29*** 
(26.52) 
SO
C
IA
L 
C
A
PI
TA
L 
 
FARMERGRP −2.26*** (0.96) 
−2.51*** 
(1.10) 
WATERUSERGRP −1.31* (0.94) 
−1.74** 
(1.04) 
FORESTUSERGRP 1.18 (0.57) 
1.12 
(0.53) 
CREDITGRP −2.00* (1.35) 
−2.66** 
(1.27) 
WOMENGRP −0.75** (0.34) 
0.43 
(0.41) 
 INCOME 0.07 (0.11) 
0.23*** 
(0.05) 
IN
TE
R
A
C
TI
O
N
S 
INEQ*INCOME −1.45*** (0.55) 
1.54 
(1.93) 
INEQ*FARMERGRP 3.31 (29.84) 
−67.79 
(99.48) 
INEQ*WATERGRP - 
101.84 
(78.91) 
INEQ*FORESTGRP −3.52 (17.61) 
−17.06 
(51.32) 
INEQ*CREDITGRP −1.65 (39.00) 
306.09** 
(136.51) 
INEQ*WOMENGRP - 
104.24*** 
(32.67) 
C
O
N
TR
O
LS
 
GRANT -0.72*** (0.24) 
-1.18*** 
(0.28) 
POVERTY 4.58*** (0.93) 
1.37 
(1.38) 
EDUCATION 0.03 (0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
EMPLOYMENT -0.04 (0.07) 
-0.17 
(0.10) 
FARMER 1.75 (1.38) 
2.28 
(1.50) 
DENSITY -0.05 (0.05) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
ETHNICITY  0.26 (0.38) 
0.99*** 
(0.28) 
RURAL -1.88** (0.80) 
-0.22 
(1.10) 
MOUNTAIN 1.50*** (0.49) 
0.44 
(0.41) 
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HILL 1.10*** (0.37) 
0.46 
(0.29) 
 CONSTANT 0.39 (0.96) 
-0.82 
(1.09) 
 σ2CONSTANT  0.11 (0.07) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
 N 3857 3857 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively.  For issue variables (Inequality, Social Capital, Government 
Policy) statistical significance is based on one−tailed tests as per hypotheses H1−H3.  For 
all other variables, statistical significance is based on two−tailed tests. 
2. Estimates are from the underlying log−link function and therefore to be interpreted as 
coefficients from a log−linear model. 
3. INEQ in the interactions refers to the instrumented GINI or OLARIZATION. 
4. Including GINI*WATERGRP and GINI*WOMENGRP cause the Hessian to 
be near-singular and so are dropped from the first model. 
 
Have women groups in highly polarized villages redefined themselves as Maoist 
activists? If so, this disturbing phenomenon deserves further study. There is evidence of 
increasing participation of women in Maoist groups.44 This appears to be a most 
pernicious impact of increased polarization. A group that heretofore tried to achieve more 
equality by contributing social capital is now driven to achieve the same goal by any 
means possible.  
                                                 
44 It is reported that in the Maoist organization about 50% cadres at the local level and 
30% of the soldiers are women (SATP n.d.).  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSUMPTION INSURANCE UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A CASE OF NEPAL 
DURING MAOIST INSURGENCY 
4.1. Introduction  
In most of the developing countries credit and insurance markets are either poorly 
functioning or completely absent leaving households exposed to different kinds of risks. 
But, surprisingly, various studies show that households in developing countries are 
mostly insured against the idiosyncratic shocks even in the absence of formal credit or 
insurance mechanisms. Generally, informal social mechanisms and institutions may fill 
the gap in the absence of formal credits and insurance markets; then, the fear is that any 
attempt to provide formal insurance may crowd-out the existing social insurance systems. 
But, during civil wars or violent conflicts, the probability of reneging on contracts would 
be high as violent conflicts or civil war destabilizes the existing social institutions, and 
the contract enforcement would be weaker if the borrower threatens violence. Such 
behavior may compel households to opt for costly self-insurance, destabilizing the 
existing social insurance system that would otherwise help the community to share the 
risks in times of need.  
The full consumption insurance hypothesis asserts that in the case of risk-sharing 
and resource pooling, individual household consumption would be related to the 
aggregate consumption of the community regardless of the household’s income change.  
But, such risk-sharing and resource pooling may be absent during violent conflicts. If this 
is the case, then as asserted in Mace (1991), the growth rate of per capita household 
consumption would be more closely related to household income rather than to aggregate 
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consumption of the community. Such expectations about the nature of relationships 
between the household consumption with household income and aggregate consumption 
of the community permit an empirical distinction between the two benchmarks of risk 
sharing and autarky even in the situation of violent conflict.  
The objective of this research is to investigate to what extent households can 
insure their consumption against idiosyncratic shocks during such violent conflicts. In 
earlier studies of the theory of full consumption insurance, shocks such as illness, 
unemployment, and the likes are considered as idiosyncratic. In this study we consider a 
different set of shocks: In addition to the income shock, we also consider positive shocks 
such as remittances, and negative shocks such as violent conflicts and natural disaster. 
Our main goal is to investigate about: Is household consumption growth immune from 
the transfer income, such as remittances? Can the local traditional institutions guard the 
consumption loss of households during times of violent conflict or natural disasters by 
pooling their resources?  
Basically, our interest is to investigate to what extent households are insured not 
only against non-transfer income shocks as analyzed in the existing literature but also 
against transfer income shocks, and other non-traditional shocks such as natural disasters 
and deaths of family members or neighbors due to violent conflicts. For our analysis, we 
derive the implications of the full consumption insurance theory and use Nepali 
household surveys for empirical investigation. We identify the primary sampling unit 
(PSU) as an effective insurance community. It is because within a PSU, households are 
geographically close to each other and can enforce informal insurance by creating 
credible threat of non-cooperation in case of non-compliance by any participating 
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household.45 In such a community, each household can get signals about other 
household’s income or wealth and can work together so that they can establish regular 
contact to enforce an informal implementation mechanism by creating trust, a necessary 
element that determines the success or failure of any informal social insurance within 
networks. Such a closely-knitted community would be able to lower the transaction costs 
by creating trust (Jarillo 1990), prevent moral hazard and incentive-related problems and 
solve the Pareto optimal planning problem for the community where households pool 
their resources and insure each other using informal mechanisms if they are allowed to 
interact for a long period of time (Fafchamps 1992). Such informal insurance system may 
take a varieties of forms, such as, interest free loans, exchange of labor, rent free access 
to cultivating land, grain transfers in times of need, etc., (as in Plattaeu 1991). In a large 
community, these criteria are unlikely to be met, partly because of the free-rider 
(monitoring) problem and partly because of the transaction cost, contrary to the small or 
closely-knitted community.  
The theory of full consumption insurance predicts that household consumption 
should depend on aggregate shocks but not on idiosyncratic shocks. Using panel data 
from Nepal, we test the implication of the full consumption insurance hypothesis in the 
presence of economic, natural and violence related shocks. We find a positive significant 
relationship between the growth rate of household consumption and aggregate shocks 
indicating the presence of effective risk pooling in the given community. At the same 
                                                 
45 Using data from the Phillipines, Fafchamps and Gubert (2005) show that the informal 
insurance systems tend to spread risk over households who live in proximity and have 
similar income and occupations.   
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time, we also find significant impact of idiosyncratic shocks on the household 
consumption implying the rejection of the notion of the full consumption insurance, but 
the impact of different shocks is not homogeneous to all households. We find that the 
poor, socially disadvantaged caste/ethnic groups and households with low education 
levels are more vulnerable to the idiosyncratic shocks than their counterparts.   
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the theory of full 
consumption insurance, and derived testable hypotheses form the theory. Section 4.3 
provides the description of the data used for empirical analysis. In Section 4.4, we 
summarize the econometric methodology adopted for the analysis followed by the 
empirical results in Section 4.5.   
 
 4.2. Consumption Insurance 
4.2.1. Basic Theory  
As in Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994), consider an economy 
with N households where household h has a time separable, state contingent utility 
[ ( ), ( )]ht t ht tU C s s   that depends on household consumption ( )ht tC s  at time t, event   
and preference shifters ( ( ))ht ts . Also assume that each household has a finite time 
horizon (T), and experiences a variety of events ( )ts at time t with probability 
( )ts [0,1]  and    = 1, 2, …, S, where each event is a collection of states of the world. 
In the absence of formal credit and insurance markets, if all of the households pool their 
resources and insure each other against idiosyncratic shocks, then the risk-sharing Pareto-
optimal consumption allocation can be derived from the social planner’s perspective that 
maximizes a weighted sum of the individual households’ life-time utilities: 
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 max 
1 1 1
( ) ( ) [ ( ), ( )]
N T S
t
h h t ht t ht t
h t
s U C s s  

   
  
  ,           [4.1]  
where h  is the Pareto (or planner’s) weight for household h such that h (0,1)  and 
1
N
h
h


 =1, and h  is the subjective time discount rate of household h. The resource 
constraint is that the aggregate consumption ( ( )At tC s ) must not exceed the sum of 
resources, composed of transfer income (Aht) and non-transfer income (Yht) of all 
households at each date and each state: 
 ( )At tC s 
1
( )
N
ht t
h
C s

    
1
( ( ) ( ))
N
ht t ht t
h
A s Y s 

  ( )At tE s ,         [4.2] 
where ( )At tE s  is the total amount of consumption good available at period t. Now the 
planning problem is to maximize [4.1] subject to [4.2]. The first order conditions with 
respect to ( )ht tC s  are given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ))th t h C ht t ht ts U C s s      = ( )t ts ,           [4.3]  
where ( )t ts  is the Lagrange multiplier at time t in state   that does not depend on the 
particular household’s resources. Eq. [4.3] indicates that optimization of the planning 
problem generates the equality of weighted marginal utilities across the individual 
households as the equilibrium condition. The ex-ante uncertainty related to [4.3] 
disappears once the households realize state  , and the household fixed effect can be 
eliminated by taking the ratio of [4.3] for an individual household at two different dates 
resulting into:  
       ( 1) ( 1)
( , )
( , )
C h t h t
h
C ht ht
U C
U C
 
   = 1t
t


            [4.4] 
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Eq. [4.4] indicates that the discounted growth rate of marginal utility is constant across 
households and it is determined by the growth rate of the Lagrange multiplier that itself is 
unrelated to household h income or the endowment. As the Lagrange multiplier is a 
function of the aggregate resource available to the community at two different dates, not 
the individual household’s resource growth, the full consumption insurance hypothesis 
predicts that the growth rate of the household’s marginal utility is independent of the 
growth rate of the individual household’s resources.   
  In order to put the full consumption insurance into empirical testing, we need to 
derive the form of the equation that needs to be estimated. For this purpose, consider a 
power utility function with multiplicative preference shocks (Mace 1991; Cochrane 
1991):46   
 ( , )ht htU C   = 1 ( )ht hte C  ,             [4.5] 
where (1  ) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion that is assumed constant across 
households and we need 1   for concavity. The marginal utility with respect to Cht is 
given by  
 ( )C htU C  = 
1( )ht hte C
                [4.6] 
 Combining [4.4] with [4.6] and taking logs gives 
( 1)ln h t
ht
C
C
   
 =  1 ( 1)
1 ln ( ) ln( )
1
t
h t ht h
t
     


           
         [4.7] 
                                                 
46 Given our short panel data with several year’s gap in between, we use a growth rate 
model which can be derived from the power utility function.  
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Eq. [4.7] implies that for a power utility function there is a positive linear relationship 
between the growth rate of individual household consumption and the growth rate of 
aggregate consumption. Generally, panel data are affected by nonseparability, functional 
form, and generalization of preference shocks. While running a regression based on [4.7], 
the right hand side variables must be uncorrelated over time with variation in the growth 
of the Lagrange multiplier, as well as preference shocks and measurement errors. To 
control for this problem, most of the researchers including Mace (1991) and Townsend 
(1994) include aggregate consumption growth on the right hand side variable as 
aggregate shocks. Cochrane (1991) argues that the use of the aggregate consumption 
growth taken over the sub-sample being studied, not the entire population of the 
community, may not serve its purpose due to the small sample. To avoid the correlation 
issue raised by Cochrane, we use the village specific aggregate consumption growth of 
the entire household, not the aggregate consumption growth of sub-sample being studied. 
As indicated by Eq. [4.7], the regression model should not include any level variables as 
it is the standard approach of panel data analysis (Stock and Watson 2003).  We specify 
our econometric model as  
 ln htC  = ( ln , ln , ; )At ht ht htf C Y X u               [4.8]   
where ln htC  is per capita household consumption growth rate, ln AtC  is (are) the 
aggregate shock(s) to the community (aggregate consumption growth at the community 
level), ln htY  is a vector of idiosyncratic shocks to individual households (growth rate of 
the household resources measured in terms of the non-transfer income and transfer 
income, e.g., remittances), htX  is the change in the preference shifters of the household 
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(e.g., changes in household size, age and sex compositions between two dates47), htu  is 
the error term that captures the measurement errors of the dependent variable and the 
change in the household h unobservable preference shifters, and   is a vector of 
regression parameters that are to be estimated econometrically.  
The growth rate specification of [4.8] avoids the correlation from omitted 
unobserved household characteristics, and hence avoids problems of omitted variables 
bias. This specification is similar to Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Townsend (1994) 
and many other studies with the fundamental difference that we do not use the level-value 
of any arbitrary variable as the right hand side variables. As asserted by Stock, Wright 
and Yogo (2002), we use the generalized method of moments (GMM), where the choice 
of the right-hand variables is dictated by the first-order conditions, not by a debatable 
exclusion principle as using first order conditions derived from economic theory and 
careful consideration of instrument exogeneity is a standard part of any empirical analysis 
using GMM. 
    
4.2.2. Hypotheses 
The full consumption insurance theory described above generates two testable 
hypotheses.  
                                                 
47 One can make a point that level of education can be a good candidate of the preference 
shifters. Within the given analytical framework, level of education affects income, not the 
consumption, so level of education is used as an instrument, not as an argument of the 
growth rate of the household consumption.   
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H1: Given that households in their insurance community pool resources and 
insure each other for unforeseen shocks, then the per capita growth rate of the 
household consumption should grow linearly at the aggregate growth rate of 
community level consumption, i.e.,  
ln AtC
 = 1.   
H2: As the household level resources does not enter into the first order conditions 
[4.4], the effect of idiosyncratic shocks to growth rate of the per capita household 
consumption should be zero, i.e.,  
ln htY
 = 0.  
In empirical settings, we will test these two hypotheses jointly as predicted by the theory 
as  
H3: 
ln AtC
 = 1 & 0k  , k .  
Inclusion of more shocks may change the number of parameters to be tested, but the basic 
idea remains the same. We will test this hypothesis jointly where we use more than one 
idiosyncratic shock.  
 
4.2.3. Earlier works and results   
Several authors have developed and tested the idea of consumption insurance. 
Theoretical works by Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968) show that a household’s 
consumption does not depend on idiosyncratic income shocks once aggregate shocks are 
taken into account under a Pareto-optimal consumption plan. Using data from the Panel 
Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) of the US households, Cochrane (1991) finds some 
support to the theory of consumption insurance, but not against all types of shocks.  
Mace (1991) reports mixed support for the theory of full consumption insurance 
using a panel from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (1980-83). Townsend (1994) 
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provides evidence of risk-sharing among the villagers in rural India where formal credit 
and insurance markets are absent. Using the same PSID date set, Hayashi et. al. (1996) 
find no support for the intra- as well as inter-family full risk-sharing. Using a panel data 
set from Indonesia, Gertler and Gruber (2002) document imperfect consumption 
insurance over major illnesses as a measure of idiosyncratic shock. More recent studies 
(Skoufias 2003; Mu 2006) reject the hypothesis of perfect consumption insurance in 
Russia, but find that food-consumption is better protected than non-food consumption.         
 
4.3. Data Descriptions 
The data used for this research come from two rounds of Nepal Living Standard 
Survey (NLSS) conducted in 1995/96 and 2003/04 by the Nepal Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) in collaboration with the World Bank. Both of these surveys followed 
the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology and a 
two-stage stratified sampling was used to collect nationally representative samples. In 
both rounds, two sets of questionnaires, at the household and community level, were 
administered and the data were collected during a one-year period to cover a complete 
cycle of agricultural activities and to capture seasonal variations in different variables. In 
the first round of NLSS (1995/96), 3373 households are included in the survey and in the 
second round (2003/04), the sample size is 3912 households. Along with these main 
surveys, CBS also collected panel data from 962 households around the country during 
those surveys. We use panel data for this research along with the data from the main 
surveys. Other than the village level aggregate consumption, and violence related 
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information, all other variables used in this paper are drawn from the panel aspect of the 
NLSS.   
The conflict-related data are collected from the Informal Sector Services Center 
(INSEC), a not-for-profit national human rights organization in Nepal. The number of 
deaths in the villages due to the violent conflict since 1996 are obtained from the annual 
reports (1996-2004) of the INSEC, and aggregated up to 2004.  We personally converted 
all the reported deaths due to the violence in those reports in the usable format as those 
human rights reports contain the narrative of the events, not the casualty data in a usable 
format.  Another source of our data is population census of 2001. In our panel data or full 
NLSS samples, small numbers of households were chosen from each Primary Sampling 
Unit (PSU) to collect household information.  Due to the small sample, any single 
household consumption may have significant effect on the community (PSU) level 
consumption. In order to avoid influence of individual household on the community level 
consumption aggregate, a variable that we use as a measure of aggregate shocks in the 
community, we use village level average consumption. But the NLSS samples do not 
have the village level consumption information. In order to overcome deficiency of 
village level consumption information we use the population census for imputing the 
household consumption using the recently developed micro-level estimation techniques 
(Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2003).  
Basically, we use the full NLSS samples to impute expenditures for the 
households that are enumerated in the population census as the census data do not have 
the households’ welfare measures such as income or expenditures. We use the following 
procedure for imputation. Let yh be the household h’s expenditure obtained from the 
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NLSS survey. A regression of yh on a vector of covariates Xh, where Xh are chosen so that 
they are available in the NLSS as well as in the census data, is estimated using the 
generalized least squares method. Then the estimated model is used to impute the census 
household expenditures from which we computed community (village) level 
expenditures. Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics and definition of the variables used 
in the empirical analysis. 
  
4.4. Econometric Methods 
In this chapter we test the full consumption insurance hypothesis using household 
survey data from Nepal. This section describes the econometric method used for 
estimating the model presented in Section II (Eq. 4.8) and testing the hypotheses implied 
by the theory. Though we are using panel data, we have only two observations for each 
household, and these observations are several years apart. Therefore, we use the power 
utility in order to test the proposed hypotheses as this functional form allows us to use 
growth rates of the relevant variables, not just the difference.48 As noted in Cochrane 
(1991) and Hayashi, et al. (1996), the panel data with longer gaps may be a blessing in 
disguise as it helps to avoid certain deficiencies present in the more frequent panel data 
with shorter horizon. The longer period allows more households to receive shocks while 
                                                 
48 In such a specification, the individual fixed effects are removed when the observations 
are first differenced. Given that consumption and income are in logarithms, it accounts 
for potential differences in the inflation rate across communities (Skoufias 2003).  
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the timing problems that result form using a discrete-time model to study time aggregates 
would be reduced.49  
For analytical purposes, we disaggregate the total household expenditure into 
food-expenditure and non-food expenditure. As we use the household’s expenditure 
growth rates as dependent variable, ordinary least squares (OLS) would be the starting 
point for econometric estimation as it is the most common estimation method used in the 
earlier studies. But, as specified in Eq. [4.8], the growth rate of household income also 
enters as a right-hand-side variable, and measured income is likely to be correlated with 
the measurement error in household consumption that violates the fundamental 
assumption of OLS. Additionally, the Anderson-Rubin endogenity test (Baum, Schaffer 
and Stillman 2003) shows that some of the right-hand variables are endogenous. So, 
inferences from OLS estimates would not be valid for hypotheses testing.     
An alternative to the OLS is two-stage least squares (TSLS) or instrumental-
variable (IV) estimation that takes into account the endogenity of income or some other 
variables used as right-hand side variables. Both of these methods basically inherit the 
basic assumption of homoskedasticity from the OLS. In our sample data, the White-
Koenker test (White 1980; Koenker 1981) shows that the errors in IV-method are 
heteroskedastic. If the error terms exhibit heteroskedasticity of unknown form, as in our 
                                                 
49 But the longer periods may also capture the change in living standards over many years 
rather than the effects of the sudden shocks that might more plausibly be insured 
(Cochrane 1991). If short term income is dominated by transitory income changes, such 
as remittances, the orthogonality conditions may have low power in GMM estimation 
(Hayashi, Atonji and Kotlikoff 1996).  
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sample, then the inference about hypothesis testing under IV-method is again invalid 
even if one uses standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (Dufour 2003) and 
diagnostics for endogenity and over-identifying restrictions would also be invalid (Baum, 
Schaffer and Stillman 2003). Furthermore, the household surveys that we are using are 
designed using multi-stage stratified cluster-sampling. In such a situation it is possible 
that error terms are correlated within but not across the clusters. The consequence of such 
clustering resembles that of the presence of heteroskedasticity where traditional IV 
estimation becomes problematic. As an alternative to IV estimation, one can use the 
generalized methods of moments (GMM) proposed by Hansen (1982) in the presence of 
heterogeneity of unknown form.  
The GMM makes use of the orthogonality conditions to allow efficient estimation 
in the presence of heterogeneity of unknown form, but it still requires strong instruments 
for the endogenous variables.50 If model is poorly identified, then as discussed in Stock 
and Write (1995), continuously- updated GMM provides better estimates. Use of strong 
instruments is the basic requirement for efficient GMM estimates, and finding such 
strong instruments is an arduous task; we utilize the continuously-updated GMM method 
(also called continuously-updated estimation (CUE)) in which the test statistic is robust in 
the light of weak instruments. Hansen, Heaton and Yaron (1996) develop the idea of 
                                                 
50 The validity of the instruments is a serious issue in GMM estimation, where validity 
implies orthogonal to the errors but correlated to endogenous regressors. If instruments 
are irrelevant or weak, then the sampling distributions of GMM as well as IV statistics 
are non-normal and standard GMM and IV point estimates, hypothesis tests, and 
confidence intervals are unreliable.  
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CUE and show that this estimation technique has several advantages over the TSLS, IV, 
or GMM, such as more reliable test statistics and insensitivity to parameter-dependent 
scale factors.51 
 
4.5. Empirical Results 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for empirical 
analysis. For empirical analysis, we divide total household consumption per capita, the 
dependent variable, into food and non-food consumption and separately use the growth 
                                                 
51 For a regression model: y X u  , if ( ) 0t tE X u  , one can use the IV method for 
estimation, which is a special case of GMM. If the error variance is heteroskedastic, then 
one needs to use GMM. The idea of continuously updated GMM estimator (CUE) can be 
summarized as follows (Hansen, Heaton and Yaron 1996). Write the moment conditions 
as [ ( , )] 0tE X   , where   is k-dimensional vector of interest, (.)  has n k  
coordinates, and 
1
2
1
{ ( , )}
T
t
t
T X 

 (0, ( ))N V  .  Then an efficient GMM estimator of 
the parameter vector   is constructed by choosing c (consistent estimator of  ) that 
minimizes 1 1 1
1 1
[ ( , )]'[ ( )] [ ( , )]
T T
t c T c t c
t t
T X V T X      
 
  , where ( )TV  consistent (but 
infeasible) estimator of covariance matrix that also works as a weighting matrix in GMM 
estimation. Instead of taking the weighting matrix as fixed, if we consider an estimator in 
which the covariance matrix is continuously updated as c  changes in the above 
minimization problem, then we get an alternative GMM estimator, called the 
continuously-updated estimator (CUE).  
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rate of per capita household consumption (GRHPCTCON), growth rate of household per 
capita food consumption (GRHPCFCON) and growth rate of household per capita non-
food consumption (GRHPCNFCON) as the dependent variables.  
The major explanatory variables are the growth rate of per capita consumption 
(GRVPCCON) at the village level, growth rate of household per capita income 
(GRHPCINC) and the change in remittance (DREMITTANCE) received by the 
households between 1995/96 and 2003/04.52 The first explanatory variable 
(GRVPCCON) is used as a proxy for aggregate shocks to the households in the given 
community, and the other two variables (GRHPCINC and DREMITTANCE) are used as 
the proxy of idiosyncratic shocks at the household level.    
We also use the number of people killed during 1996-2003 (cumulative deaths 
due to the Maoist rebels (MKILL) as well as the cumulative total deaths (TOTKILL)) in 
the villages as an additional regressor.53 Definitely, these variables measure shocks to the 
                                                 
52 Use of the growth rate of remittances received by the households is problematic as not 
all households in 1995/96 had received remittances. If some household received 
remittances in 2003/04 but not in 1995/96, then the growth rate goes to infinity creating a 
practical problem in empirical analysis. To avoid such practical difficulties, we use 
difference(s), not the growth rate(s) of those variables that did not have values in both 
ends.   
53 As the number of deaths due to government forces is about two-thirds of the tatal, and 
it is highly correlated with the total number of deaths, we exclude this measure from our 
analysis. Our approach of cumulating regressors resembles Cochrane (1991), where right 
hand side variables are cumulated for three years, and the growth rate of the dependent 
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households, but whether it is idiosyncratic or aggregate to the households is an open 
question. If a family lost its member(s) due to the conflict that may be idiosyncratic to the 
household, and for the rest of the community that may serve as an aggregate shock. In our 
data set, we have the total number of deaths in each village, but we do not have a separate 
account of the deaths where one can see which household in the given community lost 
their family member(s).  
Along with the variables that are used to measure various shocks to the 
households, we also use three more variables as the measure of preference shifters of the 
households. They include the change in the household size (DHHZIZE), the change in the 
age (DHHAGE) and sex (DHHSEX) compositions of the households. An obvious 
advantage of our panel data with more than a year span is apparent here since we can 
observe significant changes in these preference shifters that may be absent in the case of 
more frequent panel data.    
The main idea of the full consumption insurance theory is that the growth of the 
per capita consumption will not depend on changes in household resources that are 
uncorrelated with shifts in preferences once the growth in community resources are taken 
into account. We use the household per capita income growth as a measure of 
idiosyncratic shocks. In developed countries, most of the incomes are insured, but in 
developing countries, such as Nepal, the household income is not insured at all indicating 
                                                                                                                                                 
variable (food consumption) was measured for a three-year period, not as a year-to-year 
basis. The longer period analysis can be viewed as a test of the change in the standard of 
living over many years (rejection of full consumption may indicate slow changes in the 
living standards over many years).   
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that household income serves better proxy for the idiosyncratic shocks. Still, household 
income alone may not capture all types of risks and shocks; we also include direct 
measures of shocks/risks, such as the non-transfer income (remittances), risks due to 
violent conflict, and environmental shocks, such as flooding.  
Obtaining accurate measurement of household income or expenditure through 
survey is difficult if not impossible. Deaton (2000) asserts that in many surveys, 
household consumption and income suffer significant levels of measurement error. Also, 
the number of people killed in the given village may depend on several factors including 
political activities of the rebels, presence of social capital in the community, presence of 
security forces, population density, distributional issues like inequality, and so on. In 
Table 4.1, we can see the wider cross-sectional variations in household consumption, 
income and the measure of violence, such as MKILL (number of people killed by Maoist) 
and TOTKILL (total deaths due to the violence), indicating that there is good deal of 
measurement error in our data. Therefore, we suspect that growth rate of household per 
capita income (GRHPCINC) and the number of people killed (MKILL and TOTKILL) 
may be endogenous. The Anderson-Rubin (1950) endogenity test shows that these two 
variables are actually endogenous. We use several variables as the instruments to correct 
for the endogenity, including the household and community characteristics that are 
expected to be correlated to the growth rate of the household per capita income and the 
violence, but orthogonal to the error term.54  
 
 
                                                 
54 See Table 4.1 footnote for the list of instruments.   
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Table 4.1: Variables Definitions and Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Definition 
Sample Mean (S.D.) 
1995/96 2003/04 
PCHTCON 
 
Household per capita total consumption (Rs.)  
 
9924 
(11589) 
19557 
(22270) 
PCHFCON 
 
 Household per capita food consumption (Rs.) 
 
5820 
(6149) 
10944 
(11813) 
PCHNFCON 
 
Household per capita non-food consumption (Rs.) 
 
4104 
(8336) 
8993 
(16318) 
VPCCON 
 
Village per capita Consumption(Rs) 
 
9761 
(5079) 
18094 
(11515) 
PCHINC 
 
Household per capita income excluding remittance (Rs.) 
 
11622 
(34858) 
17352 
(25114) 
MKILL 
 
Number of deaths due to Maoist in each village 
 - 
2.57 
(5.37) 
TOTKILL 
 
Number of total deaths in each village 
 - 
7.20 
(15.61) 
REMITTANCE 
 
Household remittance income (Rs.) 
 
4637 
(45031) 
11913 
(44725) 
HHSIZE 
 
Household size 
 
6.00 
(2.74) 
5.75 
(2.73) 
HHAGE 
 
Average age of household members 
 
25.39 
(10.24) 
29.18 
(12.65) 
HHSEX 
 
Percentage of male in household 
 
0.49 
(0.17) 
0.48 
(0.18) 
FLOOD 
 
Binary variable (1 if flood in the past five years, else 0) 
 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
Note: Standard deviations within parentheses. 
1. Data sources:  
PCHTCON, PCHFCON, FCHNFCON, PCHINC, REMITTANCE, HHSIZE, HHAGE, 
HHSEX, and FLOOD-- Nepal Living Standard Surveys (Panel) 1995/96 and 2003/04, 
Central Bureau of Statistics (Nepal) and the World Bank; MKILL and TOTKILL-- 
Informal Sector Services Center (INSEC); VPCCON -- Survey-to-Census imputation 
through small area estimates.  
 
2. Instruments (figures within parentheses are average values):  
i) Categorical variables: if the caste/ethnicity is low (31%) or middle (37%), if the 
electricity is available (36%), if child works (2%), if household owns house (95%); 
ii) Household (per capita) level variable: schooling (4.48 years/member), employment 
(5.32 months/year), illness (3.26days/year); members working in farm (27%); number of 
livestock (4.2/household); 
iii) Change in community level social network indices between 1995/96 and 2003/04: 
farmer network index (27%), water network index (23%), forest network index (38%), 
and women network index (39%); 
iv) Others: district’s population density in 2001 (541/sq km); public facility index (59%).    
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In order to see the relevancy and sufficiency of these instruments, and the need of the 
particular estimation method, we perform several statistical tests as described in section 
4.4  All of these test statistics are summarized in the respective tables.   
 
4.5.1. Non-Food Consumption 
Table 4.2 presents the results from the continuously updated GMM (also called 
CUE) estimates where the dependent variable is the growth rate of the household per 
capita non-food consumption (GRHPCNFCON). All together, the results from four 
different models are presented in Table 4.2. Model-A1 and Model-A2 are similar except 
that the former uses MKILL and the latter uses TOTKILL as a measure of risk coming 
from the violent conflict. In the next two models, we add one more explanatory variable, 
DFLOOD, in order to check the robustness of the model specifications.  
Before discussing about the actual results, the lower-half of Table 4.2 deserves 
proper explanation as it reports several tests statistics about the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, instrument relevance, and under and over-identification issues.55 The 
White-Koenker test for the presence of heteroskedasticity indicates the strong presence of 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form in all models. As we are using more than one 
endogenous variables, the usual first-stage F-statistics56 or partial R2 may not provide 
sufficient information about the relevancy and sufficiency of the instruments.  
                                                 
55 We also report these test statistics in all other tables as well. 
56 For a single endogenous variable, F < 10 in the first-stage is a cause for concern, but 
with multiple endogenous variables, such a rule of thumb is not applicable (Staiger and 
White 1997).   
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Table 4.2: Continuously Updated GMM Estimates (Dep. Var.: Non-Food Exp.) 
 Ind. Var.↓ Model-A1 Model-A2 Model-A3 Model-A4 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.364*** 
(0.071) 
0.361*** 
(0.072) 
0.339*** 
(0.082) 
0.339*** 
(0.082) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHHINC 
0.062 
(0.070) 
0.070 
(0.072) 
0.114* 
(0.088) 
0.125* 
(0.090) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
M
A
N
 M
A
D
E 
SH
O
C
K
S LMKILL 
0.051 
(0.053) 
- 
 
0.015 
(0.061) - 
LTOTKILL 
- 
 
0.030 
(0.040) - 
0.004 
(0.046) 
N
A
TU
R
A
L 
SH
O
C
K
 
DFLOOD - - 
0.095 
(0.116) 
0.095 
(0.116) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.066*** 
(0.012) 
-0.066*** 
(0.012) 
-0.063*** 
(0.012) 
-0.063*** 
(0.013) 
DHHAGE 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
DHHSEX 
0.166 
(0.133) 
0.170 
(0.133) 
0.164 
(0.132) 
0.165 
(0.132) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.403*** 
(0.053) 
0.404*** 
(0.055) 
0.428*** 
(0.063) 
0.429*** 
(0.065) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ222) 41.65*** 41.91*** 41.85*** 41.65*** 
b Anderson LR-Stat.( χ216) 70.86*** 66.94*** 50.20*** 48.58*** 
c Hansen J-Stat. ( χ215) 5.92 6.17 5.06 5.10 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat. (χ217) 26.63* 26.63* 26.78** 26.78** 
e χ2(k) [H0: ln AtC = 1 & k = 0, k ] 85.67*** 84.60*** 82.84*** 82.16*** 
Over-all R2 0.542 0.543 0.545 0.544 
No of Instruments 17 17 17 17 
No of Observations 922 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  Hansen test of 
relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all instruments are relevant/over 
ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of 
endogenous variables are jointly insignificant); e Joint hypothesis of full consumption 
insurance where k= 4 for first two models and k=5 for the last two models; Cluster-
robust standard errors are within parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by 
the theory.  
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So, we perform Anderson canonical correlation test (Anderson 1977) for the under-
identification of the moments conditions. The test statistic shows that our models do not 
suffer from an under-identification problem (the null of under-identification is strongly 
rejected). An alternative to the Anderson canonical correlation (LR) statistics is Hansen 
(1982) J- statistic. This is a test of the joint hypotheses of correct specification of the 
model and the orthogonality conditions. The J-statistics are sufficiently small so that we 
cannot reject the null of instrument relevancy and over-identification.  Such a failure to 
reject the null in our sample implies proper identification and orthogonality of the 
instruments, the necessary conditions to make any inferences using the estimated 
coefficients.57 
As indicated by all of the test statistics, the models are correctly identified and the 
instruments are properly chosen.58 Table 4.2 presents our first set of results using four 
models were the dependent variable is growth rate of household per capita non-food 
                                                 
57 Since the GMM method suffers the weak identification problem we use CUE, as this 
procedure is robust to weak identification (Stock, Wright and Yogo 2002).   
58 As we use a relatively larger set of excluded instruments, we also perform redundancy 
as well as orthogonality tests of a subset of instruments using ‘difference-in-Sargan’ test, 
also called C-test (Hayashi 2000). In the case of the redundancy test, the null of 
redundant instruments is strongly rejected, and in the case of the orthogonality test for a 
subset of instruments, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that both sets (suspected set 
and the remaining set) of instruments are orthogonal and valid. As the C-test shows that 
the suspected sub-set of instruments is relevant and we retain all 17 instruments for 
estimation.  
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consumption. The only difference in the first two models (Model-A1 & A2) is that 
Model-A1 has MKILL and Model-A2 has TOTKILL as an explanatory variable. The last 
two models have one additional explanatory variable (DFLOOD) that is used to test 
robustness of the model specifications. Regardless of the model specifications, our results 
indicate that for every 10% increase in village level aggregate consumption, the per 
capita household consumption increases by 3.6%, an indication of weak association 
between those two variables. Over all, the results show that there is less than perfect but 
positive (
ln AtC
 = 0.36) association between GRVPCCON and GRHPCNFCON implying 
that partial risk-sharing in non-food consumption is taking place in the communities 
where sample households are residing. The coefficient of GRHPCINC is positive but 
insignificant in the case of Model-A1 and Model-A2, and it is weakly significant in the 
case Model-A3 and Model-A4. Numerically, for every 10% increase in the growth rate of 
the household per capita income, the per capita non-food consumption grows in the range 
of 0.62% - 1.2%, depending on the model that we use. Statistically, these coefficients are 
mostly insignificant, indicating that the growth rate of non-food consumption is not 
significantly affected by the growth rate of household income. This is an indication of the 
presence of risk pooling in the case of non-food consumption within the given 
community.    
 The coefficient of DREMITTANCE in Model-A1 is 0.008 and significant at 5% 
level, indicating that an additional 1000 Rupees remittance for every household leads to 
an increase in non-food consumption by 0.008%.59  The coefficient of DREMITTANCE is 
                                                 
59 We measure the remittance in 1000 Rupees in order to account for the scale issue. If 
we use growth rate of remittance, it forces us to drop a significant number of households 
 152
not significantly different among the four models. There might be several implications of 
the significant coefficients of this transfer income, which is available only for the one-
third of the sample households. First, household consumption is not fully protected from 
the shocks originating from transfer incomes. Second, as remittances cause non-food 
consumption to grow significantly, and only one-third of households are receiving the 
remittance income in 2003/04, it may be contributing to the widening expenditure 
inequality in the country.   
The effect of the violence related shocks (MKILL and TOTKILL) appears to be 
positive but insignificant on the growth rate of household’s per capita non-food 
consumption indicating that the violent conflict does not tend to affect household’s non-
food consumption. This result is surprising on the ground that it is contrary to a priori 
expectation of a negative effect of conflict on household non-food consumption. The 
insignificant impact of violent conflict on non-food consumption can be explained with 
the widespread poverty in the country where the non-food consumption share is very 
small for a majority of households, and this portion of consumption may be already so 
low or it may be the bare minimum level that is required for survival of the households 
and cannot go down further even in the face of the violent conflict.60  
                                                                                                                                                 
from our analysis as not all households that are receiving remittances in 2003/04 had 
remittance income in 1995/96.    
60 In our sample, the share of non-food consumption ranges from 1% - 88% with the 
mean share 35%, implying that, on average, about 65% of total household expenditure 
goes to food consumption. In the case of low income households, the share of non-food 
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After including an environmental shock (DFLOOD in Model-3A and Model-4A), 
a variable that measures the occurrence of natural disasters, such as flooding in the given 
community, the basic results do not change.  This variable measures the presence or 
absence of flooding in the given community during the past five years before conducting 
each survey. The coefficient of DFLOOD is positive but insignificant indicating that 
shocks coming from natural disasters, such as flood, are basically insured within the local 
community, a result consistent with the existing literature (Mace 1991; Cochrane 1991; 
Townsend 1994; Gertler and Gruber 2002). However, the joint hypothesis of the full 
consumption insurance (
ln AtC
 = 1 and k = 0, k  ) is strongly rejected at 1 percent 
level. This rejection is basically because of the less than perfect relationship between the 
aggregate shock and non-food consumption (
ln
1A
tC
  ) but not because of the significant 
impact of idiosyncratic shocks ( 0k  , k ) on the household non-food consumption. In 
all cases, we use cluster-robust standard errors as our panel data are clustered in the 
primary sampling units (PSUs), a section of a village from where the sample was taken 
using multi-stage stratified sampling scheme. 
Other control variables used to account for the shift in household preferences are 
change in household size (DHHSIZE), change in household age (DHHAGE) and sex 
(DHHSEX) compositions. The significant negative coefficient for DHHSIZE indicates 
that given the resources and preference shifters, increased household size drags down the 
non-food consumption growth rate of the households. This result is consistent across 
                                                                                                                                                 
consumption on total expenditure is even smaller indicating that food-consumption may 
have suffered due to the violent conflict.   
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different models. The increase in household’s average age has a positive significant effect 
on the growth rate of the household’s per capita consumption, while the change in sex 
composition has no significant effect on the consumption growth indicating that the non-
food consumption growth is not gender sensitive.    
 
4.5.2. Food Consumption 
Table 4.3 presents the continuously updated GMM estimates when dependent 
variable is the growth rate of household per capita food consumption (GRHPCFCON). 
Except for the change in the dependent variable, we use the same set of right hand side 
variables that are used for different models presented in the Table 4.2. Here, the 
coefficient of GRVPCCON is significantly higher than what we have in Table 4.2 for 
non-food consumption. The coefficient of 0.70 (approximately equal across all four 
models) indicates that for every 10% increase in GRVPCCON, there is 7% increase in the 
growth rate of per capita household food consumption. The impact of per capita 
household income is significant and much higher in food consumption than for the case 
of non-food consumption.  
The coefficients of DREMITTANCE across different models are smaller and 
barely significant at 10% in some cases, whereas in the case of non-food consumption 
(Table 4.2), the remittance has a positive significant effect. This finding indicates that the 
household level food consumption growth is more vulnerable than the non-food 
consumption growth to the change in household non-transfer income. This finding 
contradicts the Skoufias’ (2003) finding for Russia where food consumption is relatively 
better insured than the non-food consumption.  
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Table 4.3: Continuously Updated GMM Estimates (Dep. Var.: Food Exp.) 
 Ind. Var.↓ Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.714*** 
(0.073) 
0.673*** 
(0.078) 
0.733*** 
(0.077) 
0.705*** 
(0.080) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHHINC 
0.200** 
(0.090) 
0.181** 
(0.082) 
0.215** 
(0.095) 
0.217*** 
(0.093) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
M
A
N
 M
A
D
E 
SH
O
C
K
S LMKILL 
-0.147** 
(0.066) 
- 
 
-0.170*** 
(0.073) - 
LTOTKILL 
- 
 
-0.084** 
(0.042) - 
-0.117** 
(0.052) 
N
A
TU
R
A
L 
SH
O
C
K
 
DFLOOD - - 
-0.048 
(0.051) 
-0.039 
(0.054) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.054*** 
(0.010) 
-0.057*** 
(0.010) 
-0.054*** 
(0.010) 
-0.054*** 
(0.010) 
DHHAGE 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
DHHSEX 
0.007 
(0.154) 
0.007 
(0.155) 
0.048 
(0.154) 
0.038 
(0.157) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.064 
(0.053) 
0.080 
(0.057) 
0.053 
(0.055) 
0.072 
(0.060) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ2(22)) 38.92*** 42.84*** 39.99** 43.56*** 
b Anderson LR-Stat. ( χ2(16)) 50.28*** 48.67*** 50.11*** 47.60*** 
c Hansen J-Stat.  ( χ2(15)) 17.4 19.59 17.76 20.14 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat.  (χ2(17)) 44.55*** 44.55*** 49.85*** 49.85*** 
e χ2(k) [H0: ln AtC = 1 & k = 0, k ] 18.62*** 21.13*** 19.54*** 20.92*** 
Over-all R2 0.583 0.588 0.573 0.567 
No of Instruments 17 17 17 17 
No of Observations 922 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  Hansen test of 
relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all instruments are relevant/over 
ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of 
endogenous variables are jointly insignificant); e Joint hypothesis of full consumption 
insurance where k= 4 for first two models and k=5 for the last two models; Cluster-
robust standard errors are within parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by 
the theory.  
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However, the food consumption growth rate is less responsive to the change in transfer 
(remittance) income as there is very weak statistical evidence for it (hardly significant at 
10% level with one-tailed test).    
Here, we can observe some fundamental differences in the results presented in 
Table 4.3 from the results from Table 4.2. In the case of the food consumption (Table 
4.3) , the effect of the violence-related shocks is negative and significant, indicating that 
household food security has declined due to the violence. The coefficient of LMKILL (-
0.147 in Model-B1 and -0.170 in Model-B3) suggests that for every 10% increase in 
violence due to the Maoists, the growth rate of the food consumption declines in the 
range of 0.015% - 0.017%. This number is significantly smaller (0.008% in Model-B2 
and 0.012% in Model-B4) in the case of LTOTKILL, indicating that the negative impact 
of the violence related shocks (level of insecurity) among the villagers may be different 
depending on who was responsible for creating the terror in the given community. First, 
regardless of who killed the people in the village, the impact of violence on the household 
food consumption is negative. Second, the decline, however, is not the same for killings 
by the Maoists and the overall deaths. The higher reduction in the food consumption 
growth in the case of LMKILL as compared to the reduction in food consumption due to 
LTOTKILL suggests that supporters of the Maoists who are living side by side in the 
villages may suffer relatively less than others who do not support the Maoist cause, a 
finding consistent with a common perception.  
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4.5.3. Total Consumption 
In Table 4.4, we present the continuously updated GMM estimates where the 
dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita household total expenditure. Here 
again, we use the same set of right hand side variables as in the previous tables. The 
coefficient of GRVPCCON is 0.75 and is approximately the same for all four models. It 
indicates that for every 10% increase in the growth of the aggregate consumption, 
household consumption increases by 7.5%, ceteris paribus. Such a less-than-perfect but 
high association between the household consumption growth and the community level 
aggregate consumption growth provides evidence of partial insurance of the household 
consumption within the local insurance community. This number is much higher than for 
the case of non-food consumption (Table 4.2). The coefficient of GRPCHINC (0.12 and 
it is approximately the same across different models) is positive and significant indicating 
that for every 10% increase in household income growth there would be a 1.2% increase 
in household consumption growth. These coefficients are larger than the predictions 
made by the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) under no risk sharing (1% increase in 
transitory income increases consumption by 1% times the interest rate (Cochrane 1991)). 
This indicates that household consumption is not protected from idiosyncratic shocks.   
The coefficient of transfer income (DREMITTANCE) is positive and significant 
across the models, indicating that remittance has a positive effect on household 
consumption growth. Given that only one-in-three households received the remittances in 
2003/04 in our sample, and the remittance income is contributing significantly to the 
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growth rate of household consumption, the expenditure inequality must have been rising 
in Nepal.61  
The effect of violence (MKILL and TOTKILL) is negative but insignificant on the 
growth rate of household’s per capita consumption indicating that the violent conflict is 
lowering the overall consumption growth of the households, but the reduction is not 
significant. This result is surprising on the grounds that it is contrary to a priori 
expectation of the effect of conflict on the household consumption. The implication is 
that the overall consumption growth rate is least affected by the ongoing conflict. The 
joint hypothesis of the full consumption insurance (
ln AtC
 = 1 and k = 0, k  ) is 
strongly rejected at the 1 percent level. The rejection of the full consumption insurance 
may also be related to the slower pace of change in living standards (Cochrane 1991) as 
we are using growth rates over a seven-year period. After including the environmental 
shock (Model-A3 and Model-A4), a variable that measures the occurrences of natural 
disasters, such as flood, the basic results do not change. The coefficient of DFLOOD is 
negative but insignificant indicating that the shocks coming from natural disasters are 
basically insured within the insurance community. The coefficients of the remaining 
control variables are qualitatively similar to the previous results.    
 
 
                                                 
61 Our finding is supported by the increasing expenditure inequality between 1995/96 and 
2003/04 in Nepal. CBS (2005) reports that the expenditure GINI index has been 
increased from 0.34 to 0.42 between these two years that is also confirmed in previous 
chapter (chapter 2).  
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Table 4.4: Continuously Updated GMM Estimates (Dep. Var.: Total Exp.) 
 Ind. Var.↓ Model-C1 Model-C2 Model-C3 Model-C4 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.754*** 
(0.042) 
0.750*** 
(0.042) 
0.767*** 
(0.042) 
0.761*** 
(0.042) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHHINC 
0.127** 
(0.061) 
0.116** 
(0.057) 
0.127** 
(0.061) 
0.112** 
(0.057) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
M
A
N
 M
A
D
E 
SH
O
C
K
S LMKILL 
-0.039 
(0.040) 
- 
 
-0.041 
(0.040) - 
LTOTKILL 
- 
 
-0.022 
(0.026) - 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
N
A
TU
R
A
L 
SH
O
C
K
 
DFLOOD - - 
-0.043 
(0.042) 
-0.033 
(0.042) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.053*** 
(0.009) 
-0.054*** 
(0.009) 
-0.053*** 
(0.009) 
-0.054*** 
(0.009) 
DHHAGE 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
DHHSEX 
0.087 
(0.122) 
0.066 
(0.123) 
0.079 
(0.122) 
0.061 
(0.122) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.066** 
(0.032) 
0.069** 
(0.032) 
0.060* 
(0.032) 
0.064** 
(0.032) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ222) 57.74*** 57.93*** 58.83*** 59.25*** 
b Anderson  LR- Stat.( χ216) 50.28*** 48.67*** 50.20*** 48.58*** 
c Hansen J- Stat. ( χ215) 14.45 14.78 14.02 14.47 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat. (χ217) 27.87** 27.87** 27.58** 27.58** 
e χ2(k) [H0: ln AtC = 1 & k = 0, k ] 38.32*** 39.82*** 37.07*** 38.65*** 
Over-all R2 0.674 0.677 0.675 0.678 
No of Instruments 17 17 17 17 
No of Observations 922 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  Hansen test of 
relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all instruments are relevant/over 
ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of 
endogenous variables are jointly insignificant); e Joint hypothesis of full consumption 
insurance where k= 4 for first two models and k=5 for the last two models; Cluster-
robust standard errors are within parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by 
the theory.  
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One might argue that the households may adopt costly and inefficient self-insurance 
activities during the violent conflict as conflict imposes higher transaction costs and 
contract enforcement becomes costly if the borrower threatens violence. In the face of 
uncertainty about the future due to the high intensity violent conflict, it would be hard to 
find the lender and households may be forced to opt for autarky. In the case of autarky, 
the household’s consumption is more closely related to household income than to the 
community level aggregate consumption, a scenario that is absent in our data. In all three 
consumption categories (non-food, food and total) the coefficient of aggregate 
consumption is positive and significant, and always greater than the coefficient of 
household income suggesting that even under high-intensity conflicts, some form of risk 
sharing is taking place within the local village (insurance community).  
 
4.5.4. Vulnerability to Food Consumption  
 So far we have seen that there is partial insurance of household consumption in a 
given community, and food consumption is less insured (more vulnerable) than non-food 
and total consumption. In this section we explore the level of food consumption 
vulnerability of households based on their characteristics. We identify three such 
characteristics: socially disadvantaged low caste/ethnicity (LOW-CASTE), low education 
(LOW-EDU), and low income (POOR).62 In our sample, about 32% households are from 
                                                 
62 Banerjee and Dulfo (2007) document the economic lives of the poor/extremely poor  
households from 13 different countries where they find that poor have very little access to 
formal insurance and consumption is strongly affected by variations in their incomes, and 
evidence of consumption vulnerability of the poor.   
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socially disadvantaged, low caste/ethnic groups that are considered as the most deprived 
social strata in Nepal. Over 35% of households have a very low education level, and 50% 
are relatively poor.63  We identify these characteristics in order to analyze the relative 
vulnerability of households in food consumption as food expenditure comprises over 
65% of overall households’ expenditure in our sample. The relative vulnerability is 
measured in terms of the coefficient of the interaction between growth rate of per capita 
income and one of the characteristics of the households we just mentioned. We estimate 
the following equation: 
0 1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln ( ln )
A
ht t ht ht ht ht ht htC C Y Z Y Z X u                  , [4.9] 
Where htZ = 1 if {LOW-CASTE, LOW-EDU, POOR}, 0 otherwise. In this setting, the 
coefficient of the interaction term ( 4 ) measures the relative vulnerability (if 4 > 0 and 
significant) of households with chosen characteristics, htZ . In order to avoid multi-
colinearity, we use one characteristic at a time when estimating equation [4.9] as these 
                                                 
63 We identify the socially disadvantaged households as the so called ‘untouchables’, and 
other households with similar social status. In the NLSS surveys, households are 
identified by based on their caste/ethnicity that we use for identifying the low caste/ethnic 
households. For expositional purpose, we use two years or less of average household 
schooling to identify the households with low education level since less than three years 
of schooling is below the primary level education, and we assume that less than primary 
level education is equivalent to no education at all. We use two-thirds of the national 
average income in order to identify the relatively poor households, but our results remain 
robust with the change in the cut-off income for relatively poor households.  
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characteristics are correlated with each other.64 The rest of the variables used in [4.9] are 
already defined in [4.8]. 
  Table 4.5 presents the continuously updated GMM estimates for equation [4.9]. 
The coefficient of the interaction term (LOW-CASTE*INCOME) in Model-D1 is negative 
and insignificant ( 4  = -0.193) indicating that the level of food-consumption 
vulnerability for the low caste/ethnic households is not significantly different from the 
reference group. The coefficient of the interaction term in Model-D2 (LOW-
EDU*GRPCHINC), which measures the marginal effect of the growth rate of household 
income on food consumption if the household’s education level is low, is positive and 
significant (0.774). It indicates that for households with no or very low level of 
education, a 10% increase in the growth rate of household income leads to increase the 
household food consumption growth by 7.74%, an indication of high vulnerability of the 
households’ food consumption growth with low level of education relative to households 
with higher level of education. The coefficient of the POOR*GRPCHINC in Model-D3 is 
positive and significant (0.369), indicating that food-consumption vulnerability of poor 
households is much higher than for non-poor households.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 The correlation between low-caste and poor is 0.28; it is 0.22 between low-caste and 
low-education, and 0.27 between poor and low-education.  
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Table 4.5: Continuously Updated GMM Estimates for Comparing Vulnerability of 
Households under Different Characteristics (Dep. Var.: Food Exp.)  
 Ind. Var.↓ Model-D1 Model-D2 Model-D3 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.762*** 
(0.068) 
0.745*** 
(0.099) 
0.818*** 
(0.069) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHINC 
0.240** 
(0.122) 
0.270** 
(0.136) 
0.250** 
(0.122) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.013** 
(0.008) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
LO
W
-C
A
ST
E 
LOW-CASTE 
0.152** 
(0.069) - - 
LOWCASTE*GRPCHINC 
-0.193 
(0.250) - - 
LO
W
-
ED
U
C
A
TI
O
N
 
LOW-EDUCATION - 
0.052 
(0.090) - 
LOWEDU*GRPCHINC - 
0.774** 
(0.374) - 
LO
W
-
IN
C
O
M
E 
POOR - - 
0.193* 
(0.116) 
POOR*GRPCHINC - - 
0.369* 
(0.222) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.060*** 
(0.010) 
-0.039*** 
(0.018) 
-0.049*** 
(0.013) 
DHHAGE 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
DHHSEX 
-0.002 
(0.156) 
0.212 
(0.255) 
0.168 
(0.180) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.010 
(0.068) 
0.195** 
(0.098) 
0.008 
(0.107) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ2(22)) 33.12* 78.16*** 31.96* 
b Anderson LR-Stat.   ( χ2(14)) 23.47** 27.50** 21.57* 
c Hansen J-Stat.  ( χ2(13)) 15.65 14.83 15.16 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat.  (χ2(16)) 37.48*** 40.82*** 50.73*** 
Over-all R2 0.578 0.497 0.388 
No of Instruments 16 16 16 
No of Observations 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  Hansen test of 
relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all instruments are relevant/over 
ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of 
endogenous variables are jointly insignificant); Cluster-robust standard errors are within 
parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by the theory. 
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4.5.5. Consumption Insurance for Low Caste/Ethnic Households 
The evidence so far indicates that low caste/ethnic households are not more 
vulnerable than the other households in terms of food consumption. It is contrary to the 
general expectation as the low caste/ethnic households are socially disadvantaged and 
discriminated in the society, in terms of access to education and employment. We further 
test the consumption insurance hypothesis for the low caste/ethnic households. Given 
their low social status, those households may have stronger social networks in a given 
village and may help each other out in times of needs. Such type of social insurance 
through caste/ethnicity based social networks is observed in India (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig 2005). If this is the case, then the low caste/ethnic households might have 
full consumption insurance through their own social networks in a given village.  
Table 4.6 presents the results from CU-GMM estimates for the sub-sample of low 
caste/ethnic households where the dependent variable is the growth rate of household per 
capita food consumption. Here, we re-estimate Models B1, B2, B3 and B4 for the sub-
sample. As surmised, the coefficients of all but aggregate consumption growth are 
insignificant across all models, and the joint hypothesis of full consumption insurance is 
not rejected, indicating that full consumption insurance is taking place for low 
caste/ethnic households in a given village. Support to the full consumption insurance 
hypothesis in the case of low caste/ethnic households may be due to the fact that those 
households may have good social networks, and help each other out given their 
disadvantaged position in Nepalese society. Though the issue is interesting, the survey 
data does not report any such information that allows us further investigation.   
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Table 4.6: Continuously Updated GMM Estimates (Dep. Var.: Food Exp. for Low 
Caste/Ethnic HHs) 
 Ind. Var.↓ Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.781*** 
(0.134) 
0.773*** 
(0.129) 
0.839*** 
(0.123) 
0.827*** 
(0.118) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHHINC 
-0.022 
(0.123) 
-0.027 
(0.123) 
-0.033 
(0.122) 
-0.033 
(0.122) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
M
A
N
 M
A
D
E 
SH
O
C
K
S LMKILL 
0.019 
(0.172) - 
0.032 
(0.171) - 
LTOTKILL - 
0.035 
(0.101) - 
0.053 
(0.100) 
N
A
T.
 
SH
O
C
K
 
DFLOOD - - 
-0.119 
(0.017) 
-0.123 
(0.104) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.092*** 
(0.017) 
-0.092*** 
(0.017) 
-0.091*** 
(0.017) 
-0.092*** 
(0.017) 
DHHAGE 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
DHHSEX 
-0.184 
(0.317) 
-0.207 
(0.321) 
-0.183 
(0.312) 
-0.225 
(0.317) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.126 
(0.131) 
0.123 
(0.122) 
0.062 
(0.129) 
0.063 
(0.117) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ2(20)) 26.20 27.19 28.31 30.09* 
b Anderson LR-Stat. ( χ2(14)) 27.67** 26.96** 27.66** 27.22** 
c Hansen J-Stat.  ( χ2(13)) 9.80 9.61 10.44 10.14 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat.  (χ2(15)) 30.21** 30.21** 31.09*** 31.09*** 
e χ2(4) [H0: ln AtC = 1 & k = 0, k ] 3.86 3.73 2.75 2.74 
Over-all R2 0.600 0.597 0.599 0.596 
No of Instruments 15 15 15 15 
No of Observations 922 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  Hansen test of 
relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all instruments are relevant/over 
ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of 
endogenous variables are jointly insignificant); e Joint hypothesis of full consumption 
insurance where k= 4 for first two models and k=5 for the last two models; Cluster-
robust standard errors are within parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by 
the theory.  
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4.5.6. Coping Mechanisms 
 In the absence of formal insurance markets, households may smooth their 
consumption using local informal institutions and sometimes they may participate in 
costly self-insurance activities, such as depleting their savings and selling assets in order 
to protect household consumption during bad times. In our sample, it seems that the 
credit market is used to some extent for smoothing household consumption as the share 
of loans to total household consumption is over 30% for the entire sample of households, 
and this ratio is about 46% for the sub-sample where households actually borrowed 
money (over 66% of households did that) for several purposes. For those households who 
borrowed money for consumption purpose (over 35% of households), the average ratio of 
credit to total consumption is 22.2% (ranging from 0.2% to 206%). Other than 
borrowing, about 25% of households use self-employment as a coping mechanism, and 
about the same percentage of households use share-cropping as a measure of 
income/consumption smoothing.65  
 In this sub-section, we investigate different coping strategies of the Nepalese 
households.  Using panel aspect of NLSS-II data, we identify three different coping 
strategies of households, and analyze how the households are coping with different 
shocks, such as, food deficit, illness, violence in the village, and flooding. We run three 
logit regressions in which the dependent variable is the one of the coping strategies that 
we mention above. We use various shocks as explanatory variables along with 
                                                 
65 Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find that during bad years, children from poor family leave 
schools, a tendency absent in our sample as only six households reported school drop-out 
out of 960 households surveyed in the sample.    
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households’ characteristics, community characteristics, and ecological belts. For 
household characteristics, we use caste/ethnicity, gender, age, education, and 
landholdings status (land owner or landless); for community characteristic, we use  the 
presence of various kinds of social networks, such as, forest user groups, water user 
groups, women groups farmer groups and credit groups, perception index of households 
about the adequacy of the public facilities, such as, drinking water, electricity, post-
office, public-health, road, school, and telephone in the villages; and  for ecological belts 
we use mountain or hills with flat plain as the base category.  
As we can see from Table 4.7, the probability of share-cropping goes down with 
the presence of violence in the village and if the household members are more educated; 
the probability of share-cropping goes up if the household experience flooding and the 
household head is a male. The probability of self-employment goes down if the 
household receives remittances; such probability goes up if the household belong to the 
low caste/ethnicity, if the household is land less, if the household members are educated 
and if the household head is a male. The probability of borrowing for consumption 
purpose goes up if the household experiences food-deficit, without such borrowing it is 
very likely that households would starve. The probability of borrowing for consumption 
goes down if the household is living in a village where violence is broken out, or if the 
household members are educated. This makes intuitive sense as violence increases the 
transaction costs of borrowing, and borrowing for consumption is un-productive activity 
that an educated (informed) household can avoid.  
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Table 4.7: Logit Estimates for Household Coping Strategies (Dep Var.: Coping Strategy)  
 
Coping 
Strategy   Share-Cropping Self-Employed Borrowing for Consumption 
 Variables  Coeff. dy dx  Coeff. dy dx  Coeff. dy dx  
D
IF
FE
R
EN
T 
 S
H
O
C
K
S FOODDEFICIT 
0.246 
(0.202) 
0.042 
(0.036) 
0.034 
(0.199) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
0.771*** 
(0.175) 
0.177*** 
(0.042) 
ILLNESS 
0.054 
(0.193) 
0.009 
(0.032) 
0.243 
(0.187) 
0.041 
(0.033) 
0.268 
(0.175) 
0.060 
(0.040) 
VIOLENCE 
-0.152* 
(0.091) 
-0.025* 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.084) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.329*** 
(0.081) 
-0.072*** 
(0.018) 
REMITTANCE 
0.301 
(0.190) 
0.051 
(0.033) 
-0.803*** 
(0.217) 
-0.122*** 
(0.030) 
-0.040 
(0.173) 
-0.009 
(0.038) 
FLOOD 
0.781*** 
(0.242) 
0.148*** 
(0.051) 
0.002 
(0.277) 
0.000 
(0.046) 
0.208 
(0.229) 
0.047 
(0.053) 
H
O
U
SE
H
O
LD
 C
H
A
R
A
C
TE
R
IS
TI
C
S 
LOW CASTE 
-0.216 
(0.251) 
-0.035 
(0.040) 
1.382*** 
(0.262) 
0.258*** 
(0.051) 
-0.212 
90.217) 
-0.046 
(0.046) 
MID CASTE 
0.153 
(0.219) 
0.026 
(0.488) 
0.221 
(0.229) 
0.037 
(0.039) 
-0.223 
(0.194) 
-0.048 
(0.042) 
MALE HEAD 
1.030*** 
(0.264) 
0.140*** 
(0.029) 
0.619** 
(0.276) 
0.091** 
(0.035) 
-0.026 
(0.203) 
-0.006 
90.045) 
HHAGE 
-0.037*** 
(0.008) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
HHEDU 
-0.082*** 
(0.025) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.090*** 
(0.023) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.066*** 
(0.021) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
LANDLESS 
0.010 
(0.260) 
0.002 
(0.043) 
0.521** 
(0.226) 
0.093** 
(0.043) 
-0.169 
(0.213) 
-0.037 
(0.045) 
Wald (χ219) 102.95*** 99.38*** 124.37*** 
ˆ Pr( )y coping j   0.208 0.207 0.326 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.128 0.118 
No of Observations  922 922 922 
 
Note: Other than various shocks and household characteristics, we also use community 
characteristics such as, presence of various kinds of social networks (forest user groups, 
water user groups, women groups and farmer groups), perception index of households 
about the adequacy of the public facilities (drinking water, electricity, post-office, public-
health, road, school, and telephone) in the villages, ecological belts (mountain or hills 
with flat plain as a base category). Coefficients of these community characteristics as 
well as the constant term are not included in the table. Robust standard errors are within 
parentheses.  
 
4.5.7. Instrument Sensitivity 
The CUE estimates may be very sensitive to the instruments. We, therefore, 
estimate all of the different models presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 with a different 
sub-sets of instruments to test the sensitivity of results with respect to the set of 
instruments. We do so by removing sub-sets of instruments from the original set of 17. 
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The instruments taken out are related to social network indices (farmer index, water 
index, forest index, and women index).  The CUE estimates with the smaller set of 
instruments are reported in three additional tables below (Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10). Now 
we can compare the results from Table 4.2 and Table 4.8, Table 4.3 and Table 4.9, and 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.10. A closer look reveals that there is no fundamental (qualitative 
or quantitative) differences between the new results and the ones presented in Tables 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4, indicating that our results are not sensitive to the particular sub-set of 
instruments. The stability of the coefficients and standard errors with the use of different 
sets of instruments also indicates that our CUE estimates do not suffer weak instruments 
or identification problems. If identification is weak, then estimated coefficients would be 
very sensitive to the different subset of instruments (Stock, Wright and Yogo 2002).     
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Table 4.8: Continuously Updated GMM Est. (Sub-set of Instruments, Dep. Var.: Non-Food Exp.) 
 Ind. Var.↓ Model-E1 Model-E2 Model-E3 Model-E4 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.369*** 
(0.074) 
0.370*** 
(0.073) 
0.350*** 
(0.084) 
0.351*** 
(0.083) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHHINC 
0.126 
(0.104) 
0.148 
(0.152) 
0.122 
(0.104) 
0.143 
(0.103) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
M
A
N
 M
A
D
E 
SH
O
C
K
S LMKILL 
-0.008 
(0.071) - 
0.009 
(0.072) - 
LTOTKILL - 
-0.008 
(0.051) - 
-0.007 
(0.051) 
N
A
TU
R
A
L 
SH
O
C
K
 
DFLOOD - - 
0.084 
(0.117) 
0.084 
(0.117) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.064*** 
(0.012) 
-0.063*** 
(0.013) 
-0.064*** 
(0.012) 
-0.063*** 
(0.013) 
DHHAGE 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
DHHSEX 
0.152 
(0.132) 
0.150 
(0.132) 
0.149 
(0.132) 
0.148 
(0.132) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.401*** 
(0.057) 
0.406*** 
(0.058) 
0.420*** 
(0.066) 
0.424*** 
(0.068) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ219) 35.23*** 34.60** 38.68*** 38.18*** 
b Anderson LR-Stat.( χ212) 42.45*** 42.43*** 42.33*** 42.34*** 
c Hansen J-Stat.( χ211) 4.16 4.15 4.23 4.22 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat. (χ213) 25.07** 25.07** 24.05** 24.05** 
e χ2(k) [H0: ln AtC = 1 & k = 0, k ] 83.42*** 81.37*** 81.35*** 79.47*** 
Over-all R2 0.544 0.541 0.545 0.543 
No of Instruments 13 13 13 13 
No of Observations 922 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  Hansen test of 
relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all instruments are relevant/over 
ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of 
endogenous variables are jointly insignificant); e Joint hypothesis of full consumption 
insurance where k= 4 for first two models and k=5 for the last two models; Cluster-
robust standard errors are within parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by 
the theory. 
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Table 4.9: Continuously Updated GMM Ests. (Sub-set of Instruments, Dep. Var.: Food Exp.) 
 Ind. Var.↓ Model-F1 Model-F2 Model-F3 Model-F4 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.732*** 
(0.070) 
0.735*** 
(0.069) 
0.758*** 
(0.072) 
0.763*** 
(0.071) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHHINC 
0.173** 
(0.081) 
0.163** 
(0.077) 
0.167** 
(0.078) 
0.160** 
(0.077) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
M
A
N
 M
A
D
E 
SH
O
C
K
S LMKILL 
-0.127** 
(0.062) - 
-0.129** 
(0.061) - 
LTOTKILL - 
-0.083** 
(0.042) - 
-0.085** 
(0.042) 
N
A
TU
R
A
L 
SH
O
C
K
 
DFLOOD - - 
-0.047 
(0.048) 
-0.052 
(0.049) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.056*** 
(0.010) 
-0.057*** 
(0.010) 
-0.054*** 
(0.010) 
-0.055*** 
(0.010) 
DHHAGE 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
DHHSEX 
0.029 
(0.150) 
0.016 
(0.150) 
-0.257* 
(0.156) 
-0.257 
(0.157) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.061 
(0.053) 
0.071 
(0.053) 
0.174** 
(0.084) 
0.182** 
(0.085) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ219) 37.39*** 38.52*** 45.45*** 45.68*** 
b Anderson LR-Stat.   ( χ212) 42.45*** 42.43*** 59.95*** 58.79*** 
c Hansen J-Stat.  ( χ211) 15.79 16.54 15.84 16.85 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat.  (χ213) 35.06*** 35.06*** 31.26*** 31.26*** 
e χ2(k) [H0: ln AtC = 1 & k = 0, k ] 17.34*** 18.36*** 18.08*** 18.25*** 
Over-all R2 0.599 0.602 0.601 0.604 
No of Instruments 13 13 13 13 
No of Observations 922 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  Hansen test of 
relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all instruments are relevant/over 
ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of 
endogenous variables are jointly insignificant); e Joint hypothesis of full consumption 
insurance where k= 4 for first two models and k=5 for the last two models; Cluster-
robust standard errors are within parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by 
the theory.  
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 Table 4.10: Continuously Updated GMM Ests. (Sub-set of Instruments, Dep. Var.: Total Exp.)  
 Ind. Var.↓ Model-G1 Model-G2 Model-G3 Model-G4 
A
G
G
. 
SH
O
C
K
 
GRVPCCON 
0.753*** 
(0.043) 
0.749*** 
(0.043) 
0.774*** 
(0.042) 
0.770*** 
(0.042) 
IN
C
O
M
E 
SH
O
C
K
S 
GRPCHHINC 
0.144** 
(0.068) 
0.149** 
(0.066) 
0.137** 
(0.067) 
0.139** 
(0.065) 
DREMITTANCE 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
M
A
N
 M
A
D
E 
SH
O
C
K
S LMKILL 
-0.048 
(0.045) - 
-0.047 
(0.045) - 
LTOTKILL - 
-0.035 
(0.030) - 
-0.032 
(0.29) 
N
A
TU
R
A
L 
SH
O
C
K
 
DFLOOD - - 
-0.046 
(0.043) 
-0.046 
(0.044) 
PE
FE
R
EN
C
E 
SH
IF
TE
R
S DHHSIZE 
-0.052*** 
(0.009) 
-0.053*** 
(0.009) 
-0.053*** 
(0.009) 
-0.054*** 
(0.009) 
DHHAGE 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
DHHSEX 
0.092 
(0.122) 
0.074 
(0.123) 
0.089 
(0.121) 
0.074 
(0.122) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.062* 
(0.032) 
0.066** 
(0.033) 
0.055* 
(0.032) 
0.057* 
(0.033) 
a White-Koenker nR2-Stat.  (χ219) 53.89*** 53.76*** 55.29*** 55.27*** 
b Anderson LR-Stat.   ( χ212) 42.45*** 42.43*** 42.33*** 42.34*** 
c Hansen J-Stat.  ( χ211) 13.55 13.42 13.19 13.09 
d Anderson-Rubin Endo. Stat.  (χ213) 25.96** 25.96** 25.62** 25.62** 
e χ2(k) [H0: ln AtC = 1 & k = 0, k ] 37.61*** 38.62*** 35.97*** 36.99*** 
Over-all R2 0.670 0.669 0.672 0.672 
No of Instruments 13 13 13 13 
No of Observations 922 922 922 922 
Notes:  a White-Koenker test of the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (H0: 
disturbance is homoskedastic); b Anderson canonical correlation test of under 
identification /IV irrelevance (H0: instruments are irrelevant/under ID); c  
Hansen test of relevancy/ over-identification of all instruments (H0: all 
instruments are relevant/over ID); d Anderson-Rubin endogenity test of 
suspected regressors (H0: coefficient of endogenous variables are jointly 
insignificant); e Joint hypothesis of full consumption insurance where k= 4 for 
first two models and k=5 for the last two models; Cluster-robust standard errors 
are within parentheses; *, **, and ***  refer to significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. For all the shocks the test is one-tailed as predicted by the 
theory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
5.1. Summary 
This research revolves around the distributional issues such as inequality, 
polarization, and poverty, and their relationship with the violent conflict and its welfare 
consequences in Nepal’s households. During 1995/96 – 2003/04 Nepal experienced the 
worst form of violent conflict that claimed over 13,000 lives and over 200,000 people 
were displaced internally. Given the intensity and effect of the violent conflict, we 
construct the poverty, inequality and polarization indices across the villages of Nepal, and 
analyze if the violent conflict is related to those distributional issues. We also analyze the 
effect of decade-old violent conflict on the households’ welfare.  
The main research is presented in three chapters.  In chapter 2, we analyze the 
poverty and inequality situations among the villages of Nepal during 1995/96 and 
2003/04. This poverty / inequality mapping is first of its kind using Nepal data. For 
poverty and inequality mapping, we basically use Nepal Living Standard Surveys I & II 
along with the Nepal Population Census 2001. With the use of micro-level estimation 
technique, we combine nationally representative but relatively smaller surveys 
information with the national census that enables us to estimate village level 
distributional measures which would be not possible without the use of such statistical 
methods. 
 The main contribution regarding the poverty and inequality mapping is that to our 
knowledge this is the first attempt to estimate village level poverty and inequality across 
Nepal. So far, all sorts of development policies are made based on aggregate analysis of 
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distributional issues in the lack of micro-level information. In a heterogeneous country 
like Nepal, such aggregate distributional measures do not provide relevant and essential 
information that can be used for designing village level public policies.   
 In chapter 3, we present the public choice theory of conflict and derive testable 
hypotheses about the role of distributional measures in escalating the violent conflict. 
Using poverty and inequality indices derived in chapter 2 along with the polarization 
indices that we also estimate, we test several hypotheses related to the violent conflict 
and inequality, polarization, poverty, social capital and government welfare programs. 
We find that inequality and polarization have significant positive association with the 
violent conflict, where as social capital and government welfare programs have 
significant negative relationship with the violent conflict that is measured in terms of 
people killed by the Maoist during the 1996 – 2004 period.  
In chapter 4 we test the full consumption insurance hypothesis that is derived 
from the state dependent time separable household utility function in the presence of 
violent conflict. This hypothesis asserts that in a given community, households can 
maximize their welfare by pooling their resources and ensuring each other in the times of 
needs. For the analysis, we use the panel aspect of the household surveys from 1995/96 
and 2003/04.  We not only use traditional indirect measures of shocks, such as household 
non-transfer income, but also direct measures of shocks, such as the level of violence in 
the given village, remittances received by the households, and additional shocks due to 
natural disasters, such as flood. As the correlations between all these shocks are not high 
to raise concerns about multicollinearity, we use all shocks simultaneously.  Due to the 
presence of error heterogeneity and endogenity of some of the key right hand side 
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variables we use the continuously updated GMM method for estimation that is robust to 
the weak instruments.  
  
5.2. Conclusions 
 A recent household survey (NLSS-II) indicates that Nepal poverty has gone down 
(the aggregate head count index went down 0.42 to 0.32) but inequality went up (the Gini 
index increased from 0.34 to 0.42) significantly between 1995/96 and 2003/04 (CBS 
2005). Despite such indication that the aggregate level of poverty went down by 10 
percentage points during the past eight years (1995/96 – 2003/04), our findings indicate 
that the reduction is not uniform in the first place, and the level of poverty actually went 
up in the significant part of the country that comprises over 40% of the total population. 
Our findings suggest that the increased poverty among the significant portion of the 
population accompanied by the accelerating inequality and polarization throughout the 
country has compounded the divide between the haves and the have-nots and provided a 
suitable atmosphere for the conflict.  
Combining rational choice theory with micro-level sub-national data from Nepal 
that facilitates controls for heterogeneous cross-country and international factors,66 we 
                                                 
66 The heterogeneity in cross-cultural norms, institutions and unique historical settings 
can produce different reference points or anchors, and a lack of common anchor within 
the sample can bias the perception of the threat and hence the measurement of such 
variables. Cultural and historical differences may influence the perception of the 
acceptable levels of violence in cross-country settings. Our micro level sub-national data 
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analyze the association between inequality and violent conflict in chapter 3. Along with 
the traditional measures of inequality, the GINI index, we also construct and use the 
recently developed polarization indices advanced by Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) to 
explain the violent conflict. Using negative binomial count data models with test and 
correction for endogenity, results from multi-level analysis are robust and highly 
significant irrespective of the measure of inequality (GINI or POLARIZATION) used for 
the analysis, indicating that distributional outcomes do matter significantly when it comes 
to the violent conflict.  
However, inequality or polarization is not the only source of the violent conflict. 
As indicated by the theory, weak rule of law, weak enforcement of property rights, and 
dearth of social capital can help to propagate the conflict. Our empirical results find 
support to the hypothesis that social capital generates valuable spillover effects in the 
form of shared value, norms, self-governance and understandings among the villagers 
that encourages the community members to cooperate among themselves that helps 
deterring the violent conflict.    
Another important finding of our research is that transfer of resources from the 
central to the local governments can play vital role in lowering the violence as it may 
provide the sense of hope, connectedness and opportunity to the local people. In the 
backdrop of widespread poverty in the villages of Nepal, we also find a significant 
positive association between level of poverty and the intensity of the violence. The policy 
implications of these findings are that government policies towards balancing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
avoids such cross-cultural heterogeneity and differential perceptions (Bohara, Mitchell 
and Nepal 2006).     
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unintended inequality combined with grants and targeted transfers for reducing poverty 
can potentially solve much of the problems for which the Maoists are blamed.  Such 
policies can deliver expected outcomes provided that the transferred funds find their way 
to the intended beneficiaries. International agencies, local institutions, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and civil society can play meaningful roles by 
developing a productive partnership to achieve such objectives in the light of widespread 
perceptions that corruption is rampant in the government offices and such corruption also 
engenders poverty.67 Motivating such partnership towards promoting social networks in 
the local communities would provide an added bonus for creating lasting peace as we 
find that social capital helps to inhibit the violence by promoting understandings among 
the community members.  
Additional way of looking at the solution is that what factors are contributing to 
the increased inequality. As this research shows, the foremost contributors of rising 
inequality are enterprise income and remittances. On the other hand, agriculture income, 
high school and college level education help to reduce the inequality. Then the policy 
implication of these findings is that focusing on agricultural sector, high school and 
college education along with fiscal policy-mix (tax-transfer) could address the rising 
inequality and poverty.        
 
                                                 
67 The Transparency International corruption perception index (CPI) for Nepal is 2.5 in 
2006. The index value below 3 is considered as an indication of rampant corruption (TI 
2006).  
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The results from Chapter 4 show that households are insured for the violence 
related shocks in the case of non-food expenditures, but those households are highly 
vulnerable in the case of food consumption. In our sample, food consumption absorbs 
majority of the household total expenditure (65% of the total household expenditure in an 
average), and it is not insured against the violence related shocks implying that the 
household are suffering from food insecurity due to the decade-old violent conflict. When 
analyzed the effect of household income growth on the food consumption growth, all 
types of households are vulnerable, but we find that households with low education and 
with low income are more vulnerable than the households with higher education level 
and with higher income level.  
When we divide the households based on the caste/ethnicity, a variable that is 
considered as the root cause of several ills in the society, the socially disadvantaged low 
caste/ethnicity does not appeared to be more vulnerable than the reference caste/ethnicity. 
We further investigate if the low caste/ethnic households have separate kind of social 
networks that provide insurance during the difficult times. In the sub-sample of low 
caste/ethnic households, the full consumption insurance hypothesis is not rejected 
providing some support to the basic conjecture. In our sample, the households are using 
share-cropping, self-employment and borrowing for consumption as coping strategies of 
food consumption vulnerability. These coping strategies, however, are highly dependent 
on the types of shocks the household experience and the characteristics of household.  
Our finding that low caste/ethnic households are not relatively more vulnerable 
than other households is a good news in the sense that public policies can always be 
devised to influence the variables like income and education, but the perception of 
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caste/ethnicity is hard to change in the short period of time. The policy implication is that 
public policies targeting the education and employment help to protect the households 
from being vulnerable towards food security. 
 
5.3. Future Directions 
Estimating poverty, inequality, and polarization across the villages of Nepal is 
one of the main contributions of this research. Still, Nepal population census data prior to 
2001 has not been considered for this research due to its unavailability in a usable format.  
The village level poverty and inequality mapping aspect of this research could be 
improved if we could make use of the population census of 1991 along with Nepal 
population census of 2001. The use of this additional data will bring new dimensions to 
the poverty and inequality mapping across the villages of Nepal and the comparison of 
poverty and inequality between the 1990s and 2000s would be more natural.   
 A natural extension of this research is to analyze the effect of various 
macroeconomic policies to the village level poverty and inequality using computable 
general equilibrium modeling frameworks. Given the current states of affairs in Nepal 
where caste/ethnicity has been in the forefront of the public policy debate, impact of 
various policies on the poverty level of ethnic groups and resulting intra-ethnic income 
distribution would be another way of extending this research.  
A question that this research brings up is why other countries with similar or even 
more unequal distribution of income and wealth have not witnessed the widespread 
violence seen in Nepal.  A case in point is India, where violent conflict between the 
government and Maoist organizations has occurred, but only locally and sporadically.  
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There may be some bearing to the fact that India has a long history of democracy and 
stable institutions.  A hypothesis is that effective redistribution by the central government 
from wealthier states to poorer ones has prevented inequality from growing worse and 
avoided conflict.  Further research into this issue should be rewarding for a number of 
reasons.  If this hypothesis is valid, it is not only consistent with our findings but would 
exemplify the kind of center-state institutions Nepal needs in its transition to democracy 
in order to solve this thorny problem.  It would also indicate to emerging countries which 
have not seen this scale of violence that they should pay greater attention to widening 
inequality and deepening polarization in their societies that might threaten their growing 
prosperity.  
 Contrary to the general belief that low caste/ethnic households are socially and 
economically disadvantaged and may be more vulnerable to shocks that impacts their 
consumption. Our findings suggests that low caste/ethnic households are not relatively 
vulnerable than other households and sub-sample of low caste/ethnic households exhibit 
full consumption insurance. We suspect that these low caste/ethnic households may have 
stronger social networks among themselves that provide better insurance in times of 
needs. Our survey data lacks information regarding intra-caste/ethnic social networks. 
While conducting socio-economic surveys, such as NLSS, addition of few more survey 
components that helps to collect information regarding caste/ethnic-specific social 
networks. This additional information would be helpful to better understand why low 
caste/ethnic households are not more vulnerable than the other households given their 
low socio-social status.     
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Finally, the widespread poverty and growing inequality may have far- reaching 
environmental impacts in the face of a decade long violent conflict. Analyzing the 
environmental impacts of the conflict, inequality and poverty would be a logical 
extension of this research.      
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APPENDIX A: SOFTWARE AND CODES 
1. Example of SAS Codes for Data Preparation for Poverty Mapping Using SAS68 
*============= Specify the Survey information ==================; 
**** dir of survey data **;   %let sdir=; 
**** input dataset name **;   %let srvdata=NLSSI;        
**** clustering variable *;   %let Cluster=CLUSTER; 
**** survey weight *******;   %let sWeight=FACTORES; 
**** LHS variable ********;   %let lhs= LRPCEXP; 
**** Beta RHS variables **;   %let rhs= 
EDUCHD HEADAGE NOWIFE EDUCWF WIFEAGE PPD YGIENE1 
TOPER2 TOPER3 PPD2 PPD3 CMEAN2 CMEAN3 CMEAN25 CMEAN40 SCMN22; 
**** Alpha RHS vars ******;   %let arhs=VAR4 VAR11 XBETA4 S12 S112 S23 
S45 S46; 
**** Locational effect? **;   %let LOCERR=YES; 
 
*================ Specify the census information ===============; 
**** dir of Census data***;   %let cdir=; 
**** input dataset name **;   %let cendata=smallcengabe; 
**** census weight  ******;   %let cWeight=OPERSON;      
**** ID Vars in census ***;   %let cKeyVar=Cluster; 
**** Cluster only vars ***;   %let cOnlyVar=CMEAN2 CMEAN3 CMEAN25 
CMEAN40 SCMN22; 
**** Cluster only file ***;   *%let cOnlyDat=cclusterOnly; 
 
*================= Output Directory ============================; 
**** output directory ***;    %let outdir=; 
%let LOCERR=Yes; 
%let dataout=small; 
%dataprep; 
                                                 
68 The above program is written in SAS macro language, and adopted from Zhao (2004). 
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2. Example of Multilevel Estimation Using MLwiN 
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3. Example of STATA Codes for GMM Estimates 
ivreg2 grpchfcon grvpcon dremit lowcast dHHsize dHHage dHHmale 
(grpchinc ltotkill lowcastinc = electricity HHEDU foodinsuff sharecrop 
selfemp HHMONTHWORK HHFARMER PerCapILLdays dfarm dwater dforest dwomen 
vdcpop houseowned popdensity_2001 NLSTOCK PublicIndex ), cluster(WWW) 
cue orthog(vdcpop houseowned popdensity_2001 NLSTOCK 
PublicIndex)redundant (vdcpop houseowned popdensity_2001 NLSTOCK 
PublicIndex) ffirst 
ivhettest, nr2 
test grvpcon=1 
test lMtotkill=0, accumulate 
test grpchinc=0, accumulate 
test dremit=0, accumulate 
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APPENDIX B: FIRST AND SECOND STAGES REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table B1 : First-Stage (Beta Regression1) GLS Estimates for Log Per-Capita Expenditure 
 1995/96 2003/04 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
INTERCEPT 8.20*** 0.096 8.68*** 0.081 
HINDU -0.04 0.028 0.02 0.023 
NEWARI 0.01 0.068 0.09** 0.042 
BAHUNCHHETRI 0.07** 0.027 0.07*** 0.023 
TAMAGURALI 0.01 0.031 -0.06** 0.027 
DAKASA -0.08** 0.036 -0.10*** 0.031 
TERAICASTE 0.08** 0.033 0.01 0.030 
MALE -0.01 0.025 -0.06*** 0.020 
MARRIED -0.03 0.025 0.02 0.022 
AGEHEAD 0.00* 0.001 0.00*** 0.001 
FARMERH 0.00 0.019 -0.04 0.033 
PERMANENTHOUSE 0.34*** 0.040 0.15*** 0.030 
SEMIPERMANENT 0.15*** 0.030 -0.05** 0.024 
OWNHOUSE -0.02 0.036 0.21*** 0.031 
WATERPIPED 0.05** 0.025 0.10*** 0.023 
WATERWELL 0.05 0.033 0.03 0.030 
TOILETFLUSH 0.22*** 0.044 0.22*** 0.025 
LIGHTELECTY 0.24*** 0.034 0.17*** 0.021 
TV 0.19*** 0.040 0.57*** 0.032 
FULEWOOD -0.03 0.027 -0.07*** 0.021 
CANWRITE -0.02 0.022 -0.05** 0.022 
EDUCATION 0.02** 0.009 0.01** 0.003 
OWNLAND 0.13*** 0.026 0.10*** 0.022 
HHAGE 0.01*** 0.001 0.01*** 0.001 
HHFARMER -0.14*** 0.047 -0.28*** 0.065 
HHNOTWORK -0.21*** 0.057 -0.95*** 0.134 
HHMONTHWORK 0.02*** 0.003 0.03*** 0.004 
HHWRITE 0.43*** 0.043 0.43*** 0.033 
HHEDU -0.01 0.009 0.01*** 0.003 
EASTERN 0.35*** 0.053 -0.03 0.043 
CENTRAL 0.30*** 0.052 0.02 0.041 
WESTERN 0.19*** 0.055 0.06 0.044 
FWESTERN -0.04 0.065 0.01 0.057 
MOUNTAIN 0.01 0.048 0.12*** 0.042 
TERAI -0.09** 0.045 -0.02 0.033 
RURAL -0.10* 0.060 -0.14*** 0.034 
HHSIZE -0.05*** 0.004 -0.03*** 0.003 
2Adjusted R2 0.502 0.642 
N 3373 3909 
Sample Clusters 274 326 
1Estimates for equation [2.1] 
2The adjusted R2 is reported from the OLS regression as GLS does not have such 
measure. 
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Table B2: Heteroscedastic Model (Alpha Regression1) Estimates in 2ˆˆ( )ch cu   
Variable 1995/96 2003/04 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Intercept -4.59*** 0.110 -5.16*** 0.093 
HHSIZE*EDUCATION 0.01** 0.003 0.00 0.003 
OWNLAND*OWNHOUSE -0.27*** 0.096 -0.41*** 0.077 
AGEHEAD*AGEHEAD 0.00*** 0.000 0.00 0.000 
EDUCATION*AGEHEAD 0.00* 0.000 0.00 0.000 
RURAL*LIGHTELECTRICITY -0.10 0.162 0.00 0.091 
PERMANENTHOUSE 0.32** 0.158 0.09 0.133 
TV*RURAL -0.14 0.329 -0.66** 0.345 
RURAL*TOILETFLUSH 0.15 0.256 0.06 0.133 
FULEWOOD*TV -0.21 0.377 1.05*** 0.366 
TERAI*RURAL -0.19** 0.081 -0.08 0.072 
N 3373 3909 
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.142 
1 Estimates for equation [2.2]. 
